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Present: De Sampayo A.J.
KUSALHAMY v. DIONIS APPU.
624—P. ('. Matara, 3,476.
Maintenance—Evidence of mother that child was maintained within oneyear after birth—Corroboration.
In a maintenance casethe evidence of themotherthatthe
defendant maintained thechild within twelvemonthsafterits
birth need not be corroborated.
rjl HE facts appear from the judgment. .
.4. St. T. Jayewardene,for appellant.—Themothermustbe-
corroborated on the point that the child was maintained withimtwelve months of its birth. Under section 7 of the Maintenance-Ordinance corroboration is necesssary in this particular also. Thecorroboration required should not be limited to the question ofpaternity.
Cooray, for respondent.—The section does not insist on corrobora-tion on any point beyond that of paternity. See Perera v. Fernando.1
July 26, 1912. De Sampayo A.J.—
In this case the appellant has been ordered to pay maintenancein respect of a child alleged to have been born to the applicant bythe appellant. The evidence is very strong that the appellant wasi.(1911) 15 N. L. It. 309; 5 Leader L. R. 68.
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1912 the father of the child, and indeed, the fact is not seriously disputedDa Saupayo on this appeal. It is contended, however, that the order forA.J.. maintenance cannot be sustained because the evidence of theKuealhamy complainant, the mother of the child, was not corroborated inv. Dionie respect of her evidence that the appellant maintained the childAppu within twelve months after its birth; the argument being that, undersection 7 of Ordinance No. 19 of 1889, the evidence of the motherof the child should be corroborated even in this particular. If theconstruction of the section in question be so, I find so difficulty inholding that the evidence of the mother in this case has been mate-rially corroborated on this point. The complainant herself testifiedto the fact that. the appellant maintained the child . and herselffrom the time of the birth, though later, namely, after his marriageto another woman, he did not visit her in her house, but gave herhelp or maintenance in the shape of money and goods; and she hasadded that the appellant ceased to do so only within four monthsof the commencement of these proceedings. The mother of thecomplainant, in whose house the complainant was living in herevidence stated similarly that the appellant had given help to theapplicant after the birth of the child, and that after his own marriagehe used to come himself and give her money until four months before-the case. I cannot say that this is not a substantial corroborationof the complainant’s evidence. But as regards the constructionattempted to be put on this section, I am glad that my own impres-sions are supported by a decision cited by Mr. Cooray, for therespondent, in Perera v. Fernando,1 in which it was, after fullconsideration, held that the corroboration required by the sectionin question referred only to identity of the putative father. There-fore I think that, the point urged on this appeal fails, and the ordermust be affirmed with costs.
1(1911) 15 N. L. R. 309; 5 Leader L. R. M.
KUSALHAMY v. DIONIS APPU