HOWARD C.J.—The King v. Joseph.
1940Present: Howard C.J. and Wijeyewardene J.
THE KING v. JOSEPH97—D. C. (Crim.), 12,505.
Appeal—Meaning of the word “ imprisonment ”—Context of section 335 ofCriminal Procedure—Definition in Interpretation Ordinance—Crimi7ialProcedure Code, s. 335 (J) id).
“Imprisonment” in section 335 (I) Id) of the Criminal Procedure Codemeans simple as well as rigorous imprisonment.
PPEAL from a conviction of the District Judge of Colombo.
S. W. Jayasuriya (with him C. J. Ranatunge), for accused, appellant.
S. J. C. Schokman, C.C., for the Crown, respondent.
January 25, 1940. Howard C.J.—
This is an appeal from a finding and sentence of the Additional DistrictJudge of Colombo given on July 11, 1939, sentencing the appellant to threemonths’ rigorous imprisonment on each of two counts, the sentences torun concurrently. A preliminary objection is taken by Mr. Schokman onbehalf of the Crown that such an appeal on the facts will not lie under theprovisions of section 335 (1) (d) of the Criminal Procedure Code withoutthe leave of the District Judge. In regard to this contention it has beenargued by Mr. Jayasuriya that the interpretation to be given to the word“ imprisonment ” is to be gathered from section 2 (1) of the interpretationOrdinance. This provision reads as follows : “ rigorous imprisonment ”,“ simple imprisonment ” and “ imprisonment of either description ”shall have the same meaning as in the-Penal Code, and “imprisonment”shall mean simple imprisonment. He therefore argues that in section335 of the Criminal Procedure the word “ imprisonment ” means simpleimprisonment and therefore the leave of the District Judge is not required.
We have given careful consideration to the provision of the Interpre-tation Ordinance and we think that that provision refers to penal sectionsof various Ordinances. Furthermore, Mr. Schokman has referred us tothe opening words of section 2 of the Interpretation Ordinance which
WIJEYEWARDENE J.—In re H. L. Pope.
provides that these definitions shall not apply if there is somethingrepugnant in the subject or context. In this connection he invitesattention to sections 90, 91, 311 and 312 (/) and (g) of the CriminalProcedure Code, the contexts of which he contends are repugnant to thedefinition of imprisonment as interpreted by the Interpretation Ordinance.I agree that to apply the definition provided by the InterpretationOrdinance to these sections would be repugnant and also that section335 (1) (d) is on a similar footing and to apply the expression “ simpleimprisonment ” to that provision would also be repugnant. We alsothink that the use of the expression “ term of imprisonment ” indicatesthat the section is referring not so much to the nature of the imprisonmentbut to the term for which it is imposed.
In these circumstances the preliminary objection is upheld and theappeal is dismissed.
Wijeyewardene J.—I agree.
THE KING v. JOSEPH