D. J. RANAWEERA, Appellant, and R. RAMACHANDRAN and others, Respondents

104-NLR-NLR-V-72-D.-J.-RANAWEERA-Appellant-and-R.-RAMACHANDRAN-and-others-Respondents.pdf


Banaweera v. liamachandran
663
[Privy Council]
1969 Present : Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Donovan,Lord Wilberforce, Lord Pearson and Lord DiplockD. J. R ANA WEEK A, AppeUant, and R. RARIACHANDRANand others, RespondentsPrivy Council Appeal No. 17 of 1968
S. G. 430[64—Application for a Mandate in the nature of a Writ of Certiorariunder section 42 pf the Courts Ordinance
!
Income tax—Board of llcvicw—Validity of its appointment by Minister and not bythe Judicial Service Commission or the Public Service Co umission—Function*of the Board—Power of the Board to hear appeals—Whether it invoices theexercise of judicial power—"'Public ojjh-er"—"Servant of the Crown”—“ The Crown "—“ Her Majesty "■—Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council(Cap. -379), ss. 3, 55, GO—Inconc Tax Ordinance {Cap. 212), s-s. ll (1) (a),11 (7), 15, 30 {!), 37, 15 {3), 50 {'■)), 73-77, SO—Certiorari.
In this appeal by a taxpayer against an order of (ho Board of Review whichxvns appointed by the Minister of Finance under section 74 (1) of tho InomoTax Ordinance, the first contention for tho appellant- wns that tho work of theBoard of Review involved the exerciso of judicial power and that, therefore,tho members of tho Board should have been appointed, according t-o section 55of tho Constitution, by the Judicial Service Commission and not by theMinister. Alternatively, it was contended that tho members of the Board■wero “public officers " within the moaning of the Constitution and that theirappointment to tho Hoard wns invalid because it wns made by tho Ministerand not by tho Public Servico Commission as required by section 60 of thoConstitution.
563
LORD DOXOVAN—Ranawcera v. Raniachandran
field, (i) that tho Board of Review does not oxerciso judicial power but is oneof the instruments created for the administration of the Income Tax Ordinance,and that ns such its work is administrative though judicial qualities nro calledfor in its performance. It- whs irrelevant therefore that members of tho Boardwore not appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.
(ii) that membors of the Board of Review cannot- properly bo deseribodas ** servants of the Crown ” within tho meaning of the definitionof “ public officer ” in section 3 of tho Constitution. They are more likoindependent arbitrators which the legislature has thought it right to appointas an administrative chock in favour of the taxpayer and as an additionalassurauco that his liability to tax will bo correctly ascertained.
Per Loud Divlock. in dissenting judgment—“ Tho members of the Board ofReview if not ‘ judicial officers ’ uro ‘ public officers ’ and were not validlyappointed as such.”
Appeal from a judgment of tho Supreme Court.
Sir Dingle Fool, Q.C., with M. P. Solomon and JT. I. IIahTavi~Hanijja,for the assessce-appellant.
E. F. N. Graliacn, Q.C., with R. K. Handoo, for the 4th respondent.
No appearance for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd respondents.
Cvr. adv. vuli.
December 11, 1969. [Majority Judgment delivered by Lokd Donovan]—
Tin- appellant (!‘ the taxpayer ”) appealed to the Board of Review inColombo against penalties imposed upon him by the Commissioner ofInland Revenue under section SO of the Income Tax Ordinance in thecircumstances set out in their Lordships’ judgment in the connectedappeal to them by the taxpayer entitled Jianatceerav. IVtcfcramasinghe.*As narrated in that judgment, the Board of Review dismissed the appealby Order dated 6th October 1964. Thereafter on 23rd November 1964the taxpayer presented a petition to the Supremo Court praying for theissue of a mandate in the nature of a writ of certiorari to quash the saidOrder. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on 16th October19G6, but granted leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council.
The first, second and third respondents to this appeal are members ofthe Income Tax Board of Review (“ the Board ”). They did not appearand were not represented. The fourth respondent was joined in theproceedings by the taxpayer simply to give him notice of his petition.No relief is claimed against him. He was, however, represented on thisappeal and opposed the taxpayer’s contentions.
* Page 553 (supra).
