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Present: Do Sampayo J.
QDNAEI8 HAMY v. NONABABA.
316—C. R. Matara, 11,817.
Married woman—Debts incurred without the consent of husband for odsoil-daneing ceremony—la it a contract to her benefit t—Businessconnected with the household,
A married woman cannot enter into an obligation by contractwithout the concurrence or consent of her husband.
Query, whether the principle thata marriedpersonmay enter intoa contract, which is to her benefit, is not confined to contracts bywhich the other party is bound to the married woman.
Where a married woman borrowed money for a devil-dancingceremony as she was suffering from a disease—
Held, that this was neither a kind of benefit contemplated by thedecision in Marie Kangany v. Karuppasamy Kangany,1 nor abusiness connected with the household.
The expression business connected with the household refersto the ordinary management of a household by the mistress of thehouse.
rJ^HE facto appear from the judgment.
Gooray, for defendant, appellant.
E. W. Jayaiwardene, for plaintiff, respondent.
December 12, 1921. Da Sampayo J.—
. The defendant is a married woman, and is being sued on twomortgage bonds, which she executed without the concurrence orconsent of her husband. The Commissioner held that the mortgageswere bad, but that the bonds, so far as the money claim was con-cerned, were valid. This overlooks the disability of a marriedWoman to enter into obligations by contract. Mr. E. W. Jayawar-dene, however, seeks to support the judgment on the ground thata married woman may enter into a contract which is to her benefit.In my opinion the law here relied on refers to contracts by whiohthe other party is bound to the married woman, and not she to theother party. But a wider View appears to have been taken in MarieKangany v. Karuppasamy Kangany.1 . In that case the moneyborrowed had gone in payment of a prior mortgage executed by the.wife with the consent of the husband, and where the wife died andthe husband was sued as the administrator of her estate, this Courtheld that the defendant was liable to repay "the money, as thewife’s estate had benefited by the transaction. That case is,however, distinguishable. In the present case all that the plaintiff
1 (290$) ION. L.B.79.
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said was that the defendant was suffering from a disease, and wantedthe money for a devil-dancing ceremony. This is not the kind ofbenefit contemplated by the above decision. It does not evenappear that the money was spent in the performance of the devilceremony, or that it was the devil ceremony that cured the woman.It is quite obvious that this was the case of an ordinary debt incurredby the married woman. Mr. Jayawardene also cited Walter Pereira98Laws of Ceylon 232, and argued that this was a business connected,with the household which the defendant had transacted. Theexpression “business connected with the household” evidentlyrefers to the ordinary management of a household by the mistressof the house. But I cannot regard a devil dance as such business.
I think the appeal should be allowed. The judgment underappeal is set aside, and the action dismissed, with costs, in bothCourts.
GUNARIS HAMY v. NONABABA