In her statement of objections the Petitioner does not dispute theownership of the respondent to the relevant property and submits thatthe aforesaid property was rented out by the successor to therespondent to Benedict Fonseka her husband for a monthly rental ofthirty five Rupees; that since 1960 the husband of the Petitioner enjoyedthe buildings in the property as a tenant, and that since the death ofher husband, the Petitioner has become the statutory tenant. On
it is apparently an original receipt

examination of the original receipt
Sri Lanka Law Reports
(2006) 3 Sri LR.
presume that the signature and every other part of such documentwhich purports to be in the handwriting of any particular person is inthat person’s hand writing and in the case of a document executed orattested, that it was duly executed and attested by the person bywhom it purports to be executed."
It was submitted on behalf of the Respondent that the Petitionerhad shown the Power of Attorney Holder of the Respondent (father ofthe Respondent) and said that it was he who had given the receipts!and other receipts. It was pointed out that the receipt sought to bemarked as si was signed by Emaly C.Cooray, and that this too indicatesthat the Petitioner had failed to identify si. It was also averred onbehalf of the respondent that si had not been properly listed, as thelist of documents refer to assessment No. 238/1, although thedocument relates to assessment No. 238. It was further pointed outthat the explanation to section 154 of the Civil Procedure Code statesthat if on the document being tendered the opposing party objects toits being admitted in evidence, two questions arise for the Court, firstlywhether the document is authentic, in other words whether it is whatthe party tendering represents it to be. Secondly whether it constituteslegally admissible evidence as against the party who is sought to beaffected by it. This principle it was submitted is contained in
R. S. R. Coomaraswamy’s “The Law of Evidence," Volume II Book 1at page 116.
Section 155 of the Civil Procedure Code was also referred to by theRespondent, which states "Before a witness is allowed to, in anyway,identify a document, he should generally be made, by properquestioning, to state the grounds of his knowledge with regard to it."
The Petitioner although suffering from weak eye sight and beingilliterate, in evidence had admitted her difficulty in identifying si ,andalso displayed a lack of knowledge with regard to the relevantcircumstances under which si was written. In her evidence she statedthat Emaly Cooray had probably signed si and other receipts whichwere given to her husband Benedict Fonseka, although she did notsee the transaction. A close analysis of the evidence of the Petitioner,reveals her incapacity to identify si, her lack of knowledge of the relevantcircumstances, and the fact that the Learned District Judge has not
Jeewananda and Another vs. Land Reform Commission
and Others
violated sections 151,154 and 155 of the Civil Procedure Code is alsotaken into consideration.
We are of the view that the Learned District Judge of Panadura hascorrectly evaluated the evidence of the Petitioner, and has rightlyrefused to permit the document sought to be marked as ©1 as it hasnot been properly identified by the Petitioner.
For the aforesaid reasons we dismiss this appeal of the Petitionerwithout costs and confirm the order of the Learned District Judge ofPanadura dated 30.10.2003 (P5).
Appeal dismissed.