( 44 )
1929. to whom the right of appeal is given within the meaning of sec-DaltonJ. tion 388 of the Criminal Procedure Code. She did not institute2^-7 the proceedings, although she could have done so, had she wished,^ZVona un(|er the provisions of sub-section (1) (a) of section 148 of theWijeytinghe Criminal Procedure Code. I have heard nothing from Mr. Weera-sooriya which satisfies me that Babi Nona is a party in the caseas instituted. As I pointed out in Nonis v. Appuhamy,1 it wouldappear that where section 148 provides for the institution of proceed-ings by complaint or written report, the person making the complaintor written report is regarded as the party instituting the proceedingsagainst the accused person. This matter has been consideredfrom another aspect in Sedris v. Singhp,2 but the Court there left itto await further elucidation. On the facts before me in this appeal,I have come to the conclusion that Babi Nona has no right ofappeal, and therefore her appeal must be dismissed.
The further questions raised, first, as to whether the offencecharged, which is laid under section 315 of the Penal Code, fallswithin the schedule of Ordinance No. 9 of 1924 (The "VillageCommunities Ordinance) as held by the Magistrate, and second,whether Babi Nona can avail herself of the provisions of section 61of that Ordinance by taking advantage of the fact that the pro-ceedings were instituted by a public officer, thus ousting the exclu-sive jurisdiction of the Village Tribunal, therefore need not bedecided. So far as these points were argued, I have very con-siderable doubts as to the soundness of the reasoning of the learnedMagistrate upon which he arrives at his conclusion on the first andalso as to the correctness of his order; on the second, it is difficultto see what assistance section 61 affords the present appellant.
The appeal must, for the reason 1 have stated, be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
21 N. L. B/430.
* 23 N. L. R. 171.