Sri Lanka Law Reports
H 984] 2 Sri L R
DUWEARATCHI AND ANOTHER
v.VINCENT PERERA AND OTHERS
COURT OF APPEAL.
SENEVIRATNE, J. AND SIVA SELLIAH.J.
C.A. APPLICATION No. 700/84.
JULY 9, 10, 11. 13. 23, 24, AND 25. 1984.
Writ of Certiorari – Order made by Minister under Sports Law No. 25 of 1974 – Interimstay order – Extension of interim stay order-inherent power of Court.
The Minister of Sports (1st respondent) purporting to act under section 39 (1) of theSports Law No.25 of 1975 on 25.5.1984 dmected the Sri Lanka Tennis Association ofwhich the 2nd and 3rd respondents are President and Secretary respectively to release
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14 tennis courts depicted in a sketch annexed to the Order for carrying out a coachingand training programme in tennis at a national level. The two petitioners who are thePresident and Secretary of the Playing Section of the Sri Lanka*Tenms Association filedthis application for certiorari to quash the direction of the Minister (1 st respondent)alleging that the Playing Section was an independent body with control of the tenniscourts and challenging the validity of the order. On 8.6.1984 the petitioners obtainedex parte a stay order prohibiting the implementation of the Minister's order, valid till26.6.1984. The case was called on 25.6 1984 on which day the 2nd and 3rdrespondents attended. The proceedings of 25 6.1984 revolved around the questionwhether the stay order should be extended or not. The Court however extended thestay order till 9.7.1984 and fixed the same date for inquiry into the objections of the 1stand 2nd respondents. Beginning 9.7.1984 the Court inquired into the objections of the1st and 2nd respondents.
The main disputes in the case were whether the Playing Section of the Sri Lanka TennisAssociation was a body independent of the Sri Lanka Tennis Association and whetherthe tennis courts were under the control of the Playing Section. The question beforeCourt was whether or not the operation of the interim stay order should be extended.
An interim stay order in a writ application is an incidental order made in the exerciseof the inherent or implied powers of the Court. The Court should be guided by thefollowing principles :
Will the final order be rendered nugatory if the petitioner is successful ?
Where does the balance of convenience lie ?
Will irreparable and irremediable mischief or injury be caused to either party ?
The court did not determine the controversial issues in the case but held that the finalorder would not be rendered nugatory nor the balance of convenience be titled againstthe petitioners nor irreparable damage be caused to them because there would still beleft nine tennis courts for the use of their Playing Section even if the Minister's orderwas complied with Further the Minister's order had been made in the national interestfor the purpose of training promising players for an international tournament. Thereforethe interim stay order should be vacated and not extended.
Cases referred to :
Billimoria v. Minister of Lands. Land Development and Mahaveli Development andTwo Others [1978-1979] 1 SLR (S. C.j 19. 13.
Weerasoonya v. Sidambaram Chetty8 C.W.R. 238.
Mohamed Felumesh v. S. Mondale and Others AIR 1960 Cal. 582.
State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal AIR 1932 S.C. 12
A. C. Goonaratne Q.C. with S.C. Crosette Thambiah, P. Nagendra and J. Salwatura forpetitioners
Sarath Silva, D. S. G.. for 1st respondent
K. N. Choksy, P. C. with Romesh de Silva. Dinal Phillips. Kumar Nadesan and Miss P.Ratnayake for 2nd and 3rd respondents.
Cur. adv. vult.
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August 3, 1984.