564
LORD DONOVAN'—Eanawcera v. Itamachandran
In his appeal to the Board the taxpayer first argued that the impositioiyof a penalty upon him under section 80 . was an exercise by=the Commissioner of Income Tax of judicial power and was therefore anullity since the Commissioner had not been appointed by the JudicialCommission. The Board x*ejected this contention, as their Lordshipshave now rejected it in the connected appeal.* Other issues were raisedby the taxpayer before the Board none of which were successful and noneof which now-remain.
The contentions which their Lordships now have to .consider are thatthe Board in hearing and determining the taxpayer’s appeal wereexercising judicial powers : that the first-, second and third respondentswho constituted the Board on this occasion could not exercise suchpowers, not having been appointed by the Judicial Service Commission.Alternatively the first, second and third respondents were not validlyappointed to the Board because they were at least “public officers ” buthad not been appointed by the Public Service Commission. For eitherof these reasons the order of the Board dated 6tli October 1964 wasnull and void.
In dismissing the taxpayer’s petition the Supreme Court of Ceylon gaveno reasons since Counsel for the taxpayer intimated that in view of theCourt’s decision in Xavier r. Wijeyekoon and Others l. lie again proposedto present no argument.
Under the heading “Appeals to the Board of Review ” section 74 (1) ofthe Income Tax Ordinance provides as follows :
“For the purpose of hearing appeals in the manner hereinafterprovided, there shall be a board of review (hereinafter referred to asf the board ’) consisting of not more than twenty members who shall beappointed from time to time by the Minister. The members of theboard shall hold office for a term of three years but shall be eligiblefor reappointment. ”
The Minister referred to is the Minister of Finance.
Section 74 then goes on to deal with the constitution of the Board.Two members arc to form a quorum, (hough in certain cases it is to hofive. The Board is to have a legal adviser. The remuneration ofmembers is to be fixed by the Minister.
Sections 75-77 confer jurisdiction upon the Board to hear appeals bytaxpayers who are dissatisfied by a determination of the Commissionerof Inland Revenue on an appeal to him under section 73, and prescribethe procedure to be followed. Appellants arc to attend in person or byen authorised representative: the assessor who made the assessment, orsome other person authorised by the Commissioner of Inland Revenuo is* Page 553 (Supra)1 (1066) 60 N. I. It. 107.
565
J.ORD DOXOVAX—Hauairccra v. Jtamachatufran
also to attend in support of the assessment : all appeals are to be heardin camera : the Board may summon and examine on oath or otherwise,any person they consider able to give evidence respecting the appeal. Atthe conclusion of the appeal the Board is to confirm, reduce, increase orannul the assessment, or it may remit the case to the Commissioner ofInland Revenue with the opinion of the Board thereon.
Section 70 of the Ordinance permits the Commissioner of InlandRevenue to refer an appeal direct to the Board if he considers that nouseful purpose would be served by his hearing it.
The only provision concerning costs is to be found in section 77 (0)which cm])owers the Board to order an unsuccessful appellant to pay asum not exceeding 100 rupees as costs of the Board.
Section 7S gives both the appellant and the Commissioner the right torequire a ease to he staled on a point of Jawjor the opinion of the SupremeCourt.
The first contention for the taxpayer is that the work of the Boardinvolves the exercise of judicial power. The Board does nothing else,it is said, save hear and determine appeals. Unlike the Commissioner ofInland Revenue it has no administrative duties to perform such as, forexample, the exercise of discretions which affect the quantum of ataxpayer’s liability. Its work cannot therefore be properly described asadministrative. When appeals come before the Board there is a lis inter2)artes to be determined, namely a dispute between the Commissioner ofIncome Tax on the one hand, and the taxpayer on the other; and sofar as disputed questions of fact arc concerned the Board’s decision isfinal.
Counsel for the fourth respondent contended that when the Boardhears appeals it is conducting one phase of the operations which go to. determine a taxpayer’s liability; and this is just as much part of theadministration of the tax as is the hearing of appeals by the Commissionerhimself.
