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The question arises whether this falsehood was uttered on amaterial and relevant point upon this prosecution. There is no doubt 580that this lie was deliberately uttered on a highly material issue in thiscase. The next question is the consideration whether the motivatingfactor for the lie was a realization of guilt and the fear for the truth;if so, the utterances of the lie weakens the defence case andsubstantiates and advances the prosecution version narratedagainst him. We hold that the accused uttered this deliberate lie onthis material issue because he knew that if he told the truth hewould be sealing his fate as regards this legal proceedings. If suchwas the motive, the utterance of such a lie would corroborate theprosecution case. In the decision in Haramanis v Somalatha at 590371 I stated the rationale in regard to the motive for the utterancesof a deliberate lie on some material issue by a party as follows:
‘The principle is that a lie on some material issue by a partymay indicate a consciousness that if he tells the truth he will
Justice Hall in Popovic v Derks at 433 and at 429-430 (perJustice Sholi) remarked –
"Matters which otherwise might be ambiguous are renderedcorroborative by reason of the false denial.”
I have referred in that decision to Chief Justice Lane’s eoojudgment in Rex v Lucas <8> and the judgment of Justice Athukoralein Karunanayake v Karunasiri Perera <9> at 33. Justice Athukoraleremarked –
"It seems to me that the tests which should be applied indetermining whether a lie told by an accused or a defendant,whether in or outside Court, is capable of constitutingcorroboration or not, have been correctly set out by Lord Lane,
CJ. in Rex v Lucas (supra). Under the circumstances I shouldadopt and apply the criteria formulated by him to local casesboth criminal and civil in which the question arises for 610consideration.
Vide also the decisions in Credland v Knowleri10> at 55; R vJ.H. Knight) at 126; Jones v Thomad12> at 327; R v Chapmad13)Dawson v Mackenzie<14); R v Baldwid15); Navaz Khawn vReginaC®) at 82 .
Ajit Samarakoon v The Republic (Kobaigane Murder Case)
(Javasuriva. J.)
In regard to the tests laid down by Lord Lane, learnedPresident’s Counsel appearing for the accused-appellant concededthat the accused had intentionally and deliberately lied in his dockstatement on a material issue, but he contended that the motive forthe lie was not a consciousness on his part that if he speaks thetruth in Court he will lose. Learned President’s Counsel strenuouslyargued that the accused did not act with the consciousness that ifhe told the truth he would be sealing his fate as regards this criminalprosecution. He argued that because the accused held a high postin government service as Officer-in-Charge of the police stationand because he held a high position in the social ladder, he spokethe untruth and denied his love affair with Nilanthi as she was thedaughter of a mere coconut plucker who stood in a low socialposition. In analyzing and evaluating this submission of learnedPresident’s Counsel, one must necessarily take account of thelapse of time which had ensued prior to the date on which heuttered this lie. There was a non-summary proceedingsin the Magistrate Court of Kuliyapitiya where evidence in regard tothis love affair was led at an anterior point of time. The investigationconducted by the Criminal Investigation Department and,proceedings at the inquest and in the Magistrate Court which tookplace at an anterior point of time would have necessarily attractedthe attention of the public as well as the recitors of verses (kavi kolakarayas) at bus stands in the district. Thus this love affair wouldnecessarily have been a widely publicized matter in the entiredistrict.
Besides, witness Somawathie has given pertinent evidence inregard to this aspect of the matter. In her evidence which appearsin the record, she has convincingly and affirmatively stated that ona day roughly about one month before Nilanthi’s death, the accusedwho was the Officer-in-Charge of the Kobeigana police station hadsent a message to her through a person called Martin, to call overpersonally at the police station. She has stated that when she wentthere the accused had stated thus to her:
“When I was taking Nilanthi in my official jeep your daughterSunethra Dilhani has mocked and laughed and stated certainthings. Warn your daughter to be very careful and abstain fromsuch conduct in the future.”
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After Somawathie had proceeded near the gate of the policestation the accused again summoned her and had reiterated inSinhala. The evidence given by Somawathie on this point has notbeen challenged or impugned in cross examination. This evidenceof Somawathie contains an admission that the accused had takenNilanthi in his open jeep along the town of Kobeigana. Had theaccused entertained fears and apprehensions about the social 660standing of Nilanthi when he had taken her in his official jeep alongKobeigane town? This admission which was elicited is provableagainst the accused quo admission and this evidence militatesagainst the acceptance of the explanation and the aforesaidsubmission preferred by learned President's Counsel at the hearingof argument on this appeal. Thus it is clear that the accused hasuttered these deliberate lies due to his consciousness that if hestated the truth, his fate would have been sealed as far as thisprosecution was concerned. Thus this lie weakens the defencecase, advances in strength, corroborates and substantiates the 670prosecution case presented against the accused.
