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Jtoy 81 <b 85-
CHELLATURAI v. VELUPILLAI.P. G., Ghavakachoheri, 7,953.
Toll Ordinance, No. 8 of 1898, e. 4*-" Every vehicle not carrying a load anddrawn by two. oxen, 15 cents ”—Toll on return journey—Sections 6 and14—“ Unless such vehicle shall carry a different load., "
Where a cart loaded with cocoanut husks passed a toll station andpaid 15 cents as for an unloaded cart under section 6 of the Toll Ordi-nance, . 1886, and the toll-keeper demanded and received 15 cents whenthe same cart returned empty on the same day,—
Held, the toll-keeper was justified intaking suchtoll onthe return
journey, as section 14, which dealswith,tollspayableon return
journeys, does not limit the operation of thewords“ everyvehicle not
carrying a load and drawn by two oxen, 15 cents, '* occurring in section 4.
Per Wendt, J.—The effect of section14 may besummedup thus:—
If a vehicle which passed the toll loaded returns the same day with thesame load, it is altogether exempt.
If it has a different load, it must pay the full toll for a loaded vehicle.
If it makes a second outward journey with the same kind of 'load, itis liable to one-half toll only; but if it carries a different load, it mustpay the full rate.
N this case the accused, being a toll-keeper at Kopai, wascharged under section 19 of Ordinance No. 3 of 1896 with
recovering a sum of 15 cents as toll which was not due. Itappeared that the complainant’s cart drawn by two bxen passed thetoll station one day loaded with cocoanut husks, after payment of15 cents in terms of section 6 of the Ordinance, and that when itreturned empty the same day the accused demanded and receiveda further sum of 15 cents.
The Magistrate found him guilty and sentenced him to pay afine of Bs. 10.*
The accused appealed. The case was heard in appeal on 21stMay, 1903.
Wadsworth, for appellant.—The Toll Ordinance grants exemp-tion from toll on the return journey for loaded carts only. Section14 provides that no toll shall be levied from a cart on itsreturn journey, unless such cart returns with a different load.“ Different ” implies that the cart must have been previously alsoloaded. In that section there is no provision for carts going emptyand returning empty within twenty-four hours. Where theLegislature actually intended an exemption from tolls, it clearlyexpresses itself. For instance, section 4 provides for fishing boatsgoing to be or returning from having been employed, &c. Sec-tion 7 (2), in exempting manures, provides for vehicles going to
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be or returning from being employed. Section 13, in exemptingconveyances employed in conveying the Governor, provides forconveying or returning from conveying. The Ordinance shouldbe strictly construed. The deficiencies of the Legislature cannot ,be remedied by the judiciary. Rdmanathan, 1372, p. 264.) In2 Lorenz, p. 60, it was held that the horses of a mail coach,which were taken back over the same bridge were not exemptedfrom toll, as they were not specially exempted. Since cartsloaded with cocoanut husks are to be regarded as unloaded cartsunder section 6, the toll-keeper was justified in demanding tollon the. return journey by the words “ every vehicle not carryinga load and drawn by two oxen, 15 cents,” which oocur in section4. The charges for empty carts are so low that, even if they payon their return journey, the amount paid would be about halfthe amount payable for loaded carts.
No appearance for respondent.
Cur. adv. vuli.
25th May, 1903. Wendt, J.—
This appeal raises a question under the Toll Ordinance, 1893.The appellant, who is a toll-keeper, has been convicted and finedunder section 19 of the Ordinance for having demanded and takenfrom the complainant a toll which was not payable under theprovisions of the Ordinance. About 8 a.m. on the day in questionthe complainant took a cart drawn by two oxen and loaded withcocoanut husks through the toll to Maruparai. He then paid theappellanta toll of 15centsas upon an unloaded vehicle,in
accordance with the provisionsof section 6 of the Ordinance.At
10 a.m. the complainant returned from Maruparai with the cartempty. The accused then demanded and took another toll of15 cents as for an unloaded cart. It was contended for the prose-cution that on the return journey the cart was entitled to pass,free of toll. The Magistrate accepted this construction of theOrdinance.