Their Ixirdships think it is desirable to examine the functions of theBoard a little more closely. When this is done it appears that the Board’sfunctions on appeal are not limited to deciding disputed issues of fact orJaw, but that they are empowered to review matters which were thesubject of a discretion exercised by executive officers; Thus undersection 11 (7) of the Ordinance an Assessor has certain discretionsregarding the assessment of interest. After conferring these thesubsection concludes—
“Any decision of an Assessor in the exorcise of any discretionconferred upon him by this subsection may be questioned in an appealagainst an assessment in 80001×101100 with Chapter XI. ”
LORD DONOVAN1—Ranaweera v.’ Ramachandran
5S6
In Chapter XI is to be found inter alia the power of the Board to hearappeals.
Section 15 gives other discretions to the Assessor in arriving at the.amount of assessable income, and subsection (2) contains a similarprovision to that above cpioted.
Section 56 confers important discretions on the Assessor in relation tothe taxation of certain undistributed profits of companies, and in rela tionto transactions artificially reducing the amount of tax.
Again subsection (9) of the section says—
" Xothing in this section shall prevent the decision of an Assessorin the exercise of any discretion given to him by this section from beingquestioned in an appeal against an assessment in accordance withCha})ter XI. ”
The Ordinance also, confers a number of discretions upon theCommissioner of Inland Revenue which, being exercised, will affect thequantum of ail assessment upon the taxpayer. See, for example,section 1.1 (1)(«) (depreciat ion allowances for wear and tear of plant, etc.) :Section 36 (1) (liability of certain non-resident persons) : section 37(profits of certain businesses to be computed on a percentage of theturnover): and section 43 (3) (ascertainment of the profits of a non-residentinsurance company). There appears to be no such express enactment of aright to question the manner in which such discretions are exercised asthere is in the case of Assessors : but since the amount of the assessmentwill be affected, and section 73 gives the right to a taxpayer to appealif he is aggrieved by the amount of an assessment, their Lordships thinkthat such a right must be implied. Indeed this would help to explainthe existence of section 76 of the Ordinance which empowers theCommissioner to send an appeal direct to the Board if lie thinks that nouseful purpose would be served by his hearing it. If the Commissioner’sown decision as to the exercise of a particular discretion affecting theamount of the assessment were the point at issue, he might well thinkit right to send the appeal direct to the Board.
The foregoing provisions show that the Board could become closelyassociatcd with the administration of the. tax. Even otherwise, however,it would not follow in their Lordships’ opinion that the Board whenhearing appeals was exercising judicial power strictly so called. A broad-and not a narrow approach to this problem is appropriate, and isexemplified by what was said in the Court of Appeal in England in thecase of Inland Jlevemie Commis-yioner*• r. Snenlh.1 Greer L.J. speaking ofCommissioners of Taxes in the United Kingdom said (p. 3S5)—
I think the estimating authorities, even when an appeal is madeto them, are not acting as judges deciding litigation between thesubject and the Crown. They are merely in the position of valuers
‘ (103-2) 2 K. />*. 30-2.
LORD DOKOVAK-—Ravairecra v. Rainachandrau
567
whose proceedings are regulated by statute, to enable them to makean estimate of the income of tho taxpayer for the particular year inquestion. The nature of the legislation for the imposition of taxesmaking it- necessary that the statute should provide for somemachinery whereby the taxable income is ascertained, that machineryis set going separately for each year of tax. and though the figuredetermined in one 3'ear is final for that year, it is not final for anyother purpose. It is final not as a judgment inter partes but as thefinal estimate of the statutory estimating body. No lis comes intoexistence until there has been a final estimate of the income whichdetermines the tax payable. There can be no lis until the rights andduties are ascertained and thereafter questioned by litigation. ”
llonier L.J. added (p. 390)—
If the taxpayer is not content with such assessment lie can bringthe matter before the Special Commissioners by way of appeal. Butthe proceedings on the appeal aro still merely directed towardsascertaining the income upon which tlfc“taxpayer is to be-chargedwith surtax for the particular year of assessment, and the SpecialCommissioners may, if they think fit, increase the assessment madeby them in the first instance. The appeal is merely another steptaken by the Commissioners, at the instance of the taxpayer, in thecourse of the discharge by them of their administrative duty ofcollecting the surtax. In estimating the total income of the taxpayerthe Commissioners must necessarily form, and perhaps express,opinions upon various incidental questions of fact or law. But theonly tiling that the Commissioners have jurisdiction to decide directlyand as a substantive matter is the amount of the taxpayer’s incomefor the year in question. ”
In a recent decision in England (Money v. Kean1) 31cgarrv J. wasinclined to think that these, expressions of opinion were out of date sincethe passing of the Income Tax Management Act of 1904 which transferredmany functions previously exercised by General and SpecialCommissioners of Income Tax to Inspectors of Taxes and the Board ofInland Kcvcnuc. He say’s (p. 240) “ It seems to me that today theCommissioners discharge functions which are essentially judicial innature. Virtually all their administrative functions have now gone, andtheir basic functions arc judicial. ”
The taxpayer in the present appeal naturally quoted these observationsin support of his argument : hut the attention of the learned judge seemsnot to have been drawn to paragraph 3 of Schedule 4 of the Income TaxManagement Act which enacts as follows :
“ On an appeal to the General Commissioners or SpecialCommissioners, the Commissioners shall have jurisdiction to reviewany relevant decision taken bv an inspector or the Board in exercise ofthe functions transferred to the insert or or the Board by thisSchedule. ”
1 (VJ69) 3 ir. L. R. -240.
