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Present: Schneider J.
THE COMM ISSIONER OF STAMPS v. AH AM AD ULE Y V AI.
222—C. BatHcaloa, 11,006.Stamp Ordinance, s. 50-—Application to Police Court to rccorcr
deficiency o/ stamp duty—Does an appeal lie?
The Registrar of Lands produced an authority from the Com-missioner of Stamps to .the Police Magistrate to recover, from theappellant who had executed a certain instrument, the deficiencyof stamp duty and a -penalty, and made an application undersection 60 of the Stamp Ordinance, 1909. The appellant depositedthe money under protest, and appealed to the Supreme Court.
Held, that no appeal lay.
In cases coming under chapter IV of the Stamp Ordinance, 1909,the Police Court is only invoked for the purpose of recovering theamount already determinedby the Commissioner. It has no
jurisdiction over the question Whether that amount is rightly dueor not. The mere fact that a Police Court is authorized torecover the sum dors not invest the proceeding with the characterof a criminal case or matter within the meaning of section 338 (1)of the Criminal Procedure Code.-
THE facts are set out in the judgment.
Tisseverasinghe (with him Fonseka), for appellant.
Jansz, C.C., for respondent.
June 13, 1922. Schneider J.—
This is an appeal by a person who had executed an instrumentin 1915, whereby he assigned certain rights to another. In March,1922, the Registrar of Lands at Batticaloa produced an authorityfrom the Commissioner of Stamps to the Police Magistrate torecover the sum of Rs. 327.50 as being the amount of the deficiencyof the stamp duty and of a penalty of Rs. 25. This was said to berecoverable under section 41 (1) (f>) of the Stamp Ordinance, No. 22of 1909. The application for recovery was stated to be made interms of section 50 of the Stamp Ordinance. The appellant appearedon summons, and stated that he would deposit the amount by aparticular date, but under protest as he desired to appeal to theSupreme Court. This was allowed, and the money was depositedby the date named. The appellant then preferred this appeal.Crown Counsel appearing on behalf of the Commissioner of Stamps,who has been made a party to the appeal, took the preliminary
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The, Comtnis-sioner ofStamps v.Aharmidu-lewai
objection that no appeal lay. I must uphold this objectionChapter III oi the Stamp Ordinance provides the procedure for anyadjudication as to the stamps fixed or to be fixed to instruments,and that- at the end of the chapter makes provision for an appealto this Court from the determination of the Commissioner of Stamps.Now it is evident that the appellant’s case does not come withinany of the cases contemplated in chapter III. He therefore' cannotroly upon section 82 as conferring a right of appeal on him. ChapterIV makes provision for cases of instruments not having been dulystamped, and at the end of the chapter, namely, in section 50,provision is made for application to be made by an officer authorizedin this behalf by the written order of the Commissioner of Stampsto recover from any person liable to pay any duty, penalty, or othersum as if it were a fine imposed under the Ordinance by any PoliceMagistrate having jurisdiction where that person may for the timebeing be resident. The section also provides that the Magistratemay recover such amount, although it be larger than the amountof the fine he may ordinarily impose. It is evident, therefore, thatin cases coming under chapter IV, the Police Court, is only invokedfor the purpose of recovering the amount already determined bythe Commissioner. It has no jurisdiction over the question whetherthat amount is rightly due or not. The mere fact that a PoliceCourt is authorized to recover a sura does not invest the proceedingwith the character of a criminal ease or matter within the meaningof section 338 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In my opinion,therefore, there is no right of appeal in this matter. I was invitedto deal with the proceedings by way of revision. I do not thinkI would be justified in doing that because the Magistrate has doneno more than, the law authorizes him to do, and the order of theCommissioner appears to me to be consistent with the provisionsof the Stamp Ordinance.
I therefore dismiss the appeal.
THE COMMISSIONER OF STAMPS v. AHAMADULEVVAI