039-NLR-NLR-V-43-COOPER-v.-SIRISENA.pdf
164HOWARD C.J.—Cooper v. Siriscua.
1941Present : Howard C.J.
COOPER r. SIRISBNA.
6'i9—M. M. Colombo, 68-984.
Motor jvsjlc—Power to regulate—By-law—Municipal Councils Ordinance,s. 110 (’:•) (c) '.Chap. 193).
The peeve;- given to the Municipal Council by section 110 (61 <c) of theMunicipal Councils Ordinance to make by-laws for the regulation oftraffic in streets does not include the power to make by-laws forregulating motor traffic.
A
PPEAL from a conviction by the Municipal Magistrate of Colombo.
V. E. Charavanamuttu, for the accused, appellant.
H. W. R. Weerasooriya, Crown Counsel, for the complainant,respondent.
December 5, 1941. Howard C.J.—
In this case the appellant was convicted by the Municipal Magistrate,Colombo, with having, whilst driving a motor car, failed to keep to theleft of the white line laid on the Bambalapitiya-Galle road at its inter-section with De Vos avenue in breach of section 6 Chapter VI. of theMunicipal Council by-laws published in the Gazette No. 8,239 of August14, 1936, an offence punishable under section 109 (2) of the MunicipalCouncils Ordinance. Counsel for the appellant has contended thatthere was no white line marked along Galle road at its intersection withDe Vos avenue as proclaimed and hence the appellant could not beconvicted. Inasmuch as the white line came up to the junction of theGalle road and De Vos avenue I am of opinion that this point is withoutsubstance.
The second point taken by Counsel for the appellant is of a moresubstantial character. The by-law alleged to have been contravenedby the appellant is worded as follows': —
“ 6. From the date of the publication of a notice under the handof the Chairman in the Gazette, that a white or coloured line has, bythe authority of this Council, been laid or marked along the middleof any street within the administrative limits of this Council, thedriver of every vehicle using -that street shall keep to the left of theline so laid or marked.”
This by-law is made under section 110 (6) (c) of the Municipal CouncilsOrdinance (Chapter 193) which paiagraph gives power to make by-lawsfor “ the regulation of traffic in streets.” But is this power to regulatetraffic in streets unlimited in respect of the vehicles controlled ? Havingregard to the fact that sections 82 and 174 of the Motor Car Ordinance,No. 45 of 1938, impose on the Executive Committee of Local Adminis-tration the power to make regulations for control of motor cars, I do notthink the power given to Municipal Councils is unlimited. Such bodiescannot regulate motor traffic. Moreover section 4 of the Ordinancecontains a definition of the word “vehicle” as follows: —
“ ‘ Vehicle ’ includes any carriage, cart, coach, or tramcar, andevery artificial contrivance not being a mechanically propelled vehicleused or capable of being used as a means of transportation on land.”
SOERTSZ J.—Umina Saidu v. Hasim Marikar.1C5
The question therefore* arises as to the interpretation to be given tothe word “ vehicle ” as used in the regulation. Section 16 of theInterpretation Ordinance (Chapter 1) is worded as follows : —
“ 16. Where any Ordinance, whether passed before or after thecommencement of this Ordinance, confers power to make, grant orissue any instrument, that is to say, any proclamation, letters patent,Order-in-Council, order, warrant, scheme, rules, regulations, or by-laws, expressions used in the instruments shall, unless the contraryintention appears, have the same respective meaning as in the Ordinanceconferring the power.”
Hence the word “ vehicle” when employed in the regulation must,“unless the contrary intention appears”, be given the same meaningas in the Ordinance. I do not think it can be said that a contraryintention does appear, particularly as the power to make regulations is,as I have already pointed out. expressly vested by the Motor CarOrdinance, No. 45 of 1938, in the Executive Committee of LocalAdministration. In these circumstances I am of opinion that the term“ vehicle ”, when used in the regulation, did not include a motor car.
The conviction of the appellant is, therefore, set aside, and he isacquitted.
Set aside.