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PUNOHIRALA et al. v. 8UDDAHAMY H al.
D. C., Kurunigala, 7181499.
Reference to arbitration—Power of Court to extend time after expiry of the timeoriginally fixed—Civil Procedure Code, e. 088.
Under section 683 of the Civil Procedure Code, t oosrt may enlargethe time on cause shown, when the time originally allowed for themaking of the award has expired.
HE facts of this case appear in the judgments of their LordshipsLawrib and Browns.
Bawa, for defendants appellant.
Blaze, for respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
1st March, 1895. Lawrib, A.C.J.—
The order of Court referring the matters in dispute to arbitra-tion was dated 28th February, J.894. It required the arbitrator tomake his award within thirty days. On the 24th March, thearbitrator wrote to tbe Court asking for an extension of time anddesiring record of Court be sent to him, for some reason notexplained. No notice was taken of this letter till the 2nd April,when the District Judge enlarged the time for filing the award till30th April. The question to be decided is, Had the judge powerto enlarge the time after the time originally fixed had elapsed ?
' Ae rule of English law was, that without the consent of partiesthe Court could not at common law grant any enlargement whentbe time had lapsed. The authority of the arbitrator was gone,and all the proceedings already taken became ineffectual (Holdenv. Glasscock, and Teasdale v. Atkins: Russell on Arbitrators, page150). This was remedied in England by the passing of an Act ofWilliam the Fourth, and now the Arbitration Act of 1889 enactsthat the time for making an award may from time to time beenlarged by order of the Court, whether the time for making theaward has expired or not.
Our Code is not so explicit as the English Act of Parliament,but after some little hesitation I come to the conclusion that the683rd section permits a Court to enlarge the time on cause shownwhen the time for making the awardrhas expired.
ThiB seems to me the only question of doubt. The other objectionsto making the award the basis of the decree seem to me untenable.I agree with my brother that the order should be affirmed.
The award of the arbitrator was filed in Court on the 27th April,and notice thereof was issued. The defendants oould then
( » >(Motion 687, Civil Prooedure Cods) have applied to eel aelde theaward, or to modify and correct It, or to remit it for reoonafdem*tion, if they advanced grounds such as sections 691, 688, and 690respectively indicate as those respectively appropriate for eachform of relief.
Defendants petitioned that the award should be set aside, butdid not advance any of the grounds a, b, or c prescribed bysection 691 as those upon which alone such a motion could havebeen granted. The order of the District Judge rejecting thepetition should therefore be affirmed.
I agree that the wording of section 683 is large enough toenable the Court to grant a further time to the arbitrator evenafter the expiry of the original period, when, as here, neither partyhad on the expiry called for the trial to proceed.
PUNCHIRALA et al., v. SUDDAHAMY et al