T. S. FERUANTDO, J.—Saranelie v. Wijesuriya
1957Present: T. S. Fernando, J.
A. SARANELIS, Appellant, and D. WIJESURIYA, Respondent
S. C. 86—C. R. Hambantota, 6715
Appeal—Court of Requests—Action for debt, damage or demand-—Right of appeal—Civil Procedure Code, s. 833a..
In an appeal, without leave of Court, from a judgment of a Court of Requestsin a case which reduced itself to one of debt, damage or demand at the timethe issues were framed, it is not competent for the appellant to argue amatter of law not specifically stated in the petition of appeal.
J^^-PPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Requests, Hambantota.
B. SaUruTcidasinghe, with E. B. Vannitamby, for the defendantappellant.
S. W. Walpita, with R. L. N. de Zoysa, for the plaintiff-respondent.
Gut. adv. wit.
November 27, 1957. T. S. Fernando, J.—
The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant to recover a sum of Rs. 290being the value of 4 amunams of paddy which the plaintiff alleged thedefendant had to give him as his paraveni share of the 1955 Yala crop of afield called Hataliyakelle. The plaint contained a prayer for continuingdamages and for ejectment of the defendant, but these reliefs were notpressed, and were abandoned at the stage of the framing of issues. . In theresult the action reduced itself to an action for a debt, damage or demandwithin the meaning of section 333A of the Civil Procedure Code.
No leave to appeal has been granted to the defendant, and he cantherefore advance in this Court only a ground of law stated in the petitionof appeal. I may. however, state that I have perused the evidence ledin the case and find that the learned Commissioner has addressed hismind to all the disputed facts before reaching the conclusion he did.
The first of the two points urged on behalf of the appellant in this Courtwas that the agreement relied on by the plaintiff was not enforceable as ithad not formed the subject of a notarial instrument and was by reasonof section 2 of the Prevention of Frauds Ordinance of no force at law.Section 3 of the same Ordinance makes the provisions of section 2 inappli-cable in the case of agreements for the cultivation of paddy lands forany period not exceeding twelve months. Counsel for the defendant,in an attempt to get over the exemption in regard to notarial attestationcreated in favour of agreements for the cultivation of paddy lands fora period not exceeding twelve months sought to raise in this Courtthe question that the land to which the agreement sued upon relatedwas a controlled paddy land within the meaning of the Paddy Lands Act,No. 1 of 1953. This question assumes importance for the reason thatsection 4 (1) of the Act renders invalid the letting or a tenancy of acontrolled paddy land for a period less than five years. Counsel for the
Asiya ZJmma v. Kochi Jktohideen '
pln.int.TflF objected to argument being bad on any question of law not raisedin tbe petition of appeal. It should be noted that when issues werebeing framed, the Court below ruled out an issue as to “ whether-the Courthad jurisdiction under section 10 (1J of the Paddy JLands Act”. Hoexception has been taken in the petition of appeal to the rejection of thisissue. Many cases were cited at the argument before me relating to theraising of new grounds- of appeal at the hearing, but it is sufficient if Irefer to only one of them as being particularly applicable to the presentmatter. In the case of Gordon Brooke v. Peera Veda1, . Layard, C.J.held that in a case from a Court of Requests where an appeal lies only ona matter of law, the matter of law must he stated in the petition of appeal,and that no matter of law, not so stated can he argued at the hearing ofthe appeal. I would respectfully follow this decision and hold that it isnot competent for the appellant to argue a matter of law not specificallystated in his petition of appeal. I might add that as the case reduceditself .to one of debt, damage or demand at the time issues were framed,the case of Ranasinghe v. Silva 2 to which defendant’s counsel referredme is distinguishable. In this state of affairs it does not become necessaryfor me to consider whether I should look into certain Gazettes which havebeen referred to by appellant’s counsel to enable me to be satisfied thatthe field Hataliyakelle is a controlled paddy land.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
A. SARANELIS , Appellant, and D. WIJESURIYA, Respondent