A. R. M. BARDEEN, Appellant, and W.A. A. DE SILVA, Respondent

131-NLR-NLR-V-66-A.-R.-M.-BARDEEN-Appellant-and-W.A.-A.-DE-SILVA-Respondent.pdf


TAMBIAH, J.—Bardeen v. de Silva
547
1964Present:Tambiah, J.
A. R. M. BARDEEN, Appellant, and W. A. A. DE SILVA,
Respondent
S. C. 42164 (R. E.)—C. R. Colombo, 86347
Rent Restriction Act, No. 29 of 1948, as amended by Act No. 10 of 1961—Section 13{1A) (b)—Meaning and effect of the phrase “ arrears of rent ”—Notice to quit—Payment of portion of rent thereafter—Maintainability of action.
Where, after a landlord gives his tenant three months’ notice of terminationof tenancy in terms of section 13 (1A) of the Rent Restriction Act, the tenantpays all rents due up to and including the second month of the period of notice,an action in ejectment is not maintainable if it is filed soon after the end of thethird month of the period of notice but before the expiry of one month afterthe rent for that month has become due. The phrase “ arrears of rent ” atthe end of sub-section (b) of section 13 (1A) necessarily refers to the phrase“ rent in arrears for one month after it became due ”, as used previously in thesame section.
uA.PPEAL from a judgment of the Court of Requests, Colombo.
A. R. Candappa, for the Defendant-Appellant.
V. Thillainathan, for the Plaintiff-Respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
December 8, 1964. Tambiah, J.—
The Respondent filed this action on the 5th of November 1963 to ejectthe Appellant from premises No.20 / 9, Mews Street, Slave Island, Colombo,on the ground that the rent had been in arrears.
The following facts are not contested. The Appellant had paid allrents up to February 1963. On the 30th of July 1963, the Respondentgave notice to quit, giving the Appellant three months’ time to quitthe said premises. On the 2nd of September 1963, rents up to the endof August 1963 were paid in by the Appellant. On the 28th of September1963, he paid in rents up to the end of September 1963.
The Respondent contended that the rent for a particular month waspayable on the first of that month but the learned Commissioner ofRequests has held that rent for a particular month was only payableat the end of that month.
54 S
TAMBIAH, J.—Bardeen v. de Silva
The learned Commissioner of Requests, in giving judgment for theRespondent, states “ It appears clear therefore that at the time thenotice to quit was given on 30.7.63 giving the tenant three months’notice of termination of the tenancy, the rent for March to May 1963was in arrears for one month after such rent became due. Even atthe date action was filed, the rent for October 1963 was in arrears forone month after it became due ”.
Counsel for the Respondent contended that once a tenant has been inarrears for one month after it became due, the landlord was vested witha right to bring an action to eject the tenant under the provisions ofsection 13 of the Rent Restriction Act No. 29 of 1948, before it wasamended. The amending Act No. 10 of 1961 gave a concession to thetenant to tender to the landlord all arrears of rent due up to the termina-tion of the notice and since the Appellant has not paid the sum forOctober 1963 on the date when the action is brought, the Respondent’sright to eject the Appellant was in no way affected.
He conceded that in order tt succeed in his contention the words “ upto the date of the termination of notice ” should be read into the statuteafter the words “ tendered to the landlord all arrears of rent ” in section13 (1A) (6) of the Rent Restriction Act, as amended by Act No. 10 of1961. I cannot agree. It is a cardinal rule of construction that wordsshould not be read into a statute unless clear reason for it is to be foundwithin the four comers of the statute itself (vide Vickers v. Evans -1). TheCourts cannot arrogate to themselves the functions of the Legislatureand should confine themselves to the task of interpretation.
The relevant provisions of the Rent Restriction Act (supra). as amendedby Act No. 10 of 1961, read as follows :
“ (1A) The landlord of any premises to which this Act applies shallnot be entitled tc institute any action or proceedings for the ejectmentof the tenant of such premises on the ground that the rent of suchpremises has been in arrear for one month after it has become due—
if the landlord has not given the tenant three months’ notice
of the termination of the tenancy ; or
if the tenant has, before such date as is specified in the landlord’s
notice of such termination, tendered to the landlord allarrears of rent. ”
The phrase “ arrears of rent ”, as used at the end of sub-section (6)above, necessarily referred to the previous “ rent in arrears for one monthafter it became due ”, as used previously in the same section.
It is the intention of the Legislature to give an opportunity to thetenant to pay the arrears of rent, which forms the basis on which theaction is brought, within three months of the notice given by the landlord.If the tenant is in arrears of rent for a subsequent period, the landlord
(1910) L. J. K. B. p. 955.
1
Kanapathy v. Jayasinyha
549
is given the right to bring another action on that basis. If the conten-tion of the Respondent is to be accepted, new obbgations are imposedon the tenant. He has to pay not only the rents claimed to be inarrears for one month after it became due in the plaint, but also allrents payable up to the end of the month terminating the tenancy.
It was not the intention of the Legislature to impose new obbgationson the tenant. Even if a deubt is entertained, the Courts will lean to aconstruction that an enactment is not intended to impose a serious newobligation, but only to provide new or better means of enforcing anexisting obligation (vide Finch v. Bannister1 ; Gaby v. Palmer2; Craieson Statute Law (5th Edn.) p. 111). While the words in a statuteshould be construed according to the context (Craies ibid p. 150, 160),it is a sound rule of construction to give the same meaning to the samewords occurring in different parts of an Act of Parliament (vide Courtauldv. Leghz).
Adopting these canons of construction, this action cannot bemaintained. I am of the view that the finding that, at the date theaction was filed, the appellant was in arrears of rents for October 1963,for one month after it had become due, cannot be supported in view ofthe learned Commissioner’s finding that rent for a particular month*became due only after the end of that month. Therefore the plaintiffcannot maintain this action.
Eor these reasons, I set aside the judgment and the order < f the learnedCommissioner cf Requests and dismiss the plaintiff’s action with costs.The appellant is entitled to the costs of the appeal.
Appeal allowed.