029-nlr-nlr-v-02-the-government-agent-southern-province-v-karolis-et-al
( 72 )
1896.June 11.
THE GOVERNMENT AGENT, SOUTHERN PROVINCE, v.
KAROLIS et al.
D. C., Galle, 2,910.
Donation to minor—Presumption as to acceptance on his behalf—Posset,-sion by parents of minor of property donated.
The law favours the acceptance of gifts in the case of minors.The acceptance on the face of the deed by some person or other isnot necessary : acceptance will be presumed when there are circum-stances to justify such presumption. Where, therefore, it wasfound that property gifted to minors had come into the possessionof their parents, the presumption was that the parents enteredinto such possession on behalf of the children. If the interest andthe duty of the parents were in conflict, the presumption was thatthey did their duty to their-children. There was, therefore,.in thecircumstances, a sufficient acceptance of the gift on behalf of thedonees.
fj^HE facts of the case sufficiently appear in the judgment.
Weinman, for appellant.
Asserappa, for respondent.
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• 11th Jane, .1896. Bonsbb, C.J.—
This is a compensation matter. It appears that in 1846 theowner of a garden by a deed of donation gifted that garden, or atall event® a definite portion on the western side, to two of hiB grand-children, the first defendant and his brother David, who were thechildren of his son Juanis. He recited in that deed that the occasionof this gift was the weaning of the first defendant. Therefore, atthe date of this gift the first defendant and his brother were infants,who could not themselves accept the deed of donation, for, accordingto law, acceptance is necessary. But, as was pointed out in- thecase of Francisco v. Coda et al. {8 SJ3.C. 189), by Mr. Justice Dias,the law favours the acceptance of a gift in the case of minors. It wassuggested by Mr. Asserappa that an acceptance on the face of thedeed by some person or other was necessary. That is clearly wrong.Vanderlinden, at page 124, states that “ it is immaterial whether“ the acceptance is made in the instrumentItself, by a letter, or in“ any other way, provided it is sufficiently clear.” And in the caseof Lokuhamy et al. v. Juan et al. (Ramandthan, 1875, p. 215), to whichmy brother Lawrie has called attention, it was laid down by thisCourt that acceptance will be presumed when there are circumstancesto justify such a presumption. Now, in the present case, we havethis circumstance, found by the District Judge,-that this jiropertycame into the possession of Juanis, the father, and his wife, themother, of the infants. In my opinion, we ought to presume thatthey entered into possession of it on behalf of the children. If theirinterest and their duty were in conflict, we ought to presume thatthey did their duty by their children. I therefore dissent from thefinding of the District Judge, that he has “ no hesitation in saying“ that the deed of gift on which the first defendant relies was never“ accepted.” In my opinion, we are bound to hold that it wasaccepted. That being so, the first defendant would be entitled to amoiety of the purchase money. With respect to the moiety belong-ing to David, it is stated that David is missing It is not provedthat he is dead; therefore, the Court is not in a position to dealwith the moiety of the purchase money which represents his share.It must remain in Court until it is proved that David is dead. Thenthose who are his heirs will be entitled to apply to have it paid out tothem.
o
Lawrie, J., agreed.
1896.
June 11.