5G8
LORD DONOVAN—Ixonawccra v. Ramachandran
The functions so transferred are identified in the Schedule by referencesto numerous provisions of the Income Tax Act 1952 and later Finance.Acts : and if these arc examined it will be seen that “ relevant decisions ”may be involved which will relate to many matters of administrationand these the General and Special Commissioners are empowered toreview. Their Lordships respectfully doubt therefore whether it is rightto say that these Commissioners have virtually lost all their administrativefunctions, and that the observations of Greer L. J. and Roiner L. J. abovequoted must now be regarded as spent. On the contraiy they would stillappear to have persuasive force in relation to a case such as the presenteven if the Board of Review’s functions were confined to the determinationof disputed issues of fact and law as a step in the determination of thetaxpayer’s income for the year of assessment in question.
Other authorities were canvassed in the course of the argument. Theyincluded British Imperial Oil Company Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner ofTaxation1 and Caffoor v. Income Tax Commissioner of Ceylon -: neither ofwhich decisions call for detailed comment here. Both sides relied uponShell Company of Australia Ltd. v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation 3already noted in the connected appeal. On the whole of the materialput before them on this part of (lie. case their Lordships’ conclusion isthat- the Board of Review docs not exercise judicial power but is one ofthe instruments created for the administration of the Income TaxOrdinance, and that as such its work is administrative though judicialqualities are called for in its performance. It is irrelevant therefore thatmembers of the Board were not appointed by the Judicial ServiceCommission.
The alternative contention of the taxpayer is that if the first second andthird respondents arc not <: judicial officer's ” the}' are ‘’’public officers ”within the meaning of the Constitution : and that their appointment tothe Board was invalid since it was made by the Minister and not by thePublic (Service Commission as required by section GO of the Constitution.
f* Public Officer ” is defined in section 3 of the Constitution as meaning‘‘any person who holds a paid office, other than a judicial office, as aservant of the Crown in respect of the Government of the IslandCertain persons are declared not to bo included in this definition, e.g.the Governor- Genera I, the President, the Speaker or Minister, Senator orMember of Parliament- and a number of others.
The narrow question here is, therefore, whether the first three,respondents, as members of the Board, are correctly described aservants of the Crown in respect of the Government of Ceylon.
– {I'Jfil) A. V. 6Si ; 63 S. L. It. 66.
3 (I'J3J) A. C. 276.
1 36 U. It. 1JJ.
LOUD DIPT.OCK—Pctnawctra v. Pamwhandrnn
5C9
A specimen letter of appointment to tlie Board by the Minister ofFinance was shown to their Lordships. It- appoints tlie adtJresseo for aperiod of three years and fixes his remuneration at 50 rupees for eachmeeting of two hours’ duration or less, and 75 rupees for each meetingof more than two hours’ duration, subject- to an over-riding maximum of500 rupees a month.
For the taxpayer it is said that a dilemma confronts the first threerespondents from which there is no escape. If they are not "judicialofficers ” they must be S! public officers The fourth respondent asserts,however, that the Constitution docs not purport to bo a code governingthe method of appointment to every office to which are attached functionsin the nature of public duties.