The two petitioners are the members and office bearers, to wit.President and Hony. Secretary of a Sports Club "The Playing Section ofthe Sri Lanka Tennis Association". The 1st respondent is the Hon.Minister of Sports & Parliamentary Affairs. The 2nd and 3rdrespondents are the office bearers, to wit. President and Hony.Secretary of the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION. The SRI LANKATENNIS ASSOCIATION is the National Association for the sport oftennis, in terms of sections 28 and 29 of the Sports Law No.25 of1973. The Constitution of the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION hasbeen produced as (P 1), and that of the Playing Section of the SRILANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION has been produced as (P 2). TheConstitution (P 2) calls the association in which the petitioners are theoffice bearers, "THE SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION, THEPLAYING SECTION" – Rule (1)
This is an application by the petitioners under Article 140 of theConstitution for a mandate in the nature of a Writ of Certiorari to quashthe direction issued to the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION by the1st respondent the Minister of Sports under section 39(1) of theSports Law, by letter dated 25.5.1984 (P4A) as amended by letterdated 28.5.1984 (P4C) to which is annexed a sketch of the TennisCourts (P4B). The letter (P4A) was a direction asfollows :-"Considering that the development and promotion of thesport of Lawn Tennis in Sri Lanka is seriously impeded by the lack ofnecessary facilities to carry out coaching and training programmes, Ihereby specially direct you in terms of section 39(1) of the Sports LawNo. 25 of 1973, to make available 14 Courts (numbers given)
situated at your premisesand depicted in the sketch annexed
hereto, with immediate effect, to carry out coaching and trainingprogrammes at a national level". There is a further direction to makeavailable the facilities and the pavilion in the premises to personsengaged in or connected with such coaching and trainingprogrammes.
The petitioners allege that the Tennis Courts situated in thepremises are at present "lawfully in the possession of the said PlayingSection of the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION, and they are underthe control of the Committee, and after due notice some of thesecourts are reserved for the use of the SRI LANKA TENNIS
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ASSOCIATION for temporary purposes set out in the rules". For thisposition taken up in the petition, the petitioners have relied on theConstitution of the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION (P1), Rules27(d) and (f), and also Rule 11(b) of the Constitution (P2) of thePlaying Section. Though in the petition it is not directly said so, it isclear that the position taken up by the petitioners in this petition is thatwhat the petitioners called "The Playing Section of the SRI LANKATENNIS ASSOCIATION" is a separate and independent body vis-a-visthe SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION, subject to certain rules of theSRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION'S Constitution. In the counterobjections filed by the petitioners dated 13.7.84, the petitioners moredirectly take up the position that they are the office bearers of anindependent body, the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION PlayingSection, which is the name given to this body in its Constitution (P2).
The petitioner's case is that the 1st respondent the Hon. Ministerhad no power to issue this general direction (P4A) in terms of section39( 1) of the Sports Law, and as such the said direction is unlawful andillegal. That in any case the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION cannotcomply with the direction of the 1 st respondent as all the courts interms of rules 27 (d) and (/) (PI) are in the control of the PlayingSection and the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION has only the rightto use such courts for several temporary purposes. Due to the aboveand other reasons adduced in the petition (not relevant to the presentmatter before me) the petitioners moved for a Writ to quash thedirections of the Hon. Minister, and for an order on the respondentsstaying the implementation of the said direction, until the hearing andfinal determination of this application. This application of thepetitioners was supported before another Bench on 8.6.1984 and onthat day notice was issued on the respondents, and also an interimorder directing the 3rd respondent to stay the implementation of thedirection given by the 1 st respondent in letter (P4A) read with (P4B)and (P4C) till 26.6.1984 was issued. The proceedings of 8.6.1984were ex parte proceedings. When this application was called on25.6.1984 the 2nd and 3rd respondents appeared in court andobjected to the extension of this interim stay order. The courtextended the stay order till 9.7.1984 and fixed the application forinquiry into the objection to the extension of the stay order for9.7.1984. It is this objection to the extension of the interim stay orderby the respondents (and the resistance to the non-extension of thestay order by the petitioners) that is, the subject matter of this inquiry.From 9.7.1984 this matter was argued for several days.
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The 1st respondent the Hon. Minister has by an affidavit dated21.6.1984 filed objections to this application to quash the saiddirection issued by him. P 4A P 4B and P 4C). He has set out thecircumstances which led him to make this direction and justifies theissue of the direction. In paragraph 15(7) of the affidavit, the 1strespondent affirms that "on a consideration of the recommendationmade to me by the said Committee and in view of the immediate needas aforesaid to improve the standard of the sports, as a first measure,
I issued the direction in P4Ato carry out coaching and training
programmes at a National Level".
