( 48 )
Present • Sir Charles Peter Layard, Kt., Chief Justice, Mr. JusticeWendt, and Mr. Justice Grenier.
PONNAMBALAM v. PARAMANA YAGAM.
D. C., Kandy, 16,361.
Action under s. 247 Of the Civil Code—Test of jurisdiction of Court—Amount of decree—Value of land seized—Courts Ordinance IX) of.1889), s. 74.
The value of the subject matter of an action under section 247 ofthe .Civil Procedure Code must be determined by the amount of – thedecree or the value of the property seized, whichever happens tobe less.
Don Daniel v. Daniel Appu (2 Br. 82) approved and followed.
PPEAL from a judgment of the District Judge of Kandy.
The facts are fully stated in the judgment of Wendt J.
Van Langenberg, A. S.-G., for defendant, appellant.
Domhorst, K. C., for plaintiff, respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
26th October, 1905.. Wendt J.—
This was an action brought under the provisions of section 247 ofthe Civil Procedure Code, in which plaintiffs sought to be declaredentitled to an undivided half share of. certain land and to have itreleased from a seizure in execution effected by the defendant asholder of a decree for Rs. 200. The half share was valued by plaintiffat Rs. 500. The plaintiff claimed by conveyance from the judg-ment-debtor, but defendant . attacked this conveyance as a fraudupon creditors. The District Judge upheld plaintiff’s title, andthere is no reason to think that he was wrong. At the trial an issuewas framed as to whether the Court had jurisdiction to entertain theaction. The objection really was that the ■ action should havebeen brought, in the Court of Requests. There is no doubt the Dis-trict Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Requestsin all suits cognizable by the latter, and the only Consequence ofdefendant’s objection being upheld would be that plaintiff wouldbecome liable to be deprived of his costs under section 74 of TheCourts Ordinance, and to compensate defendant for the higherexpenditure unnecessarily entailed before him in consequence ofbeing sued in the higher Court, Perera v. Perera (1). The learnedDistrict Judge over-ruled the objection. The case of Don Daniel v.Daniel Appu (2) was cited to him, but he followed the later decision
a) (1900) A N. L. R. 282.(2) (1901) 2 Browne 82.
( « )
in Urdihamy v. Ranmenika. In the argument before us all the IMS-reported local eases were discussed, and I think that an examination °cto^er^6-ofcan lead to but one conclusion, viz., that the view taken Wendt J.
by the District Judge was wrong.
In Canderperumal v. Sinnatambi (1), the question related to thetaxation of the costs of an unsuccessful claim in the District Court,and Bonser C. J., in determining the value of the subject matter ofthe claim, said:“ The object of the execution-creditor is to have
the property which is seized declared liable to him to the amountof the decree. When the amount of the decree exceeds the valueof the property the execution-creditor cannot succeed to a greaterextent than the amount of the decree. The measure, then, of thevalue of the subject-matter of such a proceeding as this will be thevalue of the property or the amount of the decree, whichever is theless. If the rule be as contended by the respondent, it would leadto this anomalous result, that a man whose property is attached byan execution-creditor is to have the valuation of his proceedings toprotect his rights determined, not by the value of his property, butby a quite irrelevant consideration, viz., the value of the originalcause of action', with which he has nothing- whatever to do. So that,if in the execution of a money decree for Rs. 10,000, a house wereseized belonging to the judgment-debtor in which was a chair ortable worth Rb. 10 belonging to a third person, that person, if hewished to assert his right to that properiy, must run the risk ofhaving the costs taxed against him on the highest scale if his claimis disallowed. ” So far as this case goes, the test of value in anaction by the creditor is to be the amount of the decree or the valueof the property seized, whichever is less, while in the case of theclaimant suing the value would be the value of his property, wherethat is less than the amount of the decree.
In Mell v. Fernando (2), Bonser C.J. (Withers J. concurring),applied this test to a creditor’s action based on a decree for Rs. 39.95only, and held that it ought to have been brought in the Court ofRequests, although the land seized was worth over Rb. 300.
In Abdul Coder v. Annamalay (3), the plantiff was the claimantand no question of jurisdiction was raised, but Bonser C.J., dealingwith that point obiter, said:“ The tuition under section 247 will not
necessarily be brought in the Court which held the claim inquiryfor if the value of the properiy seized does not exceed Rs. 300, itwill Be brought in a Court of Requests, even though the originalaction was brought in a District Court. ” Withers J., who took partin this decision, did not deal, with the point in his judgment.
