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Present: Wood Renton J,ANDRIS v. NICHOLAS.
P. C. Tangalla, 28,763.
Trial by Police Magistrate as District Judge of an offence triable sum-marily—Irregularity cured by s. 425 of the Criminal ProcedureCode—Causing hurt by blunt side of cutting instrument—Offencefalls under s. 315 of the Penal Code—Criminal Procedure Code.152 (3).
Whore a Police Magistrate, who vvus also a District Judge, triedas District Judge, under section 152 (3) of the Criminal ProcedureCode, an offence which was triable summarily, and convicted theaccused and imposed a sentence which a Police Magistrate hadjurisdiction to impose (six months)—
Held, on objection taken t.o the jurisdiction, t hat scct ion 425 curedthe irregularity.
The use of a blunt- side of a sharp cutting instrument to cause,hurt falls under section 315 of the Penal Code.
N this case the accused was charged in the Police Court ofTangalla with having caused grievous hurt to one Carolis by
means of a kateriya, and also with having caused hurt by the sameweapon to one Andris. The Police Magistrate tried the casesummarily as District Judge under section 152(3) of the CriminalProcedure Code, and sentenced the accused to undergo six months’rigorous imprisonment on each count—the sentences to runconcurrently.
The accused appealed.
A. St. V. Jayewardene, for the appellant.—The learned PoliceMagistrate had no jurisdiction to try this offence under section 152
of the Criminal Procedure Code ; section 152 (3) applies only tocases which are not triable summarily by the Police Court. Thesentence imposed is a heavy one ; the Magistrate would not haveimposed this sentence if he knew that the maximum sentence hecould impose was only a sentence of six months’ imprisonment.
The hurt caused to Andris falls under section 314, and not undersection 315 of the Penal Code, as the hurt was caused by the bluntside of the weapon.
Cur. aclv. vult.
May 17, 1911. Wood Renton J.—
The accused-appellant was charged in the Police Court of Tangallawith having caused grievous hurt to one Don Carolis by means of akateriya, and alsp with having caused hurt by the same weapon to
May 17, W11
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one Don Andris. The former of these charges falls under section 316and the latter under section 315 of the Penal Code. The learnedPolice Magistrate has convicted him on both, and has sentencedhim *o undergo six months’ rigorous imprisonment on each count,the sentences to run concurrently. I find on the record the followingentry by the Police Magistrate : “ 1 consider that this is a casewhich may conveniently be tried summarily under the provisionsof section 152, sub-section (3), of the Penal Code.” That section, aswe all know, provides that where an offence charged appears to beone triable by a District Court, and not summarily by a PoliceMagistrate, and the Police Magistrate, being also a District Judgehaving jurisdiction to try the offence, is of opinion that such offencemay properly be tried summarily, he may proceed to try it sum-marily, and in that case shall have jurisdiction to impose anysentence which a District Court might lawfully impose. The PoliceMagistrate appears to have thought that he had no jurisdiction totry these charges summarily himself as Police Magistrate. In that,however, he was under a misapprehension ; for under the secondschedule to Ordinance No. 1 of 1910 charges under both sections315 and 316 of the Penal Code are now made triable in the PoliceCourt. Mr. A. St. V. Jayewardene said in the course of his argumentthat there appeared to be considerable ignorance among the’Judgesof the courts of first instance of the existence of Ordinance No. Iof 1910. 1 quite agree, but that ignorance is not confined to thecourts of first instance. It is shared to a considerable extent bythe Bar. During the past week, in which I have been sitting inthis Court for the purpose of hearing criminal appeals, I have againand again had objections to the jurisdiction of Police Courts taken,not always by junior members of the Bar, which, on reference to theprovisions of Ordinance No. 1 of 1910, were seen to be unfounded,and were immediately abandoned. But that by the way. It appearsto me that this is pre-eminently a case in which the provisions ofsection 425 of the.Criminal Procedure Code should be applied. ThePolice Magistrate possessed jurisdiction to deal with both charges.He lias not exceeded, in the sentences, the limits of his jurisdictionas Police Magistrate, and the facts of the case, as they appear onthe record, by no means entitle the appellant to more indulgenttreatment than he,has received. There is one point as to which Iwish to say a word. At the close of his argument Mr. A. St. V.Jayewardene contended that, as regards the charge under section315, the evidence established the fact that the injury or injuriescomplained of were given by a blunt instrument, and that, therefore,the case ought really to have been tried as one of simple hurt undersection 314. There are two cases bearing on that point whichappear at first sight to be in conflict with each other. I refer tothe decisions of Mr. Justice Clarence in Marikamy v, Robertu,1 and1 (1890) 9 S. C, C, 68,
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Mr. Justice Moncreiff in the case of Police Court, Kayts, No. 6.526.1.1 am not sure that the apparent contradiction between these twocases could not be satisfactorily explained. But, if there is any realconflict between them, 1 prefer to follow the judgment of Mr. JusticeMoncreiff in Police Court, Kayts, No. 6,526, to the effect that theuse of the blunt side of a sharp cutting instrument to cause hurtfalls under section 315 of the Penal Code. It will be observed thatthat section does not say that the injury caused by the sharp cuttinginstrument must be injury in the nature of an incised wound, and iam not prepared to read any such limitation of the scope of thesection into its provisions. The appeal is dismissed.
Renton J. •
ANDRIS v. NICHOLAS