084-NLR-NLR-V-06-ABERAJENDERA-v.-GOVERNMENTAGENT-CENTRAL-PROVINCE.pdf
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IMS.March 20.
ABERAJENDBRA v. GOVERNMENT AGENT,
CENTRAL PROVINCE.
D. C., Kandy, 11.
Forest, chena, waste, or unoccupied lands—Ordinance No. 1 of 1897—Bightof private individual to withdraw from proceedings begun under tkerOrdinance—Section 19 of Ordinance No. 1 of 1897 and Civil ProcedureCode, s. 408.
11 a person interested in a forest, chena, waste, or unoccupied hud.appears in a proceeding instituted under the Ordinance No. 1 of. 1887,he cannot withdraw from it.
The provision in section 18 of that Ordinance, that the proceedingsheld under it shall be regulated so far as they can be by the Code ofCivil Procedure, means,' "so far as such procedure is consistent. with theprovisions of the Ordinance No. 1 of 1897. ”
As the object of the Ordinance iB to provide for the speedy adjudi-cation of claims to forest, chena, waste, and unoccupied lands, ' thewithdrawal of a claimant from the proceedings, if allowed, would beinconsistent with the object and spirit of the Ordinance.
rpHE plaintiff appealed in this ease against an order of thefl District Judge of Kandy refusing to allow him to withdrawfrom certain proceedings taken under the Ordinance No. 1 of 1897.The District Judge held that the plaintiff was not entitled to askpermission to withdraw his action.
DomkoT8t, K.C., for plaintiff, appellant.
Fernando, C.C., for respondent.
26th March, 1903. Layard, C.J.—
I think the District Judge was. right. The Ordinance No. 1 of1897 was expressly enacted by the Legislature for the purpose ofmaking special provisions for the speedy adjudication of claims tocertain classes of lands, such as forests, chena, waste, and unoccu-pied land. The Legislature gave the power to officers of the Crownto compel parties to bring forward their claims under that Ordi-nance, the policy of the Ordinance being that the chums of privateindividuals and of the Crown should be settled as speedily as possi-ble. There is no provision in the Ordinance which would enable aprivate individual who has been forced into Court under the provi-sions of the Ordinance of 1897 to' withdraw proceedings. It wasurged, however, that in view of the provisions of section 18 of theOrdinance the right to apply for the withdrawal of an .action underthe provisions of section 406 of the Civil Procedure Code is reservedto the private individual who has been brought into Court under
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the provisions of Ordinance No. 1 of 1897. It appears to me that 1903.seotion 13 of the Ordinance only provides that the proceedings Marches.under the Ordinance No. 1 of 1897 shall be regulated so far as they Lavab»,C.J.can be by the Code of Civil Procedure when there is no specialprovisions in the Ordinance of 1897 to regulate such proceedings.
The words “ so far as they can be ” used in section 18 I construeas meaning so far -as such procedure, is consistent with theprovisions of Ordinance No. 1 of 1897. I do not think, as the objectof the- provision of Ordinance No. 1 of 1897 is the speedy adjudica-tion of all chums in respect of the olass of land mentioned in theOrdinance and to enforce a settlement thereof,, that the plaintiffcan nlaim to withdraw his action under the provisions of seotion 406of the Code of Civil Procedure. The withdrawal of the actionif allowed would be inconsistent with the object and spirit of theOrdinance No. 1 of 1897, namely, the speedy adjudication of claims.
. I therefore think the District Judge is right, and the appealshould be dismissed with costs.
Wendt, J.—
The Ordinance does not leave the plaintiff any option as to thetime of his coming into Court. The moment the reference ismade upon a dispute with the Government Agent the claimant isrequired by notice to file his statement of claim and is obliged todo so.
As the Chief Justice has pointed out, that is in keeping with theobject of the Ordinance, which is to bring claims to waste lands toa prompt settlement. It is also worthy of notice that in section 13 ofthe Ordinance No. 1 of 1897 the words " so far as they can be ” do notstand alone, they follow the words “ except as in this Ordinanceprovided; ” and I think that shows that the former phrase was notintended merely to meet some casus omissus in the Ordinance.
I agree with the Chief Justice in thinking that the meaning to beattached to that phrase is, " so far as is consistent with the scopeand object of the Ordinance.” I think, therefore, that the DistrictJudge has no such discretion as section 406 would give him.
Even if it were otherwise, I am of opinion that the plaintiff hasshown no grounds whatever for the exercise of that discretion inhis favour.
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