Thoir Lordships think they must find the solution to this problem inthe meaning to be accorded to the words in the definition “ servants ofthe Crown Thej' regard this language as inapt to describe members ofthe Board having regard to the duties they have-to perform.. Theyrecognise that the part-time nature of the work and the modest- remunera-tion it attracts are not strictly relevant considerations. It is true, asthe fourth respondent says, that the Crown in Ceylon cannot give membersof the Board instructions as to how they are to do their work. What isalso important is that although it is engaged, as their Lordships haveheld, in the administration of the Income Tax Ordinance, it is of theessence of the Board’s function that- its members remain independent andimpartial; and this does not accord with any conception of them as“ servants of the Crown ”. They are more like independent arbitratorswhich the legislature lias thought it- right to appoint as an administrativecheck in favour of the taxpaj'er and as an additional assurance that hisliability to tax will be correctly ascertained. It was urged on behalf ofthe taxpayer that unless they were “ public officers ” members of theBoard would lose the protection enjoyed by those who are appointed bythe Public Service Commission, and that the framers of the Constitutionmust have intended that protection to be afforded to persons entrustedwith tasks similar to those of the Board. Their Lordships must neverthe-less still come to a conclusion on the language of the definition ; and theyhave reached the conclusion that members of the Board of Review cannot-properly be described as “ servants of the Crown ” within the meaning ofsection 3 of the. Constitution.
They will accordingl}' humbly advise Her Majesty that this appealshould also be dismissed. The taxpayer appellant must pay the costs ofthe appeal.
[Dissenting Judgment by Lord Diplock]
I feel reluctantly compelled to record my own dissent from the viewof the majority that a member of the Board of Review does not holdhis office as a " servant of the Crown ” within the meaning of that
570
LORD DTPLOCK—Itanau'eera r. Ramnchandran
expression iii the Constitution of Ceylon. The reasons stated for tha1,conclusion are: “that once they are appointed the Crown in Ceyloncannot give members of the Board instructions as to how they are to dotheir job ”, “ it is of the essence of their function that they remainindependent and impartial ” and “ They are more like independentarbitrators which the legislature lias thought it right to appoint. …”
Those reasons would be conclusive that a member of the Board wasnot a servant " if one were considering whether there existed betweenhim and some other person the legal relationship of master and servantin private law. But the Constitution of Ceylon is concerned not withprivate law but with public law in which the compound expression“ servant-of-the-Crown ” has become a term of art descriptive of personsby whom the functions of Government of State are carried out.
In tho context of public law I myself should have regarded thecharacteristics of the office of member of the Board of Review whichare relied upon to negative thoir being “ servants ” in private law, aspointing to the conclusion that their functions as “ servants of theCrown " were more appropriately classified as judicial rather thanexecutive or administrative so that they were “ judicial officers >!rather than” public officers” within the meaning of tho Constitution.
I recognise however that within the special field of taxation there is aline of authorities anterior in date to the Constitution of Ceylon whichdiscloses a tendency to treat as executive or administrative the function ofdeciding disputes between the Government and the taxpayer as to hislegal liability under fiscal legislation although the decision-making func-tion Is of a kind which would have, all tho indicia of being judicial if thesubject-matter of the legal liability were anything other than tax. I amnot myself convinced that even these authorities compel the conclusionthat the functions of the Board of Review under the Income Tax Ordi-nance of Ceylon are not judicial. But I do not find the reasoning of ShellCo. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation 1 easy to apply*beyond the particular statute with which it was concerned. It enumeratescharacteristics of a tribunal which are not conclusive to constitute it a“ court ” but throws little light upon what characteristics are conclusiveeither of its exercising judicial functions or of its exercising executive oradministrative functions. Despite my doubts however I should not havefelt justified in expressing positive dissent to a decision that the membersof the Board of Review were “ public officers ” rather than “ judicialofficers
1 (t9Jl) A. C. 275.