0) (1895) 1 N. L. R. 128.(2) (1896) 2 AT. 1^. R. 225.
(3) (1896) 2 N. L. R. 166.
( 50 )
In Don Daniel v. Daniel Appu (1) (the claimant was againplaintiff) the decree was for Bs. 98.40 only and the land seizedworth over Bs. 300. The action was brought in the District Courtand there was no objection taken. In appeal Browne J. laid itdown, with the expressed intention of regulating future actions ofthe kind, that when either the amount to be levied or the subjectof the levy was under Bs. 360 the Court of Bequests was theproper Court for the action under section 247, and it should bebrought in the District Court only when both the decree and theproperty seized exceeded that value. Bonser C.J. expressly agreedwith the principle so enunciated.
Three months later, in June, 1901, the case of Urdihamy t>.Ranmenika (2) came before Lawrie J., sitting alone, in whichthe plaintiff had claimed a piece of land worth over Bs. 800 whenseized upon decree for Bs. 92, and having been unsuccessful hadbrought the action in the Court of Bequests. The Commissioner, forreasons which are not. reported, declined jurisdiction, and LawrieJ. affirmed his decision, saying:“ The plaintiff prays that she be
declared entitled to the whole land. It is worth more than Bs. 300.The Court of Bequests has no jurisdiction. ” It is this rulingthat the learned District Judge has followed in the present case..But, as pointed out by Bonser C.J. in D. C-, Chilaw, 1895 (5thFebruary, 1902), the case of Don Daniel v. Daniel Appu was not citedto Lawrie J., though exactly in point, and he had only the casesof Mell v. Fernando and Abdul Cader v. Annamalay before him.
In D. C., Chilaw, 1895, just referred to, which came before Bonser
J., and myself, the action was by the holder of a decree for Bs. 60who had seized in execution land worth over Bs. 300. Objectionwas taken that the plaintiffs should have sued in the Court ofBequests, but the District Judge over-ruled it because the landwas above the value cognizable by a Court of Bequests. In appealthis Court cited and followed the ruling-in Don Daniel v, Daniel Appu.
The effect of these local cases is that it has been distinctly laiddown by Bonser C.J. and Browne. J. more than once that, forthe purpose of determining the value of the subject matter of thesuit, the Court must take the amount of the decree qr the value ofthe property, whichever happens to be less; while the decision ofLawrie J., to the effect that when the claimant is plaintiff the test isthe value of the property alone, and that where this is over Bs. 300the Court of Bequests’ jurisdiction is ousted, was not only thedecision of a single judge, but was pronounced without knowledgeor consideration of the case in which the Chief Justice and BrowneJ. had laid down a principle for the guidance of future litigation.
(1) (1901) «2 Browne 82.(2) (1901) 2 Browne 115.
October 26.Wbndt J.
( 51 )
But in addition to these local cases there are decisions of theIndian High Courts in pari materia. Our procedure for the investi-gation of claims in execution and for the trial of actions arising fromthem is borrowed from the Indian Civil Procedure Code, and we havebeen accustomed to regard the decisions of the Indian Courts in theinterpretation of these provisions as entitled .to great weight thoughnot as binding authorities. In India the question has arisen inregard to the jurisdiction of the Munsiff’s Courts, which extends to allsuits in which “ the amount or value of the subject matter indispute does hot exceed(in thecase of theBengal Courts) one
thousand rupees. " Thecase ofOvlzari Laiv. JadaunRat (1),
was a claimant’s actionin which he soughtto have aquantity
of grain belonging to him andworth overBs. 1,000released
from attachment upon a decree for Bs. 222. He sued in a superiorCourt capable of trying suits for over Bs. 1,000, but objectionwas taken that he should have gone to the Munsiff’s Court. Onspecial appeal the High Court considered themselves constrainedto allow the objection to the jurisdiction. They said:“ The
claim is to have declared the plaintiff’s right to some grain storedin pits, by setting aside an order of the MunsifE for bringingthe grain to sale in execution of a decree held by defendant againsta third party, his judgment-debtor. A course of decisions of thisCourt has held that the value of the subject matter in dispute fordetermining jurisdiction will be in such cases the amount of thedecree in satisfaction of which it is sought to bring the property, to sale.Special appeal No. 320 of 1876, decided the 16th May, 1876 (1).
