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AUSADAHAMI v. TIKIRI ETANA.1901.
June 4 and 10.
C. B., Kurunegala, 7,210.
Kandyan Law—Acquired property of husband—Right of widow in possession—
Action against heirs during lifetime of widow.
Lands acquired during wedded life belong exclusively to the husband,and after bis death the widow has a life interest in them.
It is premature oh the part of the children of the first bed to bring anaction in ejectment against the children of the second bed for anundivided half of the lands acquired by their deceased father, so long ashis widow is alive.
LAINTIFF, alleging himself to be the only surviving child ofthe first marriage of Punchirala, sued the defendants, who
were said to be the second wife of Punchirala and her children,for a declaration of title to a half share of Punchirala’s lands.
It was contended for the defence that the plaintiff was not alegitimate child of Punchirala, and that the lands were acquiredafter he had married the first defendant. The Commissionerdismissed plaintiff’s action on the ground that the children ofthe second bed were entitled to the whole of the propertyacquired during the time of the said marriage.
Allan Urivberg, for appellant, cited D. C., Kandy, 28,756,Rdmanathan, 1877, p. 54, and argued that the first wife was notentitled to more than half the estate.
Bawa for respondent.—According to Kandyan Law thechildren can only share after the death of the widow in the caseof acquired property as distinct from paraveni lands. The casequoted from Rdmanathan deals with paraveni lands, as isshown in page 55. In the case of such lands, they must be
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1901. distributed after the father’s death. Questions as to paternityJune 4 and 10 are prematurelifetime of the widow. They should be
raised afterwards. These lands were acquired after the firstmarriage, by laying out on them the second wife’s dowry. Thewidow cannot be dispossessed of any portion.
10th June, 1901. Lawrie, A.C.J.—
The Commissioner has not expressly found that the plaintiffis a son of Punchirala; he assumes that he is. The question is,however, still an open one. Assuming that he is, this action ispremature, because the first defendant, if she be the plaintiff’sstepmother, is entitled to a life rent of the property acquired byher husband during their marriage. The plaintiff cannot suethe widow in ejectment (4 S. G. C. 37).
I do not agree with the Commissioner that the children of thesecond bed are entitled to the whole of the acquired property.I am aware that that opinion is supported by Sawer, p. 6, butthat is inconsistent with the settled law that acquired landedproperty belongs exclusively to the. husband (subject to thewidow’s life rent), and on her death I think it must be dividedamong her children per stirpes. All that can be decided here isthat the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree in ejectment for halfthe lands.
The dismissal of the action is affirmed.
AUSADAHAMI v. TIKIRI ETANA