061-NLR-NLR-V-56-ATTONEY-GENEAL-Appellant-and-UPLANDS-BUS-COMPANY-.LTD-Respondent.pdf
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Attorney-General v. Uplands Bui Company, Ltd.
1955Present: Gratiaen J.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL., Appellant, and UPLANDS BUSCOMPANY, LTD., Respondent
S. C. 1,111—M. C. Nutvara Eliya, 9,859
Wages Boards Ordinance, ATo. 27 of 2941—Section 39 {1)— Prosecutions thereunder—Time-limit—Section 28 of amending Act No. 5 of 1963—Retrospective effect—Interpretation Ordinance, s. 6 {3).-
Section 28 of the Wages Boards (Amendment) Act No. 6 of 1953, which altersthe time-limit for prosecutions from one year to two years in regard to offencespunishable under section 39 (1) of the Wages Boards Ordinance No. 27 of 1941,applies not only to prosecutions for offences committed after the amendingAct No. 5 of 1953 passed into law, but also to prosecutions for earlier offencesother than those which had already become barred by limitation under theprovisions of the principal Ordinance., *
* {1922) 24 N. L R. 249.
GRATLAJEN J.—Attorney-Qeneral u. Uplanda Baa Company, LUl.
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/-PPEAXi from a judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, Nuwara Eliya.
H. A. Wijemanne, Crown Counsel, with Cecil Jayetileke, Crown Counsel,for the complainant appellant.
Jzzadeen Mohamed, with C. Jayasinghe, for the accused respondent.
Cur. adv. mitt.
(January 21, 1955. Gkatiaen J.—
This is an appeal by the Attorney-General against an order of thelearned Magistrate of N’Eliya upholding in limine an objection thatcriminal proceedings instituted against the respondent for the allegedcommission of three offences .punishable under *Section 39 (1) of theWages Boards Ordinance No. 27 of 1941 (hereinafter called “ the principalOrdinance ”) were barred by limitation.
The offences in question were allegedly committed on 10th July, 1952,but the prosecution was not initiated until 20th April, 1954. Section54 (b) of the principal Ordinance, in the form in which it stood on 10thJuly, 1952, had prohibited the institution of proceedings for any offencetinder the Ordinance except within one year of the date of its commission.On 27th February 1953, however,—that is to say, before the expiry ofone year from 10th July, 1952—Parliament enacted Section 28 of theWages Boards (Amendment) Act, No. 5 of 1953, extending the period oflimitation to two years. It follows that, if the amending Act applies tothese proceedings, they were instituted well within the time-limit pre-scribed by law. If, on the other hand, the case is still governed by Section54 (6) of the principal Ordinance in its original form, the respondent hadceased to be liable to prosecution before these proceedings commenced.
The learned Magistrate held that Section 28 of the amending Act wasnot retrospective in operation and that the prosecution of the respondentwas therefore belated. The learned Magistrate appears to have had inmind the principle that subsequent legislation is presumed not to affectrights acquired under any earlier repealed law—vide Section 6 (3) of theInterpretation Ordinance.
I agree with learned Crown Counsel that section 6 (3) of the Interpreta-tion Ordinance has no application to the facts of this case. The positionwould without doubt have been different if the period of limitation hadbeen extended only after the expiry of one year after the date on whichthe respondent is alleged to have committed these offences. In thatevent, the language of the amending Act would not have sufficed towithdraw the immunity from prosecution which the respondent alreadyenjoyed. But we are here concerned with an amending Act which ismerely procedural in its scope and which came into operation at a timewhen the respondent was still liable to be prosecuted. The ruling in
v. Chandradharma1 is precisely in point. Section 28 applies not onlyto prosecutions for offences committed after the amending Act passed into1 (1905) 2 K.B. 335.
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DE SILVA J.—Oithohamy v. Karanagoda
law, but also to prosecutions (for earlier offences) othor than thosewhich had already become barrsd by limitation under the provisionsof the principal Ordinance.
I allow the appeal and hold that the respondent was prematurelydischarged. The record must now be returned to the lower court with adirection that the trial of the respondent should procood de novo accordingto law.
Appeal allowed.