The 2nd and 3rd respondents have filed their objections by way ofpetition and affidavit dated 21.6.1984, and also prayed Court not toextend the stay order issued on 8.6.1984. The 2nd and 3rdrespondents have averred that the direction made by the Hon.Minister is lawful, and have further stated that the Playing Section ofthe SRI L4NKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION by virtue of its Constitution isneither a member of the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION noraffiliated to the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION, but was a sectionof the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION, and the Playing Section hadno independent status in fact or in law. These respondents havefurther taken up the position that the tennis courts were always in thepossession and control of the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION,which was exercised by the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATIONthrough its Playing Section. The respondents are denying that thePlaying Section has any powers or authority more than thosedelegated to it by the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION under itsConstitution. Having set up this position in law and in fact, the 2nd and3rd respondents have proceeded to set out the following matters. Asthe material in the objections which I now refer to have become veryimportant for the decision of the matter presently before me, I willrefer to them with reference to the paragraphs-
Paragraph 23 (a) – The S.L.T.A. in order to further the sport oftennis had decided to launch a coaching scheme with specialemphasis on the youth of the country.
Paragraph 23 (b)- The S.L.T.A. had a pool of about 50 youthsfor training and engaged the services of a professional coach oneMr. Neville Senaratne.
Duwearatchi v. Vincent Perera (Seneviratne. J.)
Paragraph 24-Thereupon the S.L.T.A. wished to have the use ofsome of the said tennis courts which had been managed by thePlaying Section. This was objected to by certain individuals of thePlaying Section.
Paragraph 34 is as follows
The respondents state further that irremediable damage will becaused to the S.L.T.A., if the stay order granted in this application isextended further than 26.6.1984 ; in thatParagraph 34 (a)-All preparations to conduct the first ever JuniorInternational Tennis Championships in Sri Lanka (an internationallyrecognised ranking tournament) due to commence on 17.8.1984have come to a halt.
The rest of the paragraphs 34 (b) and (c) set out more facts about thisinternational tournament.
Paragraph 34 (d) and (e) state as follows :
the coaching and training of the national squad tor theaforementioned tournament has come to a standstill ;
the Inter Club Tournament had to be postponed ;
Having made these averments, in prayer (b), it is prayed that the"court be pleased not to extend the stay order issued in theapplication".
The petitioners have, by petition and affidavit dated 3.7.1984, filedobjections to this application of the 2nd and 3rd respondents for thedissolution and/or non-extension of the interim stay order. In theseobjections the petitioners directly indicate that the Playing Section is anindependent body. These objections deal mainly with two matters.Paragraphs 1 – 15 of the affidavit filed by the petitioners deal with thedisputes that have arisen between what is called the Playing Sectionand the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION. Paragraph 17 to the lastparagraph in the affidavit, paragraph 25, deal with the affidavit filed bythe 1 st respondent. It is relevant to the matter before me to note thatthese counter objections and the affidavit do not controvertparagraphs 23 (a) and (b). and paragraph 34 of the affidavit filed bythe 2nd and 3rd respondents, as regards the matters pleaded by themin paragraphs 23 and 34 of their petition. Failure to controvert theseaffirmations or the silence regarding these affirmations, has a directand vital bearing on the matter before me, that is, whether to extend
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the interim stay order or not. The 2nd and 3rd respondents havefurther filed an affidavit by Camilus Senaratne the professional TennisCoach, who has been engaged by the SRI LANKA TENNISASSOCIATION for their coaching programmes. Camilus Senaratneaffirms to the coaching programmes launched by the SRI LANKATENNIS ASSOCIATION and to the conduct of the internationaltournament which is planned by the SRI LANKA TENNISASSOCIATION. There is no affidavit from the petitioners or from anyother person contradicting the affirmations in the affidavit of CamilusSenaratne.
From the relevant averments and affirmations in the pleadings of theparties – petitions and affidavits which I have referred to – thefollowing serious matters in dispute or debatable and contentiousmatters surface :
whether generally the direction issued by the Hon. Minister isvalid under section 39 (1) of the Sports Law ;
whether the "Playing Section" of the SRI LANKA TENNISASSOCIATION is a body independent and separate from theSRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION or is a section of the SRILANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION ;
whether the possession and the control of the Tennis Courts inthe SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION premises is in the SRILANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION or the Playing Section of the SRILANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION.