In 1881 the question came before the High Court of Madras inKrisknama Ghariar v. Sirinivasa Ayy.anger (2), which was a decree-holder’s action to have certain land declared liable to sale inexecution of his decree. The Court said:‘ ‘ The value of the subject
matter in suits such as that before us must depend on twoconsiderations, the amount of the charge and the value of theproperty it is sought to make available for the satisfaction of thecharge. If the value of the property is in excess of the charge, thevalue is the amount of the charge, for the subject of the suit is theright to make the property available for the satisfaction of the.whole charge, but where the value of the property is less than theamount of the charge, the subject matter is the right to make theproperty available, for the satisfaction of the charge so far as theproperty will suffice, and it cannot suffice to satisfy more than a sumproportionate to its value, and consequently in such cases the valueof the subject matter is the value of the property. ” ' 1
(1) (1879) I. L. B. 2 All. 799.(2) (1882) I. L. R. 4 JMad. 339.
October 20.Wendt J.
( 52 )
Id Durga Prasad v. Rackla Kaur (1), in which the holder of a decreefor Be: 1,500 sought to render property worth Bs. 400 liable to his
execution, the Court distinguished the case of Ovlzari Lai v. JadaunRai, already mentioned, and held that the value of the propertydetermined the jurisdiction. In the former case said Oldfield J.:
“ The value of the property in suit was higher than the amount ofthe decree, and the valuation was rightly limited to the amount ofthe decree, that being all that was recoverable in the event of theplaintiff being unsuccessful. ” (The report says “ successful, ” butthat is obviously a misprint.)
. In Modhusudun Koer v. Rakkal Chunder Roy (2), the decree-holder.was plaintiff. His decree was for Bs. 400 and he had attachedproperty worth over Bs. 1,000, which had been successfully claimed.The Calcutta High Court, expressly following the older decisions inBombay, Madras, and Allahabad, held that the amount in disputewas the amount which the creditor would recover if successful and notthe value of the property attached, and that therefore the Munsiffhad jurisdiction [see also Dwarka Das v. Kamsekar Prasad (3) ].
It was argued before us by the plaintiff that he had to establishhis title to the whole land (vfhich was denied), and that thereforethe value of the land must be looked to in a question as to theproper Court to sue in. But this point, among others, was so clearlydealt with by Browne J. in Don Daniel v. Daniel Appu, that
could not do better than quote his words. He said (p. 85): “As theentire land, and not a sufficient portion of it, was seized to levy thissum, it might be contended that the admeasurement should beby the value of the land seized rather than of the sum to be paid,and that the Court of Bequests had no jurisdiction. For althoughhad the suit been by the writ-holder, as in No. 4,732, D. C., Colombo,
N. L. R. 225, and put in issue his right to levy Bs. 90 off the land,the admeasurement might have been by the value of what was to beenforced by seizure, it might be conversely contended that in this casethe admeasurement should be by the value of what is to be protectedfrom seizure. But if the writ be for under Bs. 300 and the holderof the property seized wished to protect it from being sold, he canalways do so by paying the writ even after he has failed by claim, and«1 aim action also, to prevent its being held to b4' exigible. Andagain when the writ is for over Bs. 300, but. the property seized isunder that value, there cannot be taken from him by its sale anamount exceeding Bs. 300. Therefore, in either case, when eitherthe amount to be levied or the subject of the levy is under1 Bs. 300the money amount at issue between the writ-holder and the 1
(1) (1887) /. L. R. 9 4(1. .140.(2) (1887) I. L. R. 15 Cal. 104.
(3) (1895) /. L. R. 17 All. 69.
( 53 )
claimant will be under Be. 300, and so the Court o£ Bequests willhave jurisdiction. But if the amount to be paid and the value ofthe property, of which it was sought to levy it, severally exceedBs. 300, then, and then only, will the matter fall to be litigated ina District Court. ”
In fact, plaintiff’s title to the whole land iB not in dispute betweenthe parties, but only the liability of the land to be sold for the claim.The decree-holder is not concerned to deny the claimant's title quoad ultra, although the ground upon which he bases his denial mayaffect the title in its entirety.