Section 6 of the Ordinance is in the following terms:—“ From and after the day on which this Ordinance comes intooperationvehicles andboatsloaded with cocoanut husks inart
unmanufactured condition, and with no other goods or mer-chandise, except the necessary tackle, apparel and provision ofsuch boat- and the crew thereof, shall pass as, and pay the tolls of,unloadedvehicles andboatsonly. If such vehicles and boats
shall pass more than once the same day, loaded as aforesaid, nofurther tolls shall be demanded or taken for or in respect of them,but they shall pass free.”
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1908.Accordingto. the complainant,the effect of this section is “ that
May SI <fe 26. payment 0fOne toll for a cartloadedwith husks would exempt
Wbmdt, J. that cart from further toll all day if it were engaged in carryinghusks,”—meaning, I suppose, that as the cart will have to returnbefore it could pass the toll with a fresh load, the exemption coverssuch return of the cart. It appears to have been further argued forthe prosecution that there was no provision in section 14 imposinga toll on a cart returning empty on the same day as its journey out.
Now, it is clear that the carton thejourney in question comes
within theterms of section 4,whichimposes the tolls, and is
liable to pay a toll of 15 cents, and the question is whether thereis anything in the later provisions of the Ordinance which exemptsit from that liability. Section 14 is the only section which dealswith return tolls in general, and I think that the wording of itleaves no room for doubt that it was intended to apply to loadedvehicles only. Its effect may be summed up thus: If a vehiclewhich passed the toll loaded returns the same day with the sameload, it is altogether exempt; if it has a different load, it must paythe full toll for a loaded vehicle; if it makes a second outwardjourney with the same kind of load, it is liable to one-half toll only;but if it carries a different load, it must pay the full rate. Thenthere is the proviso that no payment of toll upon any vehicle whenunloaded shall in any manner affect any toll to which such vehicleis liable when loaded. There is nothing whatever in this section• which exempts a cart returning empty, and therefore the generalenactment in section 4 must have effect. The toll upon anunloaded vehicle amounts to only three-tenths of that leviableupon a loaded vehicle, and would appear to be a sort of irreducibleminimum from which the Ordinance only in certain carefullyspecified cases grants exemption. A vehicle may go out emptyand return empty, but must on each journey pay the full toll.
Then, as to section 6, I think it is equally clear with section 14.It first enacts that a vehicle, loaded with cocoanut husks shall becharged as an unloaded vehicle, and next that if such vehicleagain passes on the same day, loaded as aforesaid, it shall pass free.Here, again, there is nothing said of unloaded vehicles, but, on theother hand, such exemption as the section contains is expressly infavour of vehicles “ loaded as aforesaid.” It follows that here, too,the general enactment in section 4 operates to render unloadedvehicles liable to toll. It will be observed that section 6 has notthe words which occur in section 14 as to the vehicle going “ in alike direction ” on a subsequent journey, and the consequencemight have been that if the complainant’s cart had brought back anominal load of husks on its return journey it would have been
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exempt from toll, as being a cart loaded as aforesaid. But this 1903.apparent anomaly does not entitle me to disregard the plain May 25wording of the Ordinance. In view of that wording I must Wbkdx, J.assume that the liability of a vehicle to toll when returning ~empty was the consideration which moved the Legislature to taxvehicles loaded with oocoanut husks at the exceptionally low rateprescribed by section 6. Where the Lgislature intended to exemptvehicles on return journeys, it has expressly said so. See section4, paragraph 3; section 7, paragraph 2; and section 13.
The result is that the appellant' was entitled to exact the tollwhich he demanded, and his conviction cannot be supported. I
I therefore set it aside and acquit him.
CHELLATURAI v. VELUPILLAI