002-NLR-NLR-V-73-THE-COLOMBO-APOTHECARIES-COMPANY-LTD.-Appellants-and-E.-A.-WIJESOORIYA-and-O.pdf
Colombo Apothecaries Company, v. 1 Vijesooriya
S
[Privy Council]
1970 Present: Lord Hodson; Lord Devlin, Lord Donovan,
Lord Wilberforce, and Lord Diplock
THE COLOMBO APOTHECARIES COMPANY LTD., Appellants,and E. A. WIJESOORIYA and Others, Respondents
Privy Council Appeal No. 8 of I960
8. C. 232/67 (JDJLT {121{67)—In the Matter of an Application for aMandate in the nature of a Writ of Prohibition under s. 42 of theCourts Ordinance
Interpretation Ordinance—Section 6 (3) (c)—“ Express provision ”—" Comes intooperation ”—Industrial Disputes (Amendments) Act, No. 39 oj 1968—Changetherein of definition of “ workman **•—Eelrospeclive effect.
Section G (3) (c) of the Interpretation Ordinance reads as follows :—
“ Whenever any written law repeats either in whole or part a former writtenlaw, such repeal shall not, in the absence of any express provision to thateffect, affect or be deemed to have affected any action, proceeding, or thingpending or incompletcd when the repealing written law comes into operation,but every such action, proceeding, or thing may be carried on and completedas if there had been no such repeal. ”
Held', that a simple provision in an amending Act that such Act is to badeemed to come into operation upon a past date is enough without more as an“ express provision ” within the meaning of section 6 (3) of tho InterpretationOrdinance. Accordingly, the change in tho definition of “ workman " madeby the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act No. 39 of 1968 during the pendencyof the present appeal to the Privy Council was expressly brought into operationon 30th December 1957.
A statute may be brought into operation after the date of its enactmentand it can also, provided the language is clear and unambiguous, be mado tooperate before enactment.
J 13285 (4/70)
6
LORD DEVLIX—-Colombo Apothecaries Company Ltd. v. Wijesooriya
.A.PPEAL from a judgment of (he Supreme Court reported in(196S) 70 N. L. R. 4SJ.
M. P. Solomon, with E. Colrcui, for (he employer-appellant.
iSr. Satyendra, with ill. I. Hamavi II an iff a, for the second respondent(the employee).
E. F. N. Gratiacn, Q.C., with R. K. Ilandoo, for the third respondent(the Minister of Labour).
Cur. adv. vull..
January 26, 1970.[Delivered by Lord Deveix]—
The appellants were the employers of the second respondent until they'dismissed him on 5th April 1965, an action which led to proceedingsunder the Industrial Disputes Act (C 131). Their ordships need notdetail the whole history of these proceedings. It is sufficient to saythat on 19th April 1967 the Minister of Labour, who is the third res-pondent, made an order under s. 4 (1) of the Act referring the matteras an industrial dispute to the fifth respondent, who is the President of aLabour Tribunal, for settlement by arbitration ; and on 20th June 1967the appellants filed a Petition in the Supreme Court of Ceylone prayingfor a Mandate in the nature of a Writ of Prohibition forbidding thefifth respondent from entertaining, hearing or determining the proceedings.The contention of the appellants was and is that the Minister had nopower under the Act to make the reference and consequently that theLabour Tribunal had no jurisdiction. Because the application gaverise to some very difficult questions of construction of the Act, the ChiefJustice directed that it should be heard by a Special Bench of SevenJustices. The argument turned to a large extent upon the meaningsto be given to the terms “ workman ” and " industrial dispute ” asthey are used in the Act. On 29th February 1968 the Supreme Courtgave judgment dismissing the application by a majority of 4 to 3. It. is from this judgment that the appellants now appeal to the Board.
On 12th October 1968 assent was given to an Act amending the, Industrial Disputes Act. Among the amendments made by the Industrial• Disputes (Amendments) Act No. 39 of 1968 was a change in the definitionof " workman ”, and the Act provided that the amended definitionshould “ be deemed, for all purposes, to have come into operation onDecember 30th 1957 ”. The appellants concede that if the Boardapplies the Industrial Disputes Act as thus amended, the appeal mustfail. They contend however that the Act should not be so applied andfor this purpose they rely on s. 6 (3) of the Interpretation Ordinance,the material parts of which are as follows :
LORD DEVX.1X—Colombo Apothecaries Company Ltd. v. 1 Yijesooriya
7
" (3) Whenever any written law repeals either in whole or part aformer written law, such repeal shall not, in the absence of an expressprovision to that effect, affect or be deemed to have affected . . .
an}’ action, proceeding, or thing pending or incomplctcd whenthe repealing written law comes into operation, but every suchaction, proceeding, or thing may be carried on and completedas if there had been no such repeal. ”
The appellants submit that the amending Act No. 39 of 196S docs notcontain any “ express provision ” within the meaning of s. 6 (3) andaccordingly that the proceedings now before the Board must bo carriedon as if there had been no change in tho principal Act.
A similar submission was considered and rejected by the Board inNalla Karumbv.ru Kayambu, Shanmugam v. Commissioner for Registrationof Indian and Pakistani Residents J. The Board there laid it down thatwhat was required by s. 6 (3) was an express provision, but not a specificone. Lord Badcliffe said at 527 :
“ To bo * express provision ’ with regard to something it is not1necessary that the thing should bo specially mentioned ; it is sufficient.that it is directly covered by the language however broad the languagemay be which covers it so long as the applicability arises directlyfrom the language used and not by inference therefrom. ”
Mr. Solomon has pointed to differences in the language of tho amendingAct in that case and in this, but in their Lordships’ opinion they are notmaterial. It is true that in Shanmugam's case the wording of the amendingAct was more elaborate, but their Lordships consider that a simpleprovision that the amending Act is to be deemed to come into operationupon a past date is enough without more.
That this must be so is manifest from the language of the InterpretationOrdinance itself. The Ordinance applies to proceedings “pending orincomplctcd when the repealing written law comes into operation ”. TheirLordships cannot accept Mr. Solomon's argument that in this context“ comes into operation ” means “ is enacted Statutes are frequently ‘brought into operation after the date of enactment; and they can also,provided the language is clear and unambiguous, be made to operatebefore enactment. In the present case tho “repealing written law” wasexpressly brought into operation on 30th December 1957, on which date •the present proceedings were not pending or incompleted: so that s..C (3)of the Ordinance docs not apply at a 11^.
For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise Her Majestythat this appeal be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of thisappeal.,
Appeal dismissed.
1 {1962) A: C. 515 ; 64 X. L. R. 29.