Equally, the accused falsely asserted in his dock statementthat he did not obtain a Toyota Hiace van which was driven byGunaratnehamy and that there was never a need for him to obtainthat vehicle, as there were two jeeps and a requisitioned vanavailable for his use at the police station. But the unimpugnedevidence disclosed that the police vehicles were under repair andthe police officers to perform security duties at the ProvincialCouncil Minister's house were picked up into Gunaratnehamy's vanat the police station on this day to be transported by the accused. 680The evidence of Guneratnehamy on this aspect was neverchallenged, impugned or assailed by counsel who appeared for theaccused at the trial in cross examination. This manifest lie utteredby the accused in his dock statement too satisfies the three testsformulated by Lord Lane in Rex v Lucas (Supra). The borrowing ofthe said van was a material fact in this prosecution and theprosecution version is that Nilanthi was taken in this particular vanon the 25th of October 1989 to be killed near Kitagama junction.
The accused has uttered this falsehood deliberately with theconsciousness that it he admitted the truth and the borrowing of this 690van, his fate would be sealed as far as this prosecution wasconcerned.
Ajit Samarakoon v The Republic (Kobaigane Murder Case)
(Javasuriva. J.)
Mananalage Emalin testified before the High Court that on the24th of October 1989 her daughter Nilanthi left home in the morningat about 7.30 a.m. or 8 a.m. stating to the witness that the LokuMahataya of Kobeigane had requested her to come over to marryher and on that occasion Nilanthi had stated to the witness that shewas expecting a child in her womb due to the actions of the saidLoku Mahataya and that he wanted to get married to her on accountof that fact. She also stated that her daughter told her not to look for 700her and it it is possible that she should come round about 4 o’clockor not come at all. The aforesaid evidence given by Emalin wassought to be admitted in terms of the provisions of section 32(1) ofthe Evidence Ordinance as a dying declaration.
Learned President's Counsel contended that the entirety of thesaid dying declaration alleged to have been made by Nilanthi to hermother (the witness) did not come within the ambit of section 32(1)and was therefore inadmissible. He contended the phrase “thecircumstances of the transaction which resulted in her death” wouldrelate only to that part of Nilanthi’s statement wherein she stated in 710the morning that she was proceeding to meet the Loku Mahataya,but that the object or purpose for so proceeding was inadmissible.
The learned President's Counsel sought to rely on certainwords use by Lord Atkin in Pakala Narayanaswamy v King(17).However in the course of the argument this Court was constrainedto draw the attention of learned President’s Counsel to the effect ofthe judgment of the Privy Council in admitting as admissible thewhole of the statement sought to be admitted by the prosecutionagainst the accused-appellant and to the judgment of Justice Diasin King v Mudalihamy (18> where the learned Judge purporting to 720apply the principles laid down by the Privy Council in PakalaNarayanaswamy’s case held that the statement made by thedeceased to witness Mary Nona that he was proceeding to thejungle at the invitation of the accused to collect bee’s honey in thejungle was admissible in terms of section 32(1) of the EvidenceOrdinance. Thus both in Pakala Narayanaswamy’s case and inMudalihamy’s case not only the fact of the invitation but thepurpose of object of the invitation were determined to be acircumstance of the transaction which resulted in death.
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At a later stage of his argument learned President’s 730Counsel was constrained to accept the tenability of the saidproposition of law enunciated by this Court in the healthydialogue that took place so often between Judge and Counsel.
