Attorney-General v. Ariyaratne.
1932 Present : Macdonell C.J., Garvin S.P.J., and Dalton J.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. ARIYARATNE.
In the Matter of an Application under Section 19 of the
Proctor—Conviction of culpable, homicide—Moral turpitude—Ordinance No. Iof 1889, s. 19.
A proctor, who is convicted of the culpable homicide of his wife andchild, should be removed from office.
HIS was an application for the removal from practice of therespondent, a proctor, who was convicted of culpable homicideof his wife and child.
lllangakoon, Acting Solicitor-General (with him Basnayake, C.C.), insupport.
G. P. J. Kurukulasooriya (with him T. S. Fernando), for respondent.
' [1928) 24 .V. L. It. m.2 1 N. L. It. WO.
;i I (V. /,. It. 240.
MACDONELL C.J.—Attorney-General v. Ariyaratne.
September 5, 1932. Macdonell C.J.—
This is an application to remove a proctor from the roll ofthis Court.
The proctor in question was convicted by a jury of culpable homicideof his wife, and also of his infant child, by shooting them, for each ofwhich crimes he was sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonmentthe two sentences to run concurrently. He alleged in the statutorystatement which he made before the Magistrate, that that night he hadseen his wife kissing and talking to a man. He admitted that he waiteduntil his wife got back to the bedroom and lay down, and that he thengot a shot-gun and shot her from above as she was lying down, usingcertainly two cartridges for the purpose. The jury found him guilty ofculpable homicide and could on the evidence undoubtedly have foundhim guilty of murder. There is now this application to remove him fromthe roll by reason of these crimes of which he has been convicted. Itis argued before us, as a reason why we should not remove the respond-ent from the roll, that his crimes involved no moral turpitude but; thefacts, which I think I have given correctly, need only be stated to showthat there was, whatever may have been the provocation. It would bea very startling proposition to say that the culpable homicide, under suchcircumstances, of a man’s wife and child does not show moral turpitude.This is not a question of again punishing a man who has been punishedalready but quite a different one, viz. : ought a person against whom suchoffences are proved to remain on the roll of an honourable profession, andreally the question answers itself. His crimes at the very least were, asMr. Ilangakoon put it, an outrageous violation of the law which it washis duty as a proctor to uphold. One of the cases cited to us in argumentis absolutely in point, that of In re Cooper,1 where a solicitor had-been convicted and sentenced to penal servitude for the attemptedmurder of his wife, a crime committed while he was in a state of mentaldepression consequent on money losses. In that case Wright J. said,“ I am of opinion that having regard to the facts of conviction for afelony so grave as to involve a sentence of penal servitude, the re-spondent’s name ought to be struck off the roll Substituting our ownterminology, that dictum seems absolutely in point. The acts provedagainst the respondent and the crimes of which he has been convictedsurely make him unfit to practise as a proctor. In the Indian casecited to us, Emperor v. Rajani Kanta Bose and others* Mookerjee J,stated that licence to practice as a proctor or solicitor is somethingin the nature of a franchise, revocable whenever misconduct rendersthe holder unfit for such office. The misconduct is certainly here.In my opinion, the respondent’s name should be struck off the roll ofproctors of this Court.
Garvin S.P.J.—I agree.
Dalton J.-—I agree.
' 67 L. J. Q. B. 276.
= 49 I. L. H. Cal. 804.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. ARIYARATNE