017-NLR-NLR-V-16-APPUHAMY-v.-BRAMPY.pdf
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Present: Wood Benton J.
APPUHAMY v. BBAMPY.
428—C. R. Posy ala, 4,786.
Retrospective effect of a statute—Stamp Ordinance, No. 22 of 1909, s. 36thas no retrospective effect—Promissory note made in 1903—Insufficiently stamped—Deficiency may be supplied and actionmaintained.
Statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively unless a dearintention to that effect is manifest, or the matter in issue relatesto procedure alone.
Section 36 of the Stamp Ordinance, No. 22 of 1906, is not retros.pective, and cannot deprive a holder of an insufficiently stampednote, made before the Ordinance came into force, of his right tomamtam an action on the note after supplying the deficiency ofstamp duty under section 36 of the old Stamp Ordinance.
rpHE facts appear sufficiently from the judgment.
A. St. V. Jayeumrdene, for the plaintiff, appellant.—At the dateof the making of the note the plaintiff had to get the note properlystamped by the Commissioner of Stamps and then sue upon thenote. That right is not affected by the new Stamp Ordinance, assection 86 has no retrospective effect. See Maxwell on the Inter-pretation of Statutes.
V. Grenier, for the defendant, respondent.—The old StampOrdinance conserves the rights created by the. previous stamp laws;but the Stamp Ordinance of 1909 has no provisions to that effect.The new Stamp Ordinance has, therefore, retrospective effect.
The note sued upon was invalid even under the old law. Theright to supply deficiency was not open tp plaintiff under the presentcircumstances even under the old law. [Wood Renton J. referredcounsel to Saibu Tamby v. Musa Naina.1] In that case the provisionsof section 19 were not considered. [Wood Benton J. referred counselto Coluraad v. Rogee.2] Even under the old law the deficiency can-not be supplied after fourteen days.
A. St. V. Jayewardene, in reply.—The Interpretation Ordinanceconserves the rights which had accrued under7 the old law. Aseries of decisions under the old Ordinance has established the rightof a holder of an insufficiently stamped note to have it properlystamped at any time.
Cur. adv. vult.
* (1902) 7 N. L. B. 20.
1913.
1 (1904) 3 Ba{. 63.
I 60)
1018.
Appuhamy«. Brampy.
January 20, 1913. Wood Benton J.—
The plaintiff-appellant sued the defendant-respondent for therecovery of a sum of Rb. 300 on a promissory note which was datedJanuary 15, 1903, and which was insufficiently stamped. Therespondent contended that, in view of the provisions of section 36of the Stamp Ordinance, 1909 (No. 22 of 1909), as the note wasinsufficiently stamped it was invalid, and could not be sued upon.The learned Commissioner of Requests has given effect to thiscontention, and has dismissed the appellant's action. If section 36of Ordinance No. 22 of 1909 is applicable, this decision is clearlycorrect. But under section 35 of the Stamp Ordinance, 1890(No. 3 of 1890), which was in force . at the time when thepromissory note was made, but which was repealed by theStamp Ordinance of 1909, it would have been competent forthe appellant to have supplied the deficiency pi the stamp dutypayable upon the promissory note and to have thereafter maintainedhis action upon it. The appellant contends that section 36 ofOrdinance No. 22 of 1909 is not retrospective, and cannot deprivehim of a right vested in him at the time when the promissory notewas made. The principle of law upon which the decision of questionsof this kind turns is clear. The only difficulty is to apply it to thecircumstances of particular cases. Statutes are not to be held toact retrospectively unless a clear intention to that effect is manifest,or the matter in issue relates to procedure alone.. (See ColonialSugar Refining Company v. Irving.1) The respondent's counsel didnot argue that the right of the holder of an insufficiently stampedpromissory note to supply the deficiency in the stamping and there-after put it in suit involved a matter of procedure alone, and I donot think that such an argument .would have been tenable. Heurged, however, in the first place, that section 35 of the StampOrdinance of 1890 did not apply tp promissory notes, and, in thenext place, that, even if it did, th© right created by that sectionwas taken away by necessary intendment by the language of section36 of Ordinance No. 22 of 1909. It is, in my opinion, too late nowto contend that the group of sections in the Stamp Ordinance, 1890,to which section 35 belongs, do not include promissory notes (seeRo8ling v. Saverimuttu,2 Coluraad v. Rogce,3 and Saibu Tamby v.Mum Naina A), and I do not think that the language of section36 of Ordinance No. 22 of 1909 is strong enough to support theargument that it was intended to have a retrospective effect.
I set aside the decree under appeal, and send the case back tothe Court of Requests. If the appellant shall, within a time to befixed by the Court, supply the deficiency of the stamp duty payableon the promissory note in suit, the case will proceed to trial on the
(1905) A. C. 369.
(1892) 1 8. C. Ri 811.
» (1902) 7 N. L. R. 20.4 (im) 3 Bal. 56.
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pleadings and on the issues to bo framed thereunder. The appellantwill be entitled to the costs of the appeal and of the argument inthe Court of Bequests. All other costs will be costs in the cause.In the event of the appellant not supplying the deficiency in thestamp duty payable on the note as above mentioned, the appealwill stand dismissed with the costs of the action and of the appeal.
IMS.
WoodBenton J.
Appuhamy«. Brampy
Sent back.