For these reasons I think the action might have'been, and there-fore ought properly to have been, brought in the Court of Bequests.In dismissing the appeal, I would order that plaintiff’s costs ■ againstdefendant be taxed in both Courts as if the action had been broughtin a Court of Bequests, and that plaintiff do pay to defendant thedifference between the costs properly incurred by him in the DistrictCourt and such as he would have been put to if sued in the lowerCourt.*
This was an action under section 247 of the Civil Procedure Codefor a declaration that certain shares in two lands, more fully describedin the schedule attached to the plaint, which were seized in executionunder a writ issued in C. ft., Matale, 5,244, 'at the instance of. thedefendant, who was the decree-holder* therein, were not liable toseizure and sale under the said writ. The plaintiff claimed theshares, which he values at Bs. 500, before the' Fiscal, but his claimwas disallowed by the Court on the 27th January, 1904. The writunder which the shares were seized was for Bs. 75, and the questionthat was argued before us was whether this action should not havebeen brought in- the Court of Bequests instead, of in the DistrictCourt.
The District Judge held on the authority of a case reported in2 Browne 115-116 that the action was rightly brought in theDistrict Court, and having found that the evidence of the plaintiff’spossession wao entitled to credit because it was consistent with histitle, he gave judgment for the plaintiff with costs. The defendanthas appealed, and his counsel contended that as the amount recover-able under the execution issued was less than Bs. 300, the defendant'sobjection to the jurisdiction of the Court should have been sustained,or rather that plaintiff should not have been given any costs on theground that the action should have been brought in the Court ofBequests. The decision I have referred to in 2 Browne 115-116was by a single judge, and the case is very meagrely,reported; but
October 29.Wendt J. •
( 54 )
Mr. Justice Lawrie appears to have held that as the plaintiff prayedthat she be declared entitled to the whole land, which was worthmore than Es. 300, the Court of Bequests had no jurisdiction. Thejudgment of the learned Judge is in a very few words, and it istherefore difficult to say what his reason were for holding that thejurisdiction of the Court in which the action was to be broughtshould be determined by the value of the property seized. I findthat in the course of argument counsel for the respondent citedbefore Mr. Justice Lawrie the case of Abdul Oader v. Annamalay,
C., Kandy, 7,816, reported in 2 N. L. B. 166, in which ChiefJustice Bonser held that in an action under section 247 the prayerof a plaintiff therein should be for a declaration that he is entitledto have the property released from seizure and for an order onthe Fiscal to release the same accordingly. That is precisely theprayer in this case; but the Chief Justice proceeded further, andsaid that if the plaintiff proved he was in possession of the propertyat the time of the seizure, and that therefore the Court ought notto have refused to release the property, he would be entitled tothe declaration and order he prayed for, unless the defendantcounterclaimed that he was entitled to have the property seizedand sold for payment of his judgment-debt and proved that hisjudgment-debtor was the owner of the property. Mr. JusticeWithers, the Bench being composed of two Judges, agreed withChief Justice Bonser and re-affirmed the opinion hd had expressedin Wijewardane v. Maitland .(1), that under section 247 of the CivilProcedure Code a claimant or objector can only seek to establish inthe action thereby permitted to him the very same right in theproperty under seizure as was the subject of the adverse orderwithin fourteen days of which he is compelled to take the actionallowed him. With the greatest deference to the opinion of ChiefJustice Bonser and Mr. Justice Withers, I think that section 247 hasno reference whatever to the question of possession, which is theonly question which the Court has to decide upon what is knownas a claim inquiry. The words in section 247, “ to establish theright which he claims to the property in dispute or to have thesaid property rendered liable to be sold under the execution decreein his favour ” must not be taken in a limited sense, but, in myhumble opinion, give the claimant whose claim has been disallowedthe opportunity of proving his title independently of mere physi-cal possession of the property seized in execution. It may be thatat the time of seizure the claimant was not in possession, cither inhis own person or by some other person in trust for him, or that theproperty was not in the occupancy of a tenant or other person 1
(1) (1893), 3 C. L. B. 7.
( 55 )
paying rent to him. And it can hardly be contended that if hisclaim were disallowed he should nevertheless prove what is impossi-ble of proof, for that would 'he the result if in an action under section247 the claimant is not entitled to prove anything more; than that hewas in possession. The claimant may be outside the Colony, orhe may not be resident on the property seized, and therefore notstrictly in possession of it, and the injustice of limiting the words" to establish the right which he claims to the property in dispute ”to the question of possession solely becomes at once apparent.
