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GOPAL IYER v. SINGER SEWING MACHINE COMPANY195—D. C. Colombo, 47,267.
F. AT. de Saram, for the appellant.
Arulanandan, for the respondent.
July 31, 1918. Bertram C.J.—
This is a question as to the merits of which different views may be taken.One may or may not sympathize with a litigant in the position of Mr. deSaram?s client. But what this Court has to do is to construe the terms ofthe Civil Procedure Code, and construe them on a matter in which it is necessaryto interpret the Code with strictness and exactitude. All limitations of rightsof suit must be so construed. It would be impossible to apply what are calledbroad canons of interpretations to provisions of the law, the object of which isto draw a definite line.
Mr. de Saram has asked us to re-consider this matter, and has put forwardtwo points. The first ‘point is, that the words 44 tender security'1 in section756 of the Code merely mean 41 propose " or 41 proffer security," and that thephrase 44 security being accepted " merely means 44 security being approved."On his view of the case it would be the duty of the Court, immediately securitywas approved, to issue notice of appeal, and ultimately to forward the petitionof appeal to the Supreme Court, but not so to forward it, unless the securitywhich had been approved had by that time been actually perfected. I thinkit is quite impossible to suppose that the framers of the Code intended such acourse of events. I do not think they intended the District Court should setin motion the preliminaries to an appeal until the security for the appeal hadbeen actually perfected. The Code does not say that 44 in the event of ^suchtender being accepted," but 44 in the event of such security being accepted,"and I think that the words 44 accepted " and 44 given " must be construed ashaving reference to the same event; must point to something contemporaneous.
1 2 C. L. R. 17.
8 (1912) 16 N. L. R. 159.
9 2 Leader L. R. 100.
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II Mr. de Seram's view of the case is right, it would be possible for a noticeof appeal to be issued, and for the case not to be forwarded to the 8npremeCourt for an indefinite period. Such a position shows that the contentionwould lead to an unworkable result. This is the first point.
With regard to the second point, he argues that his client has compliedwith the words of section 767 of the Code, because by the deposit of the moneyin the kachcheri, in pursuance of an arrangement between the parties, therewas, in fact, a consensual hypothecation of the money. But that is notsufficient. Section 767 requires that there should be a hypothecation by bond.It is perfectly true that them is a bond collateral to the deposit. But thatbond does not hypothecate anything. Mr. de Saram suggested that this caseshould be referred to the Bull Court. But the whole .question has beenreviewed in a recent case, which was considered by two Judges, and which,I believe, has been followed by all the JudgeB of this Court, and which is inaccordance with the previous decisions of this Court. In the circumstances,I do not see that any good end would be served by acceding to the application.I am, therefore, of opinion that, in this case, the security for appeal has notbeen perfected, and that the appeal muBt be dismissed, with coats.
Ennis J.—I agree.
GOPAL IYER v. SINGER SEWING MACHINE CPMPANY