040-NLR-NLR-V-37-ADIHETTY-v.-WIJEYSEKERE.pdf
POYSER J.—Adihetty o. Wijeysekere.
189
1935Present: Poyser J.
ADIHETTY v. WIJEYSEKERE.
407—P. C. Panadure, 31,308.
Rubber control—False return made before the Ordinance—Charge under theOrdinance—Ordinance No. 6 of 1934, s. 51 (2) (e).
Where a person made use of an incorrect entry in a return forwardedto the Rubber Controller prior to the Rubber Control Ordinance for thepurpose of obtaining a Coupon for a larger quantity of rubber than hewas entitled to,—
Held, that he cannot be convicted under section 51 (1) (e) of the Ordi-nance of making use of an error in the return for the purpose of creatinga right to the issue of rubber coupons.
A PPEAL from a conviction by the Police Magistrate of Panadure.
R. L. Pereira, K.C. (with him S. P. Wijewickrama and Kumarasingham)for accused, appellant.
H. W. R. Weerasooria, Acting C.C., for Crown, respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
August 30, 1935. Poyser J.—
The appellant was convicted under section 51 (1) (e) of Ordinance No. 6of 1934 for knowingly making use of an incorrect entry in a return for-warded to the Rubber Controller for the purpose of creating a right to theissue of rubber coupons. The facts were as follows:—The appellantmade a return (P 1) setting out that on his land Talagahawatta therewere 160 rubber trees whereas in fact there were only 142 trees.
37/16
196
The Bank of Chettinad v. Tea Export Controller.
This return was made prior to the date the Ordinance came into force.It has already been held by this Court (Ratemahatmaya of Walapanev. Jaganathan') that such a return could not be considered areturn made under the Ordinance and that a person making such areturn cannot be convicted under section 51 (1) (d) of the Ordinance. Itis not argued that that case was wrongly decided and it was presumablyin view of that case that the appellant was charged under sub-section (e).Consequently the only point that arises on this appeal is, whether themaking of a false return before the coming into force of the Ordinanceand obtaining coupons abased on such return, can be said to be making useof an error in any return for the purpose of creating a right to the issue ofany coupons.
The Police Magistrate finds that the appellant got a larger number ofcoupons than he was entitled to by several acts commencing with thereturn (P 1) and ending with the acceptance of coupons and convictedthe accused.
It is clear that the appellant, in consequence of his false return, gotcoupons for a greater amount of rubber than he was entitled to, but cansuch action come under the provisions of section 51 (1)(e) ? In my
opinion it cannot.
The appellant had the right to the issue of coupons and such right wasnot created by the “ error ” in the return made by him and there is noprovision in this sub-section in regard to the issue of coupons for a greateramount of rubber than a person is entitled to.
The appeal is allowed and the conviction set aside.
Set aside.