The immediate matter before me is the application of the 2nd and3rd respondents not to extend the stay order, and conversely theapplication of the petitioners for a stay order till the determination ofthis application. I will now deal with these immediate matters whichare before this court. For this purpose, I am of the view that it isnecessary for this court to form a tentative view, subject to a finaldecision at the hearing of this application, regarding the dispute No. 2set out by me above. The first reference to the Playing Section of theSRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION is in rule 7 (c) of the constitution(PI), which states – 'All Associates, life Associates and honorary LifeAssociates shall be eligible to apply for Membership in the PlayingSection of the Association". The membership of the Association is setout in section 3 of the Rules. It is clear from rule 2 that themembership of this Association is only available to a group of personsand not to individuals. Rule 4 states – 'Associateship in the
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Association shall be available to any individual who is interested inTennis". Thus, rule 4 should be read with rule 7 (c). The next rule thatdeals with the Playing Section is rule 27, and rule 27 (d), which dealswith the tennis courts in the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATIONpremises is a matter highly in dispute in this application before me.Rule 27 (h) sets out that – the Playing Section shall be deemed to be aMember of the Association for the purposes of rules set out therein". Itis the interpretation of these clauses that will result in determining thestatus of this Playing Section vis a vis the SRI LANKA TENNISASSOCIATION. Some light is thrown on this matter by document(R1 A), which contains a part of a speech made by the 1st petitioner,who is the current President of the Playing Section, and also a person,who has held high office in the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATIONitself. In this speech (R1A), the 1st petitioner has stated asfollows : – "There is an impression that the Parent Body and thePlaying Section are two separate entities, and should act
independently. This is not soThe Playing
Section is the creation of the Association." There was no explanationoffered for this speech and the position set out therein, except a barestatement by the learned counsel for the petitioners that a legalinterpretation of the rules particularly rule 27 cannot be based on thatspeech. In this matter, such as the one before me, where I amconsidering an interim order before a final order is made, the positionin law is that the court can express for the purpose of a decision aprima facie and a tentative opinion subject to a final decision. I am ofthe view that on the plain construction of the provisions in theconstitution of the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION, which I haveset out above read with the enunciation of the constitution by the 1 stpetitioner in (R1A) prima facie it appears that the Playing Section isonly "a section of the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION" and "is acreation of the Association". I must reiterate that this prima facie viewis only expressed for the decision of the matter before me, and issubject to a final decision. However, I must add that I am able to formthis tentative view because both eminent counsel for the petitionersand the 2nd and 3rd respondents devoted a major portion of theirarguments to submissions on the relation of the Playing Section to theSRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION.
I will now come to the matter that is immediately before me, i.e. theapplication in respect of the interim stay order issued. The Hon.Minister's directive directs the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION to
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make available the 14 Courts (Numbers given with reference to sketchP4B) "with immediate effect to carry out the coaching and trainingprogrammes at a national level". The petitioners in their petition statethat there are 23 courts in the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATIONpremises, the control and possession of which according topetitioners is vested in the Playing Section. In terms of rule 27 (t) thecourts are made available to the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATIONfor use for the purpose set out therein, i.e. mainly for tournaments andmatches. The Playing Section has also voluntarily made 7 courtspermanently available to the SRI LANKA TENNIS ASSOCIATION forcoaching and training programmes. Four courts have been set apartfor the coaching programmes of the Playing Section. Thus, only 12courts are left for the use of the Playing Section which has about 250members. As a counter to this affirmation, the 2nd and 3rdrespondents have affirmed to the fact that only about 40 members ofthe Playing Section turned up daily for, what both parties call"recreational tennis". The 2nd and 3rd respondents have affirmed thatafter the direction (P4A), i.e. from 29th May, the SRI LANKA TENNISASSOCIATION have used the courts Nos. 1-14, and that the PlayingSection used the courts 15-23 till there was an interruption. But thepetitioners in the counter affidavit have denied that the direction of theHon. Minister was at all implemented. In any case the 2nd and 3rdrespondents have not denied the affirmation of the petitionersregarding the use and distribution of the courts before the directive.Both parties agreed that the effect of the Hon. Minister's directive willbe that the Playing Section will be reduced to the use of 9 courts i.e. 3courts less than the number of courts daily in use by the PlayingSection. The petitioners have affirmed that if this direction of the Hon.Minister is implemented it will result in 250 members of the PlayingSection being left with only 9 courts to serve their daily recreationalneeds. This is their main objection – apart from the objections in lawto the implementation of the direction of the Hon. Minister.
