3 31 N. L. R. 481.
1 25 N. L. R. 39.
= 25 N. L. R. 289.
DALTON J.—Silva v. Silva.
title. It has been repeatedly held that the non-registration of the addressof a mortgagee prevents the sale on a mortgage bond binding persons towhom the mortgagor has transferred the mortgaged property, subsequentto the mortgage. We are not bound by the sale. Our title is good.Section 2 restricts the application of section 11 to sales after thecommencement of the Ordinance.
Jayewardene, in reply.
October 25, 1932. Dalton J.—
This appeal raises a question under section 11 of the Mortgage Ordi-nance, 1927. The fifth defendant-appellant, intervened in the action,a partition action, claiming the ' entire property. He pleaded that aprevious owner, Santiago Silva, mortgaged the property to one HendrickPerera, who had assigned the bond to him. He put the bond in suit,obtained judgment, purchased the property at Fiscal’s sale, and obtainedtransfer by deed (D 3) dated March 19, 1928. That deed was registeredin 1929, but neither • Perera nor appellant had registered their addresses.
Plaintiff’s case was that Santiago Silva conveyed the land in 1923 toThomas Silva and his other children. Thomas sold his interest to theplaintiff in June, 1927, by deed P 3. That deed was registered in June,
but neither Thomas nor plaintiff had registered their addresses,' andso appellant could not make them parties to the mortgage action. Theywere therefore not bound by the decree in the mortgage suit.
Under these circumstances, the fifth defendant claims that even if thetitle of the plaintiff is superior to his, nevertheless he is entitled to theamount due on the mortgage decree or to a hypothecary charge on theproperty to the amount of the mortgage that was extinguished by thesale. In support of this contention, he relies upon the provisions ofsection 11 of Ordinance No. 21. of 1927.
The trial Judge has held, on this point, that as plaintiff obtained titlein June, 1927, this section does not apply in view of the provision insub-section (2). The Ordinance came into force on January 1, 1928,and it is provided that the section “ shall not affect any title acquired forvaluable consideration before the commencement of this Ordinance ”.There was a discussion before us as to the meaning of the words “ any titleacquired ” ; but reading the whole section together, the meaning – of thesection seems to me to be that the section shall not affect any land thetitle to which is acquired for valuable consideration before January 1,
Counsel for appellant has, however, referred to Girigoris v. Arnolis a similar case up to a point, in which the Court held that the unsuccessfulplaintiff, having taken action v/hich resulted in the mortgage being wipedout, was entitled to be compensated under the previsions of section 11.The successful defendants in that action derived title from a conveyanceby the mprtgagor dated June 21, 1926.
An examination of the judgment, and also of my notes taken duringthe course of the argument, shows that under the circumstances there
< 31 N. L. H. 481.
AKBAR J.—In re De Saram.
the defendants did not press the question of the payment of the amountdue on the mortgage, which amounted to only Rs. 50, by them, nor wassub-section (2) of the section referred to in the course of the argument.
In view of the provisions of this sub-section, I am of opinion that thejudgment of the lower Court was correct and section 11 does not applyin this case. It is not necessary therefore to consider the nature of the'relief given by that section.
The appeal is dismissed with costs.
Garvin S.P.J.—I agree.
Appeal dismissed.