I have expressed my opinion in regard to the scope of section247 in order to pave the way for the real question' which arises fordecision in this case. In the case that I have already referredto in 2 N. L. R. 166, Chief Justice Bonser held as follows inregard to the Court in which an. action under section 247 shouldbe brought:“ The action under section 247 will not necessarily be
brought in the Court which held the claim inquiry, for if the valueof the property seized does not exceed Rs. 300 it will be brought in aCourt of Bequests, even though the original action was brought ina District Court.” This appears to me a clear enunciation ofthe principle that the value of the property seized must determinethe question of jurisdiction. The principle is a reasonable one,because it may so happen that the execution-creditor with a writin his hand for Rs. 30 may cause the Fiscal to seize a propertybelonging to a third party worth Bs. 3,000, and it is inconceivablethat the Legislature should have contemplated that the title toproperty worth Es. 3,000 should be tried in the Court of Requests,whose jurisdiction is expressly limited by section 4 of OrdinanceNo. 12 of 1806. That section says, that every Court of Requests shallhave cognizance of and full power to hear and determine allactions, in which the “ debt, damage, or demand shall not exceed:Rs. 300, and also all actions in which 'the title to, interest in, orright to the possession of any land shall be in dispute, providedthat the value of the land or the particular share,, right, or interestin dispute shall not exceed Rs. 300.”
It will >be remarked that this action speaks of the right to thepossession of»any land which is in dispute, and even assumingthat in an action under section 247 the question of possession hasto be decided over again, as held in the case I have alreadyreferred to in 2 N. L. R. 166, it seems to me that “ the right tothe possession of any land ” can only be measured by what theland is worth, and that therefore the value of the propertyseized must necessarily determine the question of jurisdiction.
In an earlier case, which was reported after the case in 2 N. L. R.225, Chief Justice Bonser (Justice Withers ’ concurring) said that
( 56 )
the practice of permitting actions to be brought in the DistrictCourt where the right which the plaintiff was seeking to establishwas the right to have the land rendered liable to satisfy a writwihch he had obtained in a Court of Bequests, was wrong andshould cease. This was the converse of the case reported in 2
N.L. B. 166. The facts were these. The plaintiff had obtainedmortgage decree against the second defendant for a debt ofBs. 38.95, and on the writ issued in the case the mortgaged propertywas seized, when the first defendant claimed it, and his claim wasupheld by the District Court. The plaintiff then instituted in theDistrict Court an action under section 247 to have the propertyseized declared executable under his writ. The reason given byChief .Justice Bonser for holding that the action should have beenbrought in the Court of Bequests was that the value to theplaintiff of his right to have the land rendered liable to payhis debt should be measured by the. amount he could recover,namely, Bs. 39.95; and that being so, the action ought to have beenbrought in the Court of Bequests, quite irrespective of the value ofthe land in respect of which he wished to set up his right.
Now, there is nothing in section 247 which in my opinion wouldjustify an execution-creditor who has seized land the value of whichis over Bs. 300, and considerably in excess of the amount which heseeks to levy, in bringing an action in the Court of Bequests toestablish his right to have the property rendered liable to pay a paltrydebt due by his execution-debtor, say, of Bs. 30. The words usedin section 247, “ to establish the right which he claims to the pro-perty in dispute,” refer unmistakably to.the claimant, and there isnothing in the section by which an assessment can be made of any■ right which the execution-creditor may conceive that he has tohave the property seized rendered liable to pay his debt. In thecase of movables there will of course be no difficulty as the execution-creditor can, although he has seized property exceeding in value theamount of his writ, sell sufficient.to satisfy his writ, but I cannotunderstand how in the case of immovable property a part of it canbe carved out oh which execution may be levied in a similar way,nor can I appreciate the position advanced by Mr. Justice Browne,in 2 Browne 83, that a stranger whose property has beenseized on a writ against the^ execution-debtor can prevent its sale,by paying the amount thereof, and so having his property released.I do not think that any man would in these circumstances pay,.a debtnot due by him, nor could he be expected in reason and fairness todo 60.
It seems to me therefore inequitable that because the plaintiffvalues his right to have a stranger’s land rendered liable to pay his
( )debt of Bb. 30 at that sum be should likewise have the right tohave that stranger’s right or title to valuable land made the sub-ject of adjudication by the Court of Bequests, whose jurisdiction islimited, as I have already indicated' Intricate questions of titlemay arise, and it would be unfair and unjust to allow such questionsto be decided by a Commissioner whose experience and ability totry them may well be doubted.
