010-NLR-NLR-V-50-ABDEEN-Appellant-and-MILLER-CO.-LTD.-Respondent.pdf
A-bdeen v. Miller <fc Co., Ltd.
43
1948
Present: Nagalingam J.
ABDEEN, Appellant; and MILLER & CO., LTD., Respondent.S. C. 56—C. R. Colombo, 6,402.
Rent Restriction Ordinance—Premises required by plaintiff—Alternativeaccommodation available to defendant—No effort to secure it—Plaintiffentitled to ejectment—Section 8 (c)—Ordinance No. 60 of 1942.
Where a landlord wants the premises for the purpose of his businessand the tenant has made no effort to secure other accommodation whichmight have been available, the landlord is entitled to a decree for eject-ment under section 8 (c) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance.
44
NAGAXiXNGAM J.—Abdeen v. Miller <fe Co., Ltd.
^^^PPEAti from a judgment of the Commissioner of Requests, Colombo.
H. V. Perera, K.C., with M. A. M. Hussein, for plaintiff, appellant.
S. J. Kadirgamer, for defendant, respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
November 12, 1948. Nagauhgam J.—
The Commissioner of Requests has dismissed the appellant’s claimto have the defendant company ejected from certain premises of whichthe latter was tenant under the former. The sole point that arisesfor determination in this case is whether the landlord, the appellant,has in terms of section 8 (c) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, No. 60of 1942, been able to make out a case from which the Court could cometo the conclusion that the premises are reasonably required for thepurposes of the trade or business of the plaintiff. That the plaintiff is awealthy landowner owning property in the Port, Pettah and Maradana,not to enumerate all his other possessions, is not in dispute. That heis also one who carries on business in the purchase and sale of rubberis equally beyond controversy. He also alleges that he is engaged inan import and export trade and that although he is even now dealingin tea and importing large quantities of goods, he is anxious to expandhis tea business by opening a new line of business in respect of thatcommodity for the purpose of which he requires storage accommodationand that of the several properties owned by him, the most suitable andthe one which would cause the least inconvenience to any of his tenantsis the premises rented out to the defendant. The plaintiff thereforesays he gave notice to the defendant terminating the tenancy. Allthe other properties of the plaintiff are in occupation of tenants whocarry on business in them and those tenants would be entitled to claimthe benefit of the provisions of the Rent Restriction Ordinance to thesame extent as the tenant in the case of Chinasena v. 8angaralinga/m,Pillai l.
On behalf of the defendant company, however, it was suggested thatthe plaintiff did not require the premises for any bona fide purpose ofhis own, but that his sole interest in wanting to obtain possession of thepremises was due to a desire on his part to let out the premises at ahigher rental, meaning thereby a rental in excess of that permitted underthe Ordinance. The learned Commissioner observes that he is notsatisfied on the evidence before him that the plaintiff required the pre-mises bona fide for the purpose of his business ” and without goingfurther into any detailed examination of any question affecting theavailability of alternative accommodation to the defendant Companyhas dismissed the plaintiff’s action.
It has been strenuously contended that there was no material uponwhich the learned Commissioner could have come to this conclusion.The Commissioner seems to have been influenced by the suggestionreferred to earlier that this was a mala fide attempt on the part of the1 (1948) 49 N. L. R. 473.
45
NAGAX.INGAM J.—Abdeen v. Miller & Co., Ltd.
plaintiff to terminate tile defendant company’s tenancy to secure ahigher rental. The only basis for this suggestion was an allegationthat the defendant had claimed rent at Rs. 225 while the rent payableunder the Ordinance was only Rs. 150 at the time he made the demand.The plaintiff denied that he ever demanded any higher rent than whatwas allowed to him imder the law and was able to establish that thesum of Rs. 225 claimed by him properly represented one month’s rentof Rs. 150 and a sum of Rs. 75 being arrears in respect of the rent for fiveprevious months during which period the defendant Company had paida lower rent than what was allowed under the Ordinance. Notwith-standing this clear and incontrovertible explanation on the part of theplaintiff, which was not thereafter pursued by defendant Company’sCounsel, the suggestion of the defendant Company appears to havetaken deep root in the mind of the learned Commissioner.
The learned Commissioner also took the view that the plaintiff’sevidence should have been corroborated in regard to the extent of thebusiness carried on by him and to the necessity of his wanting thesepremises for the purpose of his own business. No corroboration wouldhave been possible from any outside sources unless it be that the plaintiffmay have been expected to produce all his business correspondenceand place them before Court. Counsel for the plaintiff contends that therewas no reason for the plaintiff to anticipate that his evidence would notbe accepted. The ease of the plaintiff was contrasted with that of alessee who may want to make a few rupees more by turning out a tenantin occupation and re-letting it to another, but here was a very wealthyman to whom a few rupees would not have offered such a large induce-ment as to make him perpetrate an offence under the statute. On theother hand the learned Commissioner seems to have been satisfied withthe sole and uncorroborated testimony of the Accountant of the defendantCompany who, although he had been in the firm for twenty years, wasunable to answer a simple question put to him in cross-examination,to which I shall advert presently. Considering the position of theplaintiff and the defendant Company’s Accountant there can be littledoubt but that the plaintiff is in a much better position in life and en-joys a status much higher than that of the Accountant. I am not pre-pared to hold that the plaintiff’s evidence should not be taken at itsface value, especially as that evidence remained unshaken under cross-examination, and the Commissioner has not disbelieved the evidenceof the plaintiff, which he very well could not have done.
In the view I have taken of the plaintiff’s case, it becomes necessaryto consider in view of the decision of G'unasena v. Sangaralingam Pillai{supra) what alternative accommodation is available to the defendantCompany. The defendant Company is one which is the lessee or ownerof very large premises—premises so large for its own business that ithas deemed it necessary to sublet various portions of the property toother tenants. The premises in question are used by the defendantCompany as a canteen or a recreation room for the benefit of its clerks.The Accountant of the defendant Company stated that he had advertisedin the papers for alternative accommodation but obtained no response.The matter was probed further and he was asked the question to which
jayaxoidarenie v. Don Leuns.
46
I have already made reference, namely, whether if the defendant Companysent out one of its sub-tenants, there would be alternative accommodationavailable to run the canteen for the clerks. The Accountant took um-brage under the statement that he could not answer that question. •If this answer of his is correct, it is obvious that as the defendant Companyhas put him forward as a responsible officer who could conduct its liti-gation, it must follow that his inability to answer can only mean that noserious or determined efforts have been made to find alternative accom-modation apart from a perfunctory notice inserted in the press in thehope that that action by itself would pass muster in a Court of law.
The position, therefore, is that the plaintiff wants the premises for thepurposes of his business, and the defendant Company has accommodationof its own which would serve its needs just as well as the plaintiff’spremises, but that the defendant Company has made no effort to takesteps to secure such accommodation.
In this state of facts, it will be unreasonable to deny the plaintiff hisclaim. I would therefore set aside the judgment of the Commissionerof Requests and allow the appeal with eosts in both Courts.
Appeal allowed.