Marutkappen v. Ashton.
1948Present: Dias J.
MA.RLI T±1 APPEN, Appellant, and ASHTON, Respondent.S. C. 1,037—M. C. Hatton, 10,109.
Jurisdiction—Criminal trespass with intention to annoy—Right of Rural Court totry stick offence—Rural Courts Ordinance, No. 12 of 1945, s. 10 (b).
, Where criminal trespass was alleged against the accused in that he unlawfullyremained upon certain premises, not with the intent to commit any offence,but merely with the intention to annoy the person in occupation of thepremises—
Held, that the jurisdiction of the Rural Court to try such an offence wasousted by the words of Column 3 of the Second Schedule to the Rural CourtsOrdinance.
DIAS J.—Maruthappen v. Ashton.
PEAL from a judgment of the Magistrate of Hatton.
L. O. Weeramantry, for the accused, appellant.
E. F. N. Graliaen, K. G., with D. W. Fernando, for the complainant,respondent.
Cur. adv. wilt.
February 6, 1948. Dias J.—
The accused appellant was convicted of the offence of criminal trespassand was sentenced to six weeks rigorous imprisonment.
The only point taken on appeal is that the Magistrate had no juris-diction to try this case which, it is submitted, is within the exclusivejurisdiction of the Rural Court as provided by section 10 (b) of the RuralCourts Ordinance, No. 12 of 1945.
The charge against the appellant was that he being a labourer employedon Mottingham estate, Maskeliya, and having been given a month’snotice terminating his employment, refused to leave the estate butcontinued to occupy his quarters to the annoyance of the Superintendent.In Selvanayakam Kangany v. Henderson1 such conduct has been held toamount to criminal trespass.
It is urged that this offence, however, is not triable by a Magistrate’sCourt, but is exclusively triable by the Rural Court.
Section 10 (6) of Ordinance No. 12 of 1945 provides :—
“ The criminal jurisdiction of a Rural Court shall extend to thetrial of such of the following offences as may have been committedwithin the local jurisdiction of the Rural Court:—
The offences for the time being included in the Second Schedule
to this Ordinance, that is to say, such of the offences underthe provisions of law enumerated in the first column of thatSchedule as are specified or described in the correspondingentries in the second column of that Schedule, but subject inthe case of each of those offences to any limitations, restrictionsor conditions set out in respect of that offence in the thirdcolumn of that Schedule.
Turning to the Second Schedule we find “ Section 433 ” referred to inColumn 1 which in Column 2 is described as “ Criminal Trespass asdefined in section 427 of that Code ” meaning the Penal Code. InColumn 3 under the heading “ Limitations, restrictions, and conditions ”against this item are the words “ A Rural Court shall have jurisdictiononly in cases where the offence intended to be committed is an offencewithin the criminal jurisdiction of a Rural Court ”.
1946) 47 N. L. R. 337.
Jayewardene v. Per era.
The offence of Criminal Trespass as defined by section 427 of thePenal Code contains four separate and distinct species of the offence,namely :—
Criminal trespass by entering into or npon property :—
(i.) Whoever enters into or upon property in the occupationof another with intend to commit an offence.
(ii.) Whoever enters into or upon property in the occupationof another with intent to intimidate, insult, or annoyany person in occupation of such property.
Criminal trespass by unlawfully remaining on property :—
(i.) Whoever having lawfully entered into or upon propertyin the occupation of another, unlawfully remainsthere with intent to commit an offence.
(ii.) Whoever having lawfully entered into or upon propertyin the occupation of another, unlawfully remains therewith intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy suchperson.
It is clear that in cases where the criminal trespass alleged against anaccused is that he entered into or upon land or unlawfully remained onland, not with the intent to commit any offence, but merely with theintention of insulting or annoying the person in occupation, the juris-diction of the Rural Court to try such an offence is ousted by the clearwords contained in Column 3 of the Second Schedule. In this case theappellant was not alleged to have committed criminal trespass with theintent to commit any offence, but merely to annoy the Superintendent.
The point of law therefore fails. I affirm the conviction and sentence.
MARUTHAPPEN, Appellant, and ASHTON, Respondent