003-NLR-NLR-V-43-CHAIRMAN,-URBAN-COUNCIL,-JAFFNA-v.-RASENDRAM.pdf
32MOSELEY S.P.J.—Chairman, Urban Council, Jaffna v. Rasendram.
1941Present : Moseley S.P.J.
CHAIRMAN, URBAN COUNCIL, JAFFNA v.. RASENDRAM.
532—M.C. Jaffna, 15,742.
Lorry—Possessing a lorry uuithout a licence—Purchase of lorry before theexpiration of licence—Failure to renew licence—Licence in force—Motor Car Ordinance, No. 45.of 1938, s. 29 (I).
Where a person, who purchased a motor lorry on December 10, 1940,but who did not obtain the,certificate of registration till January 6,1941, was charged under section 29 (1) of the Motor Car Ordinance,with possessing a motor lorry' on or about December 10, 1940, for whicha licence was not in force,-—
Held, that the licence issued for the lorry was in- force at that dateand that the accused had not contravened the provisions of the section.
The omission to have applied for a new licence under section 58b (1)has no more effect than that of preventing the use of the lorry.
^^PPEAL from a conviction by the Magistrate of Jaffna.
E. H. T. Gunasekera, C.C., for A.-G., as amicus curiae.
N.Nadarasa, for the respondent.
October 6, 1941. Moseley S.P.J.—
This appeal came up for hearing on September 9, 1941, when there wasno appearance for the accused-appellant. Counsel for the respondentput the case very fairly but, in the interests of the appellant on whosebehalf I felt something could be^said, I invited Crown Counsel to appearas amicus curiae. The appeal has accordingly been reargued to-day.
The appellant was convicted of possessing on or about December 10,1940, a motor lorry for which a licence was not- in force, in breach of
MOSELEY S.P.J.—Chairman, Urban Council, Jaffna v. Rasendram. 33
section 29 (1) of the Motor Car Ordinance, No. 45 of 1938. He wascalled upon to pay a fine of Rs. 70 which is, in fact, the full annual dutyin respect of the vehicle in question.
It appears that on December 10 the appellant purchased a lorry fromone Muniah Pillai who had obtained a licence for the year 1940. Thenecessary notices regarding change of possession were given by the vendorand the purchaser and the appellant applied without delay to beregistered as owner of the lorry. The certificate of registration ofownership was issued on January 6, 1941, but the appellant admitsthat he became the owner on December 10, 1940. The section underwhich he was charged provides by sub-section (1) that no person shallpossess or use a motor car, which expression here includes motor lorry,for which a licence is not in force. There was no suggestion that theappellant used the lorry. The essence of the alleged offence is merepossession. The question for decision is whether or not a licence wasin force for this particular vehicle.
Counsel for the respondent argued that a licence is personal to theholder thereof. This contention would seem to be negatived by thevery wording of section 29 (1) and the view is supported by a referenceto form 19 which is the form appropriate to such a vehicle in which the,following words follow:“ Licensed to carry goods to the maximum
weight of …. ” Further, the licence is expressed therein to
commence on …. and to expire on December 31 next. There
is, however, a qualification that the licence is conditional on the lorryremaining in the possession of the present registered owner. CrownCounsel, however, argued that the qualification to which I have referredhas merely the effect of suspending the operation of the licence. ,Hereferred me to section 6 of Ordinance No. 1§. of 1939, which draws adistinction between the date of commencement of an Ordinance and thedate of operation, and to section 2 of Cap. 2 of the Legislative Enactmentswhich defines “ commencement ” as the day on which an Ordinance comesinto force. An example of such a position may be found in the case ofthis very Ordinance the provisions of which are now under consideration.Ordinance No. 45 of 1938 commences on October 3, 1938, its date ofoperation is July 1, 1939. It seems to me that this distinction, that isto say, between the continuation in force of the licence and its operation,may well be drawn.
Section 18 (2) (b) does indeed provide for the use of a lorry on a changeof possession which appears to indicate that the law contemplates theremaining in force of a suspended licence. Furthermore, section 20 (2)which applies to a motor car, as opposed to a lorry, provides that theCommissioner shall in certain . circumstances make the necessaryalterations in the licence if it is still in force thus providing for a stateof things consistent with Crown Counsel’s arguments. Again, section58b (2) (a) clearly contemplates the remaining in force of a licence untilcancelled, subject of course to expiration.
– It was open to the appellant under the provisions of section 58b (1)to have applied for a new licence. It seems to me that his omissionto have followed this course, which is permissive only, has no more
34
MOSELEY S.P.J.—Menon v. Lantine.
effect than that of preventing the use of the lorry.. The provisions ofsection 30 (1) (b) which enables a registered owner to give notice ofnon-user would seem only to apply to the case of a vehicle in respect ofwhich a licence is not in force.
It seems to me for the reasons which I have set out, that a licencewas in force and that the appellant has not contravened the provisionsof section 29 (1) of the Ordinance. I would, therefore, allow the appealand set aside the conviction and sentence.
Set aside.