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Present ; Garvin and Dalton JJ.
HALL t>. PELMADULLA VALLEY TEA ANDRUBBER COMPANY.326—D. C. Ratnapurat 4,107.Privy Council—Application for final leave—Condition fulfilled icithiu
time—Vacation Ordinance No. 1 of 1906, $. 8.
The applicant was granted conditional leave lo appeal to thePrivy Council on March 28, 1827. He complied' with the conditionsimposed upon him on April 27, when the vacation of the SupremoCourt had commenced. The vacation lasted till May 5. andapplication for final leave was made on May 7.
Held, that the application was in time.
^PPLICATION for final leave to the Privy Council.
Choksy, for respondent, showed cause that the application hasto be made within one week of the compliance with the conditions.On the face of it the application is not made within a week.
“ Week M means seven successive days. (27 Halsbunj 439). Theweek expired on Thursday, May 5. The application was not madetill May 7. Notice of the application was not given through theCourt. The appellant cannot therefore claim to exclude the holidaysinasmuch as the notice was not an act of Court. (Hayley it* Kenny v.Zainudeen.1)
Under section 7 of the Interpretation Ordinance, Sundays andpublic holidays cannot be excluded. At the most the applicationcould have been made on May 6. The rule as to the time withinwhich notice has to be given has been strictly acted upon.(Goudeft v. Elias,2)
Ferdinands, in support.—The applicants complied with all theconditions imposed upon them upon the granting of conditionalleave to appeal on April 27, 1927; this date came within theSupreme Court vacation, which continued up to May 6. Theapplication for final leave bears date May 7. Buie 21 must be readsubject to the provisions of section 8 of the Vacation Ordinance,No. 1 of 1906. The result is that applicants still have a considerabletime within which they can make the application for final leave.
May 12, 1927. Garvin J.—
This is an application for final leave to appeal to His Majesty inCouncil. Conditional leave was granted on March" 28, and on April27—it is admitted—the applicant complied with all the conditions1 25 N. L.R. 312.* 13 N. L. R. 80.
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Hull v.PclmaduUnValley Tea<m'l RubberJ ompuntj
upon which the original application was granted. This applicationwas made on May 7. Counsel for the respondent urges that theapplication for conditional leave to appeal should be rescindedupon the ground that more than one week has elapsed since thedate when the applicant complied with the conditions. It is to benoted, in the first place, that rule 21 vests a discretion in the Courtas to whether or not it will rescind the leave already granted. Itwould seem that at the time the conditions were fulfilled the vacation%*f this Court had already commenced, and that vacation continuedtill May 6, on which date the Court resumed. Now section 8 of theVacation Ordinance provides that—
“ Where by any Ordinance, or rule regulating civil procedure, orby any special order of the Court, any limited time notexceeding one month is appointed or allowed for the doingof any act or the taking of any proceeding in the SupremeCourt, no days included in a vacation shall be reckonedin the computation of such time unless the Court otherwisedirects.
This is not a case in which the limit of time has been fixed by theCourt or any special directions have been given. The time limit isprescribed in rule 21 of the rules laid down for appeals to HisMajesty in Council. The application as now made is an act in Court.It is clear therefore that the provisions of section 8 apply to thecircumstances of this case. Its effect is this, that the plaintiff stillhas a considerable time within which he can make his application.
For these reasons I think the objection to the granting of thisapplication fails.
I think the applicant is entitled to his costs.
Dalton J.—I agree.
HALL v. PELMADULLA VALLEY TEA AND RUBBER COMPANY