013-SLLR-SLLR-1986-V-1-MUSTHAPA-TAMBY-LEBBE-v.-RUWANPATHIRANE.pdf
Wickremaratne v. Alpenis Perera (G. P. S. De Silva, J.)
201
CA
MUSTHAPA THAMBY LEBBE
v.• RUWANPATHIRANE
court of Appeal.
H. A. G. DE SILVA, J. AND DHEERARATNE, J.
A. 95/81 (F).
C. GAMPOLA 709/L.
OCTOBER 18,1985.
Landlord and tenant-Rent Act s. 22 (1) (d)-Nuisance-Deterioration.
Replacing a bucket latrine with a water-sealed latrine and soakage pit does not fallwithin the meaning of the expression 'deterioration* as used in s. 22 (1) (d) of the RentAct.
P. A. D. Samarasekera. P.C. with G. L. Geethanandafor plaintiff-appellant.
Ikram Mohamed with Wijedasa Rajapaksa and Miss Janakie De Silva fordefendant-respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
202
Sri Lanka Law Reports
[1986) 1 Sri { R.
December 20. 1985.
DHEERARATNE, J.
This appeal relates to certain grounds for ejectment of a tenant by alandlord, specified in section 22 (1) (d) of the Rent Act No. 7 of1972, which section as truncated by me for the purpose of thisjudgment, will read as follows
"22 (1) notwithstanding anything in any other law, no action or
proceedings for the ejectment of the tenant of any premises
shall be instituted in or entertained by any court, unless where-
{d) the tenanthas in the opinion of court, been guilty of
conduct which is a nuisance to adjoining occupiersor
the condition of the premises has, in the opinion of courtdeteriorated owing to acts committed by. or to the neglector default of the tenant'
In this case the tenant, without the permission of the landlord,demolished a bucket latrine which was a part of the rented premises,and built in its place a new water sealed latrine. The soakage pit of thenew latrine was constructed in such a manner, as to take in a few feetfrom the adjoining land owned by its occupier. The landlord thereuponterminated the tenancy and sued the tenant in ejectment on twocauses of action, both based on section 22 (1) (d). The learned trialjudge held against the landlord on both the causes of action and thelandlord has now appealed from that judgment.
•
The 1 st cause of action related to the tenant's building thfc soakagepit of the new latrine on a portion of the adjoining land owned by itsoccupier, and thereby causing a nuisance to the latter. At the trial, theadjoining occupier was called as a witness for the tenant, who, forreasons best known to him. categorically stated, that the tenant didnot cause any nuisance to him by the construction of the soakage pitpartly on his land. On this evidence the learned trial judge correctlyheld that the first cause of action of the landlord should fail. However,
I may add in passing, that, even if this adjoining occupier were to saythat such an act of the tenant did cause him a nuisance, whether bysuch evidence, the words of section 22 (1) (d) "guilty of conductwhich is a nuisance to adjoining occupiers" could have been satisfied,is a moot point which does not require our opinion here.
CAtMustapha v. Ruwanpathirane (Dheeraratne, J.)203
The second cause of action relied upon by the landlord, is that thecondition of the premises has deteriorated owing to an act committedby the tenant; the act being that the tenant had, demolished a part ofthe premises, namely the bucket latrine. The learned trial judge heldagainst the landlord on this matter too, and. it is this finding which isstrenuously canvassed before us.
It is contended by the learned counsel for the landlord, that section22 (1) (d) should be interpreted by-us against the backdrop of thecommon law rights of landlord and tenant. He contends that a tenanthas neither a.right to demolish a part of the premises let, nor a right toconstruct a new structure in its place. Therefore, contends learnedcounsel, both these acts of the tenant being unlawful, we should lookonly at the act of demolition of the bucket latrine in this case in order tocome to a finding whether the condition of the premises hasdeteriorated. However attractive this argument may seem to appear, Ido not think that the dictates of commonsense would permit us to turna blind eye to the act of building a new water-sealed latrine.
The learned counsel for the landlord further contends that if we donot view the act of demolition of the bucket latrine in isolation in ourattempt to interpret the provisions of the'Rent Act, we would in effectopen the door for any tenant of a premises, without the permission ofa landlord, to break a cement floor and replace it with a teak floor, todemolish a brick wall and rebuild it with marble; and for that matter,demolish the premises, part by part and rebuild it with the mostexpensive material. Perhaps, learned counsel is correct in hissubmission that such would be the result.
Unfortunately, our duty is not to read into section 21 (1) (d) whatwe expect to find there from the point of view of the common law, butto find out what the legislature intended to mean by that section.Under the common law, there may be many a transgression by atenant of his landlord's rights. A landlord may in terms of the contract,terminate the tenancy by giving notice to the tenant. If the tenant doesnot quit, he will be liable to be ejected by due process of law. That isthe position under the common law; but now the statute hasintervened. A landlord may terminate a tenancy by giving notice, but,he is entitled to sue a tenant in ejectment only on the groundsspecified in the statute.
204
Sri Lanka Law Reports
[1986] i Sri L*R.
The quintessence of the ground for ejectment specified in the lastpart of section 22 (1) (d) appears to me to be "deterioration" of thecondition of the premises. "Deterioration" according to the Chambers20th Century Dictionary means "the act of making worse or theprocess of growing worse". This "deterioration" should be attributableto acts committed by of to the neglect or default of the tenant or ofthe classes of persons mentioned. To my mind, the tenant in this caseby his act has certainly not caused deterioration of the condition of thepremises, I think, I would be straining the language of the section 22(1) (d) far beyond its natural meaning, if I were to include within itsambit the acts committed by the tenant in this case. On the otherhand, if it was intended to include causing of any structural alterationsto a premises by a tenant as a ground for ejectment, I would expectthe legislature to have plainly said so. For these reasons it appears tome that the learned trial judge was correct in holding against thelandlord on the 2nd cause of action too.
However, there is one matter which I think should require ourintervention. The tenant in his answer claimed from the landlord a sumof Rs. 2,300 as compensation for the improvement he has caused byconstructing the water-sealed latrine and this claim the learned trialjudge allowed. I cannot find any principle of law upon which, a tenant,who makes such an improvement without thefjonsent of a landlord,and who continues to enjoy that improvement, can successfullyground a claim for compensation. I would disallow this claim andsubject to this variation, affirm the judgment of the learned trial judgedismissing the landlord's action.
This appeal is dismissed without costs.
A. G. DE SILVA, J.-l agree.Appeal dismissed subject to variation.