Sunil Ha/my v. Wijesekera
1957Present; H. N. G. Fernando, J.SUNIL HAMY, Appellant, and S. D. WIJESEKERA,Respondent.
8. 0. 315—C. R. Colombo, 59,994.
Rent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1943—-Section 13 (1) (d)—■“ Residing ”,
A tenant cannot be ejected under seotion 13 (1) (d) of the Rent RestrictionAot on the ground that a person residing in the premises in question has beenconvioted of using the premises for an illegal purpose unless it is shown thafthatperson had his aotual plaoe of residence, whether permanently or temporarily,in the premises.
J^-PPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Requests, Colombo.
Sir Lolita RajapaJcse, Q.C., with A. Karunatilleke, for the defendant-appellant.
Q. Tf Sameraunckreme, for the plaintiff-respondent.
(Jur, adv, vult,
1 (1937) 39 N- L. R 186,
H. N» G. FERNANDO, J.—Sunil Sarny v. Wijesekera
July 16,1957. H. N. G. Fernando, J.—
The only ground upon which the plaintiff has succeeded in this action
for ejectment is that one Gunasena a son of the tenant was competedof an offence under the Betting on Horse Racing Ordinance committedon 16th October, 1954, an offence which constitutes the use of the leasedpremises for an illegal purpose within the meaning of section 13 (1) (d)of the Rent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948.
Section 13 (1) (d) is applicable where “ the tenant or his sub-tenantor any person residing with him in the premises …” has been convictedof using the premises for an illegal purpose, and the contention for thedefence is that Gunasena was not a person referred to in the section.
The evidence upon which the learned Commissioner relied in regardto this point was that of Police Constable Samaranayake who took partin the raid and detected the commission of the offence by Gunasena.According tQ this evidence he had seen Gunasena on the premises inquestion on several occasions over a long period, but the witness did notknow Gunasena’s place of residence. The only evidence as to the placeof residence of Gunasena was that of the defendant herself who statedthat although Gunasena had lived with her at No. 231, the premises inquestion, he had for some time been living on land opposite those premises.Gunasena’s rice ration book had been issued in respect of No. 233, thetenant of which is another son of the defendant. On this evidence theCommissioner was unable to hold that Gunasena actually resided on thepremises in question but, taking other factors into account such as thatGunasena was intimately connected with the business transacted atNo. 231, he held that Gunasena must be deemed to be a person residingor lodging at the premises.
While there are decisions which hold that a person may have two ormore places of residence and may be regarded for the purposes of certainstatutory provisions to be residing in a place notwithstanding that hedoes not actually sleep there, I do not think that in the present context theword “residing” was intended to have a meaning different from itsordinary connotation. In the context of the expression “ a person whois residing or lodging with ” the tenant, I think the intention of thelegislature was to refer only to persons who have their actual places ofresidence whether permanently or temporarily in the premises.
The plaintiff has therefore failed to make out a ground for his action forejectment. The appeal is allowed with costs in both Courts.
PRINTED AT THE GOVERNMENT PRESS, CEYLON.
SUNIL HAMY, Appellant, and S. .D WIJESEKERA Respondent