GtRATIAEN J.—Wijesundera v. Public Service Commission
1953Present: Gratiaen J.L. DE SILVA WIJESUNDERA, Petitioner, and PUBLICSERVICE COMMISSION, Respondent
S. C. 595—Application for a Mandate in the nature of a Writ ofCertiorari under Section 42 of the Courts Ordinance
Public officer—Dismissal by Public Service Commission—Cannot be canvassed byCertiorari.
Certiorari does not lie against the Public Service Commission in regard to anyalleged procedural irregularity in the appointment, transfer or dismissal of apublic officer..
jAlPPLICATION for a writ of certiorari.
Cyril E. S. Per era, Q.C., with T. B. Dissanayake, for the petitioner.
– M.'Timchelvam, Crown. Counsel, with J. W. Subasinghe, Crown Counsel,for the respondent.
Cur. adv. milt.
July 14, 1953. Geatxaen J.—
The petitioner, who was a member of the General Clerical Service,was dismissed from his office on 7th June, 1950, by order of the PublicService Commission. He complains that this order was illegal and unjuston the ground of certain procedural irregularities in the investigationwhich led to his dismissal, and prays for a mandate in the 'nature of a writof certiorari quashing the order of dismissal.
The application is clearly misconceived. Certiorari lies only where atribunal vested with functions of a judicial nature purports to make anorder in excess of its jurisdiction. The Constitution of Ceylon providesthat (subject to certain exceptions which do not apply to the present case)
Velenis v. Emmie
the appointment, transfer, dismissal and disciplinary control of allpublic officers shall he vested in the Public Service Commission. Noneof these functions can properly be described as functions of a judicialnature over which the Supreme Court can exercise any form of supervisorycontrol. In Suriyawansa v. The Local Government Service Commission1Canekeratne J. held, after full argument upon the point, that certioraridid not lie against the Local Government Service Commission in similarcircumstances. I am aware that in Abeygunasekera’s case 2 Nagalingam
J.expressed doubts as to the correctness of the earlier decision, but hedisposed of the matter before him on other grounds. Having consideredthe matter afresh, I would respectfully follow the decision in Suriyawansa’scase.
A most incongruous situation would arise if the petitioner’s contentionwere to be adopted by me. On 7th June, 1950, he ceased to be a publicservant holding office under the Crown by virtue of a decision of the onlyauthority vested with power to decide whether or not he should continueto serve the Crown. Were I to accede to the present application, I would,in effect, be purporting to re-instate the petitioner in the public service,and, if that were done, I would be usurping functions which are not mineto exercise.
I refuse the application with costs which I fix at Rs. 262/50.