LORD DTPLOCK—Jtanautera v. Tiamachondran
571
: ■' The Constitution of Ceylon takes the form of a constitutional monarchy‘ modelled upon that of tlie United Kingdom. Under such a constitution'all functions of central government of the State, legislative, executive and'judicial, are carried out in the name of the reigning monarch. In such^expressions as "servant of the Crown " or “ member of Her Majesty’sservice ", " the Crown " and " Her Majesty " are used not in the personalbut in a metaphorical sense to connote the central government of theStute. No one would suggest that except as respects her personal staffthere exists between Her Majesty as a natural j)crson and a " servant oftlir Crown" a legal relationship which possesses the. eharacterist ics ofthe relationship of master and servant at common law, namely, thatHer Majesty can give instructions as to the manner in which t he servantof the Crown performs his work. On the contrary Her Ministers, by theiradvice, control the manner in which Her Majesty herself performs herduties under public law. Yet so far as I am aware it has never beensuggested that Ministers of the Crown are notrincluded-in the expression': servants of the Crown So clear was this thought to be by the UnitedKingdom parliament in 1947 that in the interpretation section (S. 38 (2) )of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947, it is provided : " Officer ", in relationto the Crown, includes any servant of His Majesty, and accordingly(hut without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision)includes a " Minister of the Crown A similar recognition that the.expression " servant of the Crown ” is wide enough to include a Ministerof the Crown is to be found in the Constitution of Cejdon itself in which aMinister of the Crown is expressly excluded from the definition of" publicofficer ” within which he would otherwise have fallen as holding “ a paidoffice as a servant of the Crown in respect of the Government of the.Island ”
Control by some other person of the manner in which a person performsfunctions for the purposes of the central government of the State is notin my view a relevant test of whether or not he is a " servant of theCrown The legislation under which he is appointed may confer uponhim a wide personal discretion to act as he thinks fit. If his responsibi-lities are of a judicial nature this may be inconsistent with any power inany other person to control the decisions which he makes in dischargingthem provided that he acts within his jurisdiction. Yet a person whoperforms judicial functions is none the Jess a " servant of the Crown(Terrell v. Secretary of Stale for the Colonies1). There may be room forargument as to whether in view of their unique constitutional historyjudges of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom are excluded fromthe category of servants of the Crown or "persons in His Majesty'sservice " as Sir William Holdsworth thought they were in 1931 (48L.Q.R.);though I recall that in the oath of office I took as a Lord Justice of Appeal
‘ (1953) 2 Q.B. 432.
LORD DTPLOCK—Ttanaiceera v. Jtamachandran
I swore.that I would “well and truly serve our Sovereign Lady QueenElizabeth the Second in the Office of one of the Lords Justices of AppealHowever this may be as respects judges of the Supreme Court who inthe Ceylon Constitution are oxpressly excluded from the definition of“ judicial officer ”, so far as I am awaro it has never been suggested thatpersons appointed to other judicial offices are not servants of the Crown ;and this too is implicitly recognised in Section 2 (5) of tho CrownProceedings Act, 1947, of the United Kingdom and in the definitionof “ public officer ” in the Constitution of Ceylon.
There may be cases where a function of central government such as themaintenance of order is carried out through officers appointed locally andpaid out of local funds. Polico constables are a well known example andthere ruay be room for doubt whether in view of the manner of theirappointment and the source of their pay they are strictly servants of thoCrown ” or are as Blackburn J. put iu Mersey Docks v. Cameron1 only inconsimili casu. This however does not arise in the present appeal.
A member of tho Board of Review under the Income Tax Ordinanceholds an “office”. ‘ It is so described in Section71 (1). It is a “paidoffice ”, for Section 74 (6) provides for his remuneration which is paid outof the revenues of the central government of Ceylon. In. my opinion, thetest whether or not lie is a “ servant of the Crown ” in tho sense in whichthat expression is used in public law is whether or not tho functionsconferred or imposed by the Income Tax Ordinance upon tho Boardof Review which he is appointed to perform are under the Constitutionof Ceylon functions of central government.
The assessment, and collection of taxes to defray the expenses of thecentral government of the country is a classic constitutional function ofcentral government itself. The performance of this function must needsbe undertaken by natural persons for tho purpose of administering thefiscal legislation on the central government’s behalf. Those naturalpersons who so administer it, at- any rate if appointed by a Minister oftho Crown acting in his official capacity and if paid out of the centralrevenues of Ceylon, are in my view “ servants of the Crown ”,
For this reason I niysolf would allow this appeal on the ground thatthe members of the Board of Roviow if not “ judicial officers” are “ nublicofficers ” and were not validly appointed as such.
1 11 H. L. C. 443 at pp. 464—5.
Appeal dismissed.