At this stage he argued that part of the evidence of Emalin thatNilanthi was expecting a child on account of the activities of theLoku Mahataya and because of that fact the Loku Mahatayawanted to get married to her was clearly inadmissible as itmerely constituted the alleged reason for the purpose ofproceeding to meet Loku Mahataya which he characterized asbeing the REASON for the reason.740
Alternatively, learned President’s Counsel argued that theevidence given by Emalin, on this point was false and incredibleas being inherently improbable. Dealing with the latter issue ofimprobability, this court observes that although witness Emalinas a mother was aware about her daughter’s pregnancy aboutthree months prior to the date, when she set out from herparental home on that morning, the significant fact is that ayoung girl aged 18 was leaving the parental home in the morningto get married alone, unceremoniously and unaccompanied byany other person and without the presence and the blessings of 750her parents. Especially, among the conservative village folk,daughters of young age do not go out of their homes to getmarried without the presence of their parents having regard tothe practices, usages and the culture that prevails in the ruralvillages
In this context when Nilanthi reiterated that she wasexpecting a child by Loku Mahataya and that she was setting outalone to get married to him in terms of his directions, this Courtdiscovers no intrinsic or inherent improbability as contended forby learned President’s Counsel, when one relates this statement 760and the evidence to the attendant circumstances elicited uponthis prosecution. Though her mother was aware of herpregnancy about three months prior to the date of her settingout, it is quite probable that Nilanthi was apologetic about thefact that she was setting out alone on this mission.
Now reverting to the issue of legal admissibility of that partof her statement that she was expecting a child on account of
Ajit Samarakoon v The Republic (Kobaigane Murder Case)
CA(Jayasuriya, J.)233
the activities of the Loku Mahataya and that he wished to getmarried to her on account of this fact, this Court, proceeds toconsider whether this part of the statement is sufficientlyproximate to render it a part of the circumstances of thetransaction which resulted in her death.
This expression “circumstances of the transaction” is not sowide as circumstances which would constitute circumstantialevidence to the fact in issue in a case. The setting out fromhome for the purpose of getting married to the Loku Mahatayahas been subsequently conceded by learned President’sCounsel to be part of the circumstances of the transaction whichresulted in death.The fact that she carried the accused’s child inher womb is certainly a reason for the marriage contemplated bythe parties. Is not that reason sufficiently connected andproximate to the invitation to get married? The answer to thatquestion has definitely to be in the affirmative. Hence thepregnancy is highly connected to the invitation to get marriedand is also closely connected to the alleged acts of shooting andthe burning of Nilanthi.Viewed in this light this statement ofNilanthi to her mother shortly before she left the house thatmorning is a fact inextricably interwoven and connected to thecircumstances of the shooting and the setting on fire whichresulted in her death. In the circumstances this Court upholdsthe cogent contentions advanced by learned Additional SolicitorGeneral and rejects the submissions preferred by learnedPresident’s Counsel and holds that the evidence volunteered bywitness Emalin in regard to the entirety of what her daughterNilanthi narrated to her before she left the parental home on the24th of October 1989 is admissible in evidence in terms of theprovisions of section 32(1) of the Evidence Ordinance, adoptingthe wide and extensive construction placed upon this provisionby Lord Atkin in Pakala Narayanaswamy’s case, as opposed tothe restricted and limited construction put upon it by JusticeGarvin in King v Arnolis PereraS^
The reference in the dying declaration to the fact of pregnancyis causally and closely related to the actual occurrence and thereis a proximate relationship between the pregnancy and the actualoccurrence. It is directly related to the occasion of the death. It is
7 70
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possible that evidence which merely constitutes the motive for thecommission of the crime and such incidents which have takenplace during a period of time long prior to the commission of thecriminal act, would not constitute a circumstance of the transaction.
Vide Dharmawansa de Silva v Attorney GeneralS2°) Particularly siowhere the evidence is relevant otherwise than as motive alone andwhere there is a close proximate relationship between thehappening of that event and the murderous assault, suchcircumstances would constitute a circumstance of the transaction -See Somasiri v Republic of Sri Lanka <21); King v MarshallAppuhamyP2> at 275; Somasiri v The Queen (23) per JusticeH.N.G.Fernando and Regina v H.S.PereraS24) (where there was aninterval of over two weeks between the fact relied upon asreason for the attack on the deceased and the causing of the deathof the deceased).820
Witness Mananalage Emalin has stated in her evidence thatwhen her husband Dingiriya arrived at their home after work thatshe had related that Nilanthi left home in the morning and had notreturned as yet. This witness also stated that she met the accusedat the police station and requested the accused to take down herstatement and had requested the assistance of the accused to findher daughter but the accused had failed to record her statementand had instead observed that her daughter may have got friendlywith a boy and run away and therefore to investigate further beforemaking a complaint.830
Long prior to the 24th of October 1989 witness Emalin hasstated that the accused had come to her compound to meet herdaughter on two or three occasions and she had seen her daughtertalking to the accused in their garden. She has also testified to theeffect that a person named Dharmasiri had proposed to herdaughter and that when Dharmasiri discovered that Nilanthi washaving an affair with the accused on discovery of a love letterwritten by the accused to Nilanthi, he had terminated therelationship with Nilanthi. Under cross-examination she wasconfronted with the evidence that she gave at the non summary 840proceedings in the Magistrate Court. In parts of her statement madeto the Criminal Investigation Department marked, D20 and D21,she has stated that her daughter Nilanthi when leaving the houseon the 24th of October 1989 at about 7.30 a.m. had told her thus:
Ajit Samarakoon v The Republic (Kobaigane Murder Case)
(Javasuriva. J.)