Thus, it is clear that the ground on which the petitioners haveobtained the interim stay order is that if the Minister's direction isimplemented the Playing Section will be reduced to the use of only 9courts from the 12 courts, which are now in use by this section.
I have set out with reference to paragraphs, the affirmations of the2nd and 3rd respondents regarding the need for the use of courts fortraining programmes. In the course of the argument the issue raised
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was whether the reasons adduced by the 2nd and 3rd respondentsagainst the extension of the stay order should be confined toparagraph 34 of their objections of 21.6.19134 referred to by meabove, or whether the reasons for the application of these tworespondents should also include the averments in paragraphs 23 (a)and 23 (b). I am of the view that the application of these tworespondents not to extend the stay order issued is based on theaverments contained in paragraphs 23 (a) and 23 (b), and the furthergrounds which should be considered as of immediate necessity arecontained in paragraph 34 – the forthcoming Junior InternationalTournament due to commence on 17.8.1984, for which a coachingprogramme for the Juniors will have to be undertaken. It would beerroneous to confine the objections of these respondents toparagraph 34 only. The case of the Petitioners is that there is no suchJunior International Tournament due to take place. But though it is sostated from the Bar, the petitioners have safely avoided contradictingthe affirmations to this effect in the respondents' affidavit – paragraph34 (a) to (e). Without any such affirmation, these objections to thevacation of the interim stay order can only be explained on the basis ofthe intense acrimony prevailing between the petitioners and the 2ndand 3rd respondents.
As regards the issue of an interim stay order in a Writ application,the court is guided by certain principles. In this instance, there is anadditional and important aspect to be considered in relation to thisstay order. The direction of the Hon. Minister, whether lawful orunlawful (to be decided later) has been made on the face of it, to aNational Association and quite patently in the public interest, thecause of national sport – Tennis. No mala fides whatsoever has beenalleged against the Hon. Minister. It is in this background that theconflicting contentions of the petitioners, and the 2nd and 3rdrespondents regarding the interim stay order issued should beconsidered.
The main factor to be considered by a court for the issue of ornon-issue of a stay order (in this instance the vacation of a stay order)has been set out by his Lordship SamarakoQn. C.J., in the case ofBillimoria v. Minister of Lands, Land Development and MahaweiiDevelopment and Two Others (1). This decision dealt with the issue ofa stay order in an application for a Writ of Certiorari. Samarakoon, C.J.stated the principle as follows “In considering the question we mustbear in mind that a stay order is an incidental order made in the
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exercise of inherent or implied powers of court. Without such powerthe court's final orders in most cases would if the petitioner issuccessful be rendered nugatory, and the aggrieved party will be leftholding an empty decree worthless for all purposes – Vide Bertram,C. J., in Weerasooriya v. Sidambaram Chetty (2)~. His Lordship theChief Justice further observed at page 15 “the interests of justicetherefore required that a stay order be made as an interim measure. Itwould not be correct to judge such stay orders in the same strictmanner as final orders. Interim orders by their very nature mustdepend a great deal on a judge's opinion as to the necessity for interimaction".
A consideration of the authorities shows that two other principles ormatters have been considered in the issue of interim stay orders. 'Thebalance of convenience" of the parties to the dispute has beenconsidered. The balance of convenience has been defined in C. M.Row's Law of Injunction 5th Ed ; (1980) at page 201 as follows ""balance of convenience' means – the comparative mischief or
inconvenience to the partiesIf the inconvenience leans
to the side of the plaintiff then alone interlocutory injunction should begranted".
The term "balance of convenience"- as regards the issue ofinjunctions has been defined in Halsbury's Laws of England – 4th Ed ;Volume 24, para 956 as follows .-"The Court takes intoconsideration the balance of convenience to the parties and the natureof the injury which the defendant, on the one hand, would suffer if theinjunction was granted and he should ultimately turn out to be right,and that which the plaintiff, on the other hand, might sustain if theinjunction was refused and he should ultimately turn out to be right".
