035-NLR-NLR-V-16-ABEYSUNDARA-v.-HINNI-HAMY.pdf
Present: Pereira J.
ABEYASUNDARA v. HINNI-BAMY,-481—0. R. Oalle, 1,885.
Fixture—Wooden screen wedged in between two walls standing on itsown base—Intention of owner.
The question whether an artiole annexed to a building is to beregarded as a fixture depends not only on the degree of annexation,but the objeot of annexation. Thus, a wooden soreen standing onits base and only wedged in between two walls so as to be heldfirmly by them by lateral pressure, but intended by the owner ofthe building to be a permanent partition of the main hall of thebuilding into two rooms, is a fixture that passed to the purchaseron a sale of the building.
* a Ji. L. R. MS,
( 121 )
T
HE facts are set out in the judgment of the Commissioner ofBequests (L. W. Schrader, Esq.):—
The screen to which the plaintiff attaches the value of Bs. 125 is alarge carved jakwood partition screen, usually recognized as a fixture*being intended permanently to divide a space into rooms. It wasproduced in Court. It appears to have rested on feet on the ground,And been held in upright position by fitting firmly to the sidewalls•either with or without the help of nails inserted in the wall on eitherside of the wood to hold the screen steady. It was therefore not afixture in the sense of being fixed in the ground or attached to the walls.It was merely held in position between the two walls and not attachedthereto or to the ground.
This must be deemed a fixture for the following reasons:—
(i.) It was intended as a permanent partition making two rooms offoft central hall, and it contains the door of communication.It was an integral part of the building when plaintiffbought it.
(ii.) The deed contains the word “ fixtures ” and “ buildingsattached thereto.” The literal translation is “ the house andeverything firmly held there*” and of course is intended tobe a paraphrase for “ fixtures.”. If it did not apply to ascreen like this, what could it apply to ? It is stated to be anunusual expression, and therefore contemplates something.There is nothing for it to apply to if not the screen
E. W. Jayewardene, for the defendant, appellant.—The tendencyof the law at present is to relax the rule of the Roman law andthe Boman-Dutch law as to fixtures. The old rule Quid quidplantatur has been very largely modified in England to bring itinto harmony with modem requirements. Otherwise a tenantwill find that many things which he had brought into the house andaffixed to the building in some form or other for his own conveniencehave become “ fixtures ” in the building.
[Pereira J.—In the case of a tenant there is often an absence ofintention to have his things permanently affixed to the building.This is not the case with an owner.]
Counsel cited (1901) 1 Gh. 523, at page 534.
■ – H. Arr Jayewardene, for the plaintiff, respondent.—The defendantintended that the screen should be a permanent partition of a hall.The Commissioner has held on the facts that it was a permanentpartition, and it is not open to the appellant to challenge thatfinding without the leave of the Commissioner. When a houseis sold, all things which were fixed to such house by the vendorprior to such sale and intended to be used^in respect of such housemust be delivered with the house;as accessories. Voet 19, I, 5;Brodie v. Attorney-General;1Hattbury’s Laws of England, see Fixture.
Cur. adv. vult.
Abeya-aundara o.Hinni Ham
1 (1903) 7 N. L. R. 81, at page 89.
( 122 )
1918. January 30, 1918. Pereira J.—
Abeya-In this case, the question is whether a certain wpoden screen found
Jftnri'Hamya house sold by the defendant’s husband to the plaintiff is to be
regarded as a movable chattel or a fixture. It is difficult to ascer*tain with exactitude to what extent the screen before its removal .can be said to have been annexed to the house, but I gather fromthe Commissioner’s judgment that the screen was a large, carved,partition screen intended to divide permanently the central hall ofthe house into two rooms. It rested on its own base, and wasapparently so wedged in between two walls as to be held firm therebyby .means of lateral pressure. Now, the word “ fixture ” has no-precise legal meeting. A great deal depends upon the circum-stances of each case. As to what passes to the purchaser in thecase of the sale of a house, Voet says (29, 2, 25): “ Everything isto be given which is inserted and included in the building and intend-ed for the permanent use of the house, and as it were a part of it.**As examples he mentions paintings on the plaster and marble fac-ings, and bolts, hooks, and keys, although these are not attached tothe soil, and also the covering of a well, water vessels, and leadencisterns. He exempts from this class things which are only in thehouse for temporary and present use (see Berwick's Translation,
ecL, p. 257).
There is little difference between the above and the English law.It has been held that the question whether the chattel of one personfixed on another’s soil remains the chattel of the former dependson circumstances and the intention of the paries (Lancaster v. Eve1).The point to be considered is not only the degree of annexation,but the object of annexation (see Cosby v. Shaw.2) Thus, certainobjects though firmly fixed to the edifice are not considered to beany more than movable chattel. What are known as “ tradefixtures ” and.such chattels as are annexed for the better enjoymentof the article itself are of this class. On the other hand, an objectmay be but lightly annexed, but it may, nevertheless, be regardedas part of the building. Thus, statues and vases resting on theirown weight in an ornamental garden, and tapestry on the walls ofa room in a. mansion house., have,- in -certain-circumstances, beenheld to be fixtures.
In the present case the annexation, no doubt, was of a some-what superficial character, but, obviously, the screen was intendedby the owner of the house as a permanent addition to it, dividingthe main, hall into two rooms, and containing a door of com-munication between these rooms. In this view the judgment ofthe Commissioner'is right, and I dismiss the appeal with costs.
Affirmed.
1 $8 L. J. c. m.
* 19 L. R. Jr. 307.