“Mother Kobeigane Loku Mahataya had wanted me to come. Do notlook for me. If possible I will come around 4 o’clock or I will notcome". The purpose in marking these statements as D20 and D21was to pin point that in these statements there is no reference to thepurpose of the mission which was to get married or a reference tothe pregnancy at the hands of the accused. D24 had related to whatthe witness informed the Nikaweratiya police. We have already setour views in regard to that investigation and the recording ofstatements by the Nikaweratiya Police.
Another witness who testified at the trial was MananalageDingiriya the father of the deceased, in the course of his evidencehe has stated that Dharmasiri ceased to come to their home to seeNilanthi about six months before her death. He has referred to thefact that he purchased a white steel talisman on the advice of theVeda Mahathaya as Nilanthi had developed a skin disease.According to his testimony on the 24th of October 1989 when hecame back from work to his home, he had discovered from his wifeEmalin that Loku Mahataya had wanted Nilanthi to come over to getmarried to her and his wife had stated that she had left the home inthe morning at about 7.30 a.m. On the 25th of October 1989, thewitness had proceeded to Kobeigane police station and hadexpressed a desire to make a written complaint to the accused thathis daughter was missing. Whereupon the accused had dissuadedhim from making a complaint in writing by observing that she mayhave run away with a boy and therefore to make further inquiriesand after the lapse of two or three days to make the desiredcomplaint. On the 26th of October 1989 when he proceeded toKitagama junction he had discovered the corpse of a young girlburnt to death and when he looked closer he had seen a burnttalisman and believed the body to be that of his daughter. On hisarrival at home he had narrated this discovery to his wife andthereafter proceeded to the police station to meet the accused andhad again expressed a desire to lodge a complaint. On thisoccasion too the accused had dissuaded him from making acomplaint stating that his daughter will come back home and tomake the statement if necessary after the lapse of a few days.Thereafter when the witness insisted on making the complaint theaccused had instructed the Reserve Officer, after coming out with ajoke, to record his statement.
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The Reserve Officer subsequently advised him to inquire fromhis daughter’s friends and come back later to the police station andas a result the witness was unable to have his complaint recordedeven on that day. On the next day when he was proceeding to workhe had seen the burnt body again and he had observed the burntpart of a under skirt hidden under a bush. Subsequently he hadproceeded to this spot and taken charge of this burnt under skirt 890and later handed it over to the officers of the Criminal InvestigationDepartment. He had stated that he found letters written by theaccused to his daughter and about three letters written by Niianthito the accused which were deposited in her suitcase.
On the 31st of January 1991 the witness had made acomplaint to the Police Headquarters in Colombo and after thelapse of six days of making the said complaint his whole house hadbeen burnt. The witness has not been contradicted at the trial inregard to the contents of this complaint. Later an officer of theCriminal Investigation Department arrived at his home and 900recorded his statement. The witness had taken the officer of theCriminal Investigation Department to the spot where he found theburnt body and the burnt talisman. Long before the CID officerscame to meet him in his statement to the Police Headquarters, hehas specifically referred to the burnt body and talisman.
In this factual background, learned Additional Solicitor Generalcontended cogently that although the mother and father of his lovedgirl friend orally complained to the accused that their daughterNiianthi was missing on the 24th of October and 25th of October1989 and requested the accused to record their complaints, the 910accused had made every endeavour to dissuade them from making ’a written complaint observing that his girl friend Niianthi may haveeloped with a boy and had suggested to them to make furtherinquiries and in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge of the policestation the accused took no steps whatsoever to investigate intothese complaints, notwithstanding the fact that the person missingwas an individual to whom he had written love letters. He urged thisCourt on proof of these incriminating facts to raise an adverseinference in regard to the callous conduct and failure of the accusedto commence an investigation into these complaints.These 920complaints were made on the evening of the 24th of October 1989
Ajit Samarakoon v The Republic (Kobaigane Murder Case)
(Jayasuriya, J.)