Again, I do not see why the amount of the writ should alone betaken into consideration as determining the question of jurisdiction.There are two things that must be considered iu a matter o'f this kind,and they are so closely mixed up that they should 'not be separatedI mean that both the value of the land and the amount of thewrit are important factors which must decide the question of juris-diction. If the amount of the writ is below the sum of Bs. 300, andproperty under the value of Bs. 300 is seized in execution, then ofcourse the Court of Bequests has jurisdiction. If the property seizedis under the value of Bs. 300, although the writ may be for Bs. 400, insuch a case the Court of Bequests will have jurisdiction if theunsuccessful claimant comes before it as plaintiff. These illustrationsshow, inasmuch as they reflect the practice and the actual state oflitigation in our Courts in regard to actions under section 247, thatit is the value of the land seized and not the amount of the writ thatdetermines the question of jurisdiction.
Personally—and I say it with much diffidence—I should havethought the question free from difficulty were it not for the judgmentof. this Court reported in 2 Browne 83, in which it was held “ thatin actions under section 247, when either the amount to be levied orthe subject of the levy under the judgment-creditor’s writ is underBs. 300, the Court of Bequests has jurisdiction to entertain the action,but if the amount to be paid or the value of the property off whichit is sought to levy it severally exceeds Bs. 300, then and then onlyha6 the District Court jurisdiction.”
With the first part of this proposition I entirely agree, because itis self-evident, but the second part is, I venture to think, of too un-certain a nature, inasmuch as it is made to depend upon purelyadventitious circumstances. What if- the amount to be paid andthe value of the property seized do not severally exceed Bs. 300? Itis only the concurrence of these two conditions that is made the basisfor the pronouncement that the District Court has jurisdiction. Noreference is made to cases where one of these conditions is not present,and in view of the fact that cases constantly oceur in our Courtswhere the amount of the writ is under Bs. 300, and vice versa, itwould have been more satisfactory had some clear and distinctrule been laid down by which the question of jurisdiction could
( 58 )
be determined. The judgment of the Court was delivered byMr. Justice Browne, and Chief Justice Bonser shortly agreed with thejudgment, and particularly with that part of it which dealt with thequestion of the Court in which claims of the nature under con-sideration should be brought. The judgment appears to my mindto have been based more on grounds of expediency and conveniencethan upon any fixed principle of law or practice.
The matter therefore stands thus. The view expressed by Mr.Justice Lawrie that the jurisdiction of the Court should be determinedby the value of the property seized was apparently founded uponthe dicta of Chief Justice Bonser in the case of Abdul Coder v.Annamalay (I). That case was decided after the case reported in2 N. L. R. 225. There is a conflict between Chief Justice Bonser’sjudgment in 2 N. L. R. 166, and his judgment in 2 Broume 83, but,considering the support that the latter judgment apparentlyreceives from the decisions of the Indian Courts which werecited by 'Mi-. Van Langenberg, and which are based on the corres-ponding section of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure, I wouldadopt and follow it, as it is of the utmost importance that thereshould be no uncertainty in regard to a matter which is ofalmost daily occurrence in our courts. I 'thought it right at thesame time to express my own views on the subject.
I agree to the order proposed by my brother Wendt.
La yard C. J.-—
I have the advantage of reading the two judgments of the Puisne-Judges, and T entirely agree with the views expressed by my brotherWendt, and with the order they both suggest making on this appeal.
It was suggested by the plaintiff’s counsel in appeal that it wouldbe a hardship on owners of large properties wrongfully seized under■a writ if they were compelled to submit their claims to lands soseized to be adjudicated upon by inferior, courts. The answer tothat is clear in the first place, they need take no notice of the wrong-ful seizure, as a sale thereunder will not bind them as long as theyhave good titles; in the second place, if they do claim unsuccess-fully and prefer to bring their action in the District Court, thatCourt has jurisdiction to deal with their claims, and they merely arebound to pay for the luxury of resorting to the higher Court. Forthe above reasons it appears to me no hardship will be caused by<our decisions to the owners of large property wrongfully seized, asthey can please themselves in the matter, and there is no. necessityfor them, as pointed out above, to enter into any litigation in what..they do for them to bring their cases in the lower Court.
(1) 2 N. L. R. 166.
PONNAMBALAM v. PARAMANAYAGAM