034-NLR-NLR-V-58-DEWASURENDRA-Appellant-and-ALAHAKOON-Court-Officer-Respondent.pdf
Present : Swan, J.
1955
DEVVASURENDRA, Appellant, and ALAHAKOON (Court Officer),
Respondent
S. C. 915—31. G. Walasmulla, 13,217
Causing interruption to judicial officer—Musi be intentional—l^enal Code, S. 223.
In a prosecution under section 223 of the Ponnl Code for causing interruption^to a public servant while such public servant is sitting in any stage of a judicialproceeding, tbo Court lias to be satisfied that t-ho act of the accused was inten-tional.
A
-tiPPEAL from a judgment of the Magistrate's Court, Walasmulla.
Sir TJhwalte Jayasundera-, Q.G., with Sunil K. Rodrigo, for the accusedappellant.
Lucien de jLlwis, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vull.
October 24, 1955. Swax, J.—
The appellant was charged with having intentionally caused interruptionto the Magistrate at Walasmulla when he was holding an inquiry into-a murder case by uttering the words “ oka boru ” meaning “ that is a lie ",and thereby having committed an offence punishable under Section 223of the Penal Code.
The incident arose in the following circumstances. Mr. S. S. Kulatiilekawas conducting the inquiry in ease Mo. 12,995 of the Magistrate’s Court ofWalasmulla, and while he was examining a witness the appellant who wasthe father of one of the accused used the words in question. At the trialof this case Mr. Kulatiileka giving evidence for the prosecution statedthat he was interrupted and had to stop the proceedings and call theappellant up for having given utterance to that expression. He added,however, that he woidd notsay it was a deliberate act and that he thoughtthat it was not intentional, but he could not say so definitely, ftappeared to him, however, that it was a spontaneous outburst.
The Assistant Superintendent of Police said that due to the interruptionit was not possible for him to continue leading evidence. He admitted incross-examination that up to the time of the interruption the accusedwas seated in Court and behaving quite normally. He said that the
accused must have been grieved by the cvidcuce^of the witness, thatafter the interruption there was no further trouble and that the appellantdid not c-reate a scene.
This was the evidence for the prosecution, for the defence only onewitness was called, namely Mr. H. A. Bast innsz who was the Proctor forthe accused in the murder inquiry. He described the words used by theappellant as “ an outburst of pent-up feelings of a father who was grievedat his son being charged In answer to Court he said that the wordswere not uttered in an offensive way.
The learned Magistrate deferred his order which, he delivered one weeklater. He found the accused guilty and sentenced him to pajr a fine ofRs. 50. In the course of his judgment lie stated that the Section underwhich the accused was charged consisted of two parts, namely (a) whoeverintent ionalty offers any insult to any public servant while such publicservant is sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, and (b) whoevercauses any interruption to any public servant while such public servant issitting in aiy stage of a judicial proceeding. The case he was consideringcame under (b). Under that jiart, as he understood it, he seemed tothink that there was no necessity for proving that the accused’s act wasintentional.
There can be no doubt that the learned Magistrate has misunderstoodthe section. The adverb “ intentionally ” modifies both the phrasesoffers any insult ’’ and " causes any interruption That seems obviouswhen one considers how the section lias been framed and pays heed to thepunctuation. A glance at the side note makes this quite clear.
The corresponding section of the Indian Penal Code is section 223 andis identical with our own. In lie Itanuisamy Counden 1 it was held thatthe Court had to be satisfied that the accused intcntionallj' offeredinterruption to the Court. There are also some locat eases on contemptto the same effect.
1 think that the learned Magistrate was clearly wrong when he tried toplace his own interpretation on the section. Teamed Crown Counseltried to support the convict ion on the ground that there, was sufficientevidence to prove that the interruption was intentional. Ho argued thatthere was in fact an interruption of the proceedings and, applying theprinciple that a man must be presumed to intend the natural andprobable consequences of his acts, one must infer that the interruptionwas intentionally caused. But the circumstances negative intention.Even Mr. Ivulatilleka said that he could not be definite whether theappellant’s act was intentional or nol.
I set aside the conviction and acquit the accused.
Appeal alloiced.
1 1C Indian Cr. L. J. R. CIO.