(by the mother) and on the 25th of October 1989 (by the father ofthe deceased) and the very significant fact is that according to thetestimony of Chulasiri, Nilanthi came out of the residential house ofthe accused together with the accused and got into the van, whichwas later driven by the accused, on the 25th of October 1989 atabout 7.30 or 7.45 p.m.
The failure to record the complaints of the parents and thefailure to commence an investigation into the said complaintscoupled with the evidence of Chulasiri that he saw Nilanthi coming 930out of the accused’s residence together with the accused to boardthe van, raises highly incriminating circumstances against theaccused which the accused has failed to explain away, though itwas in the power and dominium of the accused to do so when hehad that unfettered and unrestricted opportunity to do so in his dockstatement. His dock statement to this extent is highly deficient. Thedock statement contains no denial of Dingiriya’s visits to the policestation and requests held out to the accused to have his complaintrecorded. These incriminating circumstances established againsthim gave rise to presumptions and inferences which shifted the 940evidential burden, as opposed to the legal burden, to explain awaythese highly incriminating circumstances in terms of the speechesof Lord Ellenborough in Rex v Cochrana (25> and that of JusticeAbbott in Rexv Burdett <26) at 120, The principles laid down in thesetwo cases do not place a legal or a persuasive burden on theaccused to prove his innocence or to prove that he committed nooffence but these two decisions on proof of a prima facie case andon proof of highly incriminating circumstances shift the evidentialburden to the accused to explain away these highly incriminatingcircumstances when he had both the power and opportunity to do 950so. Vide the judgment in Misnagollage Siriyawathie v The Republic(27> and Kankanam Aratchilage Gunadasa v The Republic (28l
We have held that the totality of the contents of the dyingdeclaration made by Nilanthi, shortly before she left the parentalhome on the 24th of October 1989, to her mother is admissible andrelevant in terms of sec 32(1) of the Evidence Ordinance.
Learned Additional Solicitor General alternatively argued thatthe statement relating to her going out to get married and thestatement relating to her pregnancy at the hands of the accused
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Nilanthi?’ The actual author of this letter is deceased Nilanthi andwitness Gunawathie has merely transcribed the letter at the 980dictation and instance of Nilanthi. Thus if the author of the letter isnot called as a witness, the contents of the letter dated 11.10.89 arehearsay. Although the contents of this letter are logically relevant tothe facts in issue upon this prosecution, this hearsay documentaryevidence could only be admitted if it could be brought within anyone of the sections providing for the exceptions to the hearsay ruleas spelt out in the Evidence Ordinance. Those exceptions are 1contained in our Evidence Ordinance in sec. 17-38 and the contentsof this letter do not fall within the ambit of any of these sections.Thus Gunawathie’s evidence on this matter has necessarily to be 990limited to the fact that Nilanthi dictated a letter to that effect. To thatextent Gunawathie’s evidence when so limited is direct evidence interms of section 60 of the Evidence Ordinance. In thecircumstances though the contents of this letter was marked inevidence, this letter is not admissible to establish the truth of thematters contained in the assertions of Nilanthi as embodied in thatletter. In fact even to the third aspect of evidence relied on by the
was also alternatively admissible under sec. 8(2) of the Evidence 960Ordinance as conduct of any party to any suit or proceeding andthat when such conduct is relevant a statement made whichaccompanies and affects such conduct is also relevant. This samelegal contention was advanced by learned Additional SolicitorGeneral in regard to two other items of evidence led upon thisprosecution. In the circumstances I will discuss the tenability of thiscontention in law after referring specifically to other items ofevidence which were referred to by him in the course of theargument.
Witness Gunawathie giving evidence (recorded at page 160) 970stated that fourteen days prior to Nilanthi’s death she wrote theletter dated 11th October 1989 at the dictation and at the instanceof Nilanthi addressed to Ajith Samarakoon who functioned as theLoku Mahataya at the Kobeigane police station. The contents of thisletter, inter alia, reads as follows:
“You have not sent me a letter presumably for the reason thatyou do not wish to meet me. Brother Ajit is your heart a gal
Do you think and recollect about innocent

Ajit Samarakoon v The Republic (Kobaigane Murder Case)
(Jayasuriya, J.)
learned Additional Solicitor General the principle of law enunciatedby me would be equally applicable.