The case of Mohamed Felumesh v. S. Mondale and others (3) is acase in which in a writ application the Court considered the balance ofconvenience in the issue of an interim stay order. The Court ruled asfollows :-"The question of balance of convenience poses a moredifficult problem, but, in our opinion, in the facts and circumstances ofthis case, that question should be answered in favour of theappellant". The third principle that has to be considered, which is seenfrom the authorities in the issue of an interim order is whether if aninterim order is not issued "irreparable and irremediable mischief orinjury" will be caused to a party. In C. M. Row's book referred to above- page 201 "Irreparable injury" has been defined as – "injury which
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cannot be adequately remedied by damages'. State of Orissa v.Madan Gopal (4) is a case in which an application for a Writ ofMandamus was made against the State of Orissa, under Article 226,and 131 of the Constitution of India. The High Court issued an interimorder, on the ground that the respondents’ unless protected by theCourt would undergo irreparable and irremediable loss of possession
of the mining leasesof immense value hardly capable of
being remedied by payments of money as compensation", against theState of Orissa to refrain from disturbing the petitioners' possessionover some mining areas.
The first test given above, whether if an interim stay order is notissued the relief which the petitioners will get will be renderednugatory is a matter of importance and relevance to be considered inthis instance. This principle is also connected to the other principle ofthe balance of convenience of the parties. But it miist be stated that inthis instance I am really considering the negative aspect of theseprinciples, i.e. whether the interim stay order already issued shouldnot be extended but vacated and dissolved. It is quite clear that if theHon. Minister's order in (P4A) is implemented till the finaldetermination of this application, the ultimate relief the petitioners willget if successful, will in no manner be rendered nugatory. The situationof the ultimate relief obtained being rendered nugatory, if an interimstay order is not issued, arises, inter alia, in a category of writapplications dealing with the vesting of property in Land Acquisition,under the Ceiling and Housing Property Law, and such like instances.The inconvenience that will result to the petitioners from thenon-extension of the stay order will be that the Playing Section will berestricted to a lesser number of courts, i.e. only 9 courts till thedetermination of the application. The balance of convenience wouldcertainly tilt in favour of the petitioners if the non-extension of this stayorder would result in the petitioners being deprived completely of theuse of any courts, and as such, prevented from indulging in dailyrecreational tennis. On the other hand, as regards the balance ofconvenience the application for the vacation of this interim stay orderis not based on any personal interest of the 2nd and 3rd respondents,such as indulging in recreational tennis by them, to the exclusion of thepetitioners and the members of the Playing Section. In this instancethe application for the non-extension or vacation of the stay order isnot for any personal benefit of the 2nd and 3rd respondents, but ismade in the interests of a national sports body, the SRI LANKA
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TENNIS ASSOCIATION, for national interest – "coaching and trainingprogrammes at a national level" (P4A) generally, and immediately forstaging a Junior International Tennis Championship Tournament.
For these reasons –
That the non-extension or the vacation of the interim stay orderwill not render nugatory any final relief, which will be obtainedby the petitioners in this application, if successful; and
That the balance of convenience is not in favour of theextension of the interim stay order-
I hold that the interim stay order issued against the 2nd and 3rdrespondents on 8.6.1984 should not be extended and should bevacated and dissolved. The stay order issued on 8.6.1984 is notextended and is vacated and dissolved.
I have carefully considered the quantum of costs that should beordered against the petitioners, who have resisted the application. Thehearing of this application proceeded for several days. Futher, this isan instance in which some compromise was possible but thepetitioners were not prepared to do so due to the acrimony prevailing.These matters in my view should be considered in awarding costs. Iorder the petitioners to pay the 2nd and 3rd respondents as costs ofthis inquiry Rs. 2,500. The application of the 2nd and 3rdrespondents is allowed with costs fixed at Rs. 2,500.
SIVA SELLIAH, J. – I agree.
DUWEARATCHI AND ANOTHER v. VINCENT PERERA AND OTHERS