047-NLR-NLR-V-20-MARKANDU-et-al.-v.-VYTIALINGAM.pdf
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W7.Present: Wood Benton C.J. and De Sampayo J.
MARKANDU et al. v. VYTIALINGAM.
117—D. 0. Jaffna, 3,344.
Tesswslamai—Person dying issueleet leaving grandfather andgrand-
uncles and grandaunts—Inheritance,
A, a Tamil subject to the Tesatoalamai, died intestate and issue-ices, leave her eurviving a grandfather (B) (father’s father) andbrothers and sisters of a grandmotner (father's mother).The
property in question was inherited by A from her father, whoinherited the same from his mother.
Held, that B was entitled to A's estate to the exclusion of A'sgranduncles and grandaunts.
rj HE facts are set out in the judgment.
Bawa, K.C. (with him Arulanandan), for appellants.—Accordingto the Tesaivalamai the property must go to the source from whichit came.' Espari Amma’s father inherited the property from hismother. The property should, therefore, go back to the heirs ofEspari Amma’s grandmother. The Ordinance of 1911 has notexpressly altered the law on this point. We must not construe thatthe section (29) was intended to alter the law, unless it is quite clearthat that was the intention of the Legislature. Counsel citedThiagarajah v. Paranchotipillai.1
Balaeingkam (with him Joseph), for the respondent (not calledupon).. ..
Cur. adv. vult. .
November 21, 1917. Wood Rbnton C.J.—^
The material facts are these: Espari Amma, a Tamil lady, diedunmarried and without issue, leaving certain property which she hadinherited from her father Siva Subramaniam. Siva Subramaniamhad himself inherited it from his mother Siva Kami. In a contestfor the grant of letters of administration to Espari Amma's estate,both sides have agreed that the question of title to this propertyshall be determined. The claimants are, on the one side, the nearestrelatives of Siva Kami, and, on the other, her surviving husband,Siva Subramaniam’s father. The learned District Judge has heldthat under section 29 of the Jaffna Matrimonial Rights and Inherit-ance Ordinance, 1911,2 on the death of Espari Amma intestateand without issue the property would devolve on her sole survivinggrandparent to the exclusion of relations on the other side. Thisdecision is clearly right. The section is explicit on the point. It
1 (1907) l N. L. R. 315 ; (1903) 12 N. L. R. 345.* No. 1 of 1911.
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provides that “ all the persons above enumerated (viz., children,father, and mother) failing, the property derived by the intestatefrom the father’s side and one-half of the remainder of the intestate'sestate (exclusive of the property derived from the mother’s side)shall devolve on the paternal grandparent or grandparents of theintestate if surviving. " It was urged that section 39 of the Ordi-nance should oe interpreted in the spirit of the principle of theTesavjalamai, affirmed by the Court in Thutgarajah v. Paranchoti-pillai,1 that, on the death of a father, his 'inherited propertyreturns to his own line, while on the death of a mother the dowryreturns to hers. It is, as the learned District Judge has pointedout, in accordance with the principle that the Jaffna MatrimonialBights and Inheritance Ordinance, 1911,* provides that under thecircumstances of Espari Amina's case her property should be divided,and what came from her father should go up along the father’s line.But when we are invited to go further and say that, when EspariAmma’s property has travelled back as far as her father it shouldagain be divided, and that portion of her estate which came to herown father from bis mother should go along the line of Siva Subra-maniam’s mother, we are entitled to look for direct authority forsuch a proposition in the language of the Ordinance of 1911 itself.But the language of section 29 is unambiguous, and must be appliedin its ordinary sense. The appeal must be dismissed. We are askedto order the costs to be paid out of the estate, in view of the noveltyof the point involved in the appeal. ‘Nothing is said on this subject-in the petition of appeal, and there is no record qi any application inregard to it having been made in the District Court. The originalpetitioners do not appeal. I would not interfere with the DistrictJudge's order that they and the appellant should pay the. respond-ent’s costs of contention in the District Court, and would give therespondent the costs of this appeal.
Db Sampayo J.—I agree.Affirmed.
1 (1907) 11 N. L. B. 345 ; {1908) 12 N. L. B. 345.
lfilT.
Wood
Renton C-J7
MariUmduv.
Vytialingam
1 No. 1 cf 1911.