Witness Somawathie giving evidence (recorded at page 317) 1000stated that when she was peeling ekels whilst seated on a benchpositioned under a tree in her compound. Nilanthi, who oftenstepped in at her house on the way to sewing classes, requestedfor some water to drink and stated thus:
“Aunt, the Loku Mahataya requested me every day to comeover to Kitagama junction. I accordingly proceed to that spot, but hedaily disappoints me and is in the habit of getting me to waste mytime at this place.”
Somawathie alleged that this statement was made by Nilanthito her one month before her death. In fact in relation to these three 1010aspects of evidence, learned Additional Solicitor Generalstrenuously argued that they are admissible as conduct and theaccompanying statements which explain such conduct are alsoadmissible under the provisions of section 8(2) of the EvidenceOrdinance. We hold that in law these statements are made onlylogically relevant in as much as they stand in the relationship of"CAUSE AND EFFECT” to the fact in issue by the operation ofsection 8(2) and all three aspects of evidence which were referredto by the Additional Solicitor General are species or hearsayevidence, and are excluded by the general rule excluding hearsay 1020evidence. To render these statements legally admissible inevidence, it has to be established that they fall within the ambit ofsections 17-38 of the Evidence Ordinance which provide for theadoption of hearsay under well defined exceptions to the hearsayrule in Sri Lanka. These statements do not come within any of therecognized exceptions to the hearsay rule as set forth in theEvidence Ordinance. In the circumstances these statements areinadmissible in law to establish the truth of the assertions containedin those three statements. However, the persons to whom thesestatements were made namely witness Emalin, witness 1030Gunawathie and witness Somawathie could give direct evidence toestablish merely that such statements were made. (Vide Section60(1) and 60(2) of the Evidence Ordinance), but they cannot giveevidence of the statements with the object of proving the truth of theassertions contained in those statements. Thus Somawathie’s
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evidence that Nilanthi made such a statement and that she heardsuch a lament from Nilanthi is admissible only to prove that such astatement was made. Vide section 60 of the Evidence Ordinance.
However, it has to be emphasized that the learned trial Judgehas nowhere in his judgment relied on these three statements 1040(which were hearsay) for his adjudications and has not relied on thetruth of the facts contained in those assertions to arrive at findingsagainst the accused appellant. However, the whole of the statementmade by Nilanthi to her mother shortly before she left her home isadmissible in evidence in terms of section 32(1) of the EvidenceOrdinance.
I wish to amphasize that the witnesses for the prosecution A.M.Gunadasa, R. M. Jusie Appuhamy, W. M. Sugathadasa andMunasinghe Aratchilage Mutu Menika have stated that theywitnessed only one conflagration of the nature which they 1050witnessed on the 25th of October 1989 night, in the areasurrounding Kitagama junction and specifically that there were noother such conflagrations in the area. In regard to the evaluation ofthe evidence of witness Chulasiri, witness Emalin and witnessDingiriya, it is very pertinent to analyze their evidence in the light ofthe principles laid down by Justice Thackker in the celebrateddecision in Barwada Boghin Bhai Hirji Bhai v The State of GujeratI29) at 755, in regard to the sequence in which evidence is narratedby witnesses and the tendency on the part of the witness to mix upthe sequence of events in narrating his evidence in Court.1060
I have patiently and fully considered the submissionsadvanced on behalf of the accused appellant and the Republic. Wewish to express our appreciation of the devotion and dedicationdisclosed by learned President’s Counsel on both sides in theargument of this appeal before this Court on several dates and wewish to record our gratitude to junior counsel appearing on bothsides for their research and the carefully compiled written summaryof evidence and written submissions prepared by junior counsel forthe accused appellant.
For the reasons enumerated we hold that there is no merit in 1070his appeal and the evaluation of evidence, the findings and theconviction indulged in, reached and imposed respectively by the
Seelawansa Them and Two others v Tennakoon, Additional
Secretary, Public Service Com. (Shirani Bandaranayake, J.)
learned trial Judge is wholly justified and lawful, in the result, weproceed to dismiss the appeal of the accused-appellant.
Appeal Is dismissed.