060-NLR-NLR-V-53-DHARMADASA-Appellant-and-THIEDEMAN-Inspector-of-police-Respondent.pdf
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Dkarmadasa t>. Thiedcman
1950Present: Nagalingam J.
DHARMADASA, Appellant, and THIEDEMAN (Inspector of Police),
Respondent
S. C. 391—Af. C. Gampola, 19,474
Soliciting—Meaning of expression—Vagrants Ordinance (Cap. 26), s. 7 (J) (a).
The term " soliciting ” in section 7 (1) (a) of the Vagrants Ordinance neednot necessarily be confined to cases where an appeal is made earnestly or ispressed. It is wide enough to cover the case where a person is invited or evenwhere an offer is made coupled with not necessarily an express but an impliedinvitation.
.^^.PPEAL from a judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, Gampola.
M. M. Kumarahulasingham, with J. G. Thurairatnarn, for accusedappellant.
S. 8. Wife8inha, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cut. adv. vult.
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NAQAJj INGAM J.—Dharmadasa v. Thiedeman
July 11, 1950. Nagalingam J.—
The appellant in this case has been convicted by the learned Magistrateat Gampola of having committed an offence under section 7 (1) (a) ofthe Vagrants Ordinance (Cap. 26 of the Legislative Enactments) and sen-tenced to undergo a term of three months’ rigorous imprisonment. Theonly point that was pressed on appeal was whether the facts testifiedto by the prosecution witnesses disclosed the offence and in particularwhether the facts established could be said to amount to soliciting withinthe meaning of the section under which the accused was charged.
The evidence, which the learried Magistrate has accepted, proves thatas the two witnesses who gave evidence in the case, viz., Mutuwa andWickremesinghe, passed along the road the accused spoke to them and,according to the witness Mutuwa, intimated to him that he had two girls,and according to Wickremesinghe he asked them to have tea and anythingelse they wanted, and on the last-named asking the accused where hishouse was, he pointed out to the house where near the doorway were twowomen who, according to the witness, laughed when he turned in thatdirection.
The events that subsequently transpired were narrated by the witnessesbut they could at best be regarded as furnishing corroborative testimonjvfor the subsequent events merely' indicate that the witnesses went tothe Police Station and made a complaint there, that they returned there-after and were met by the accused—it is not clear whether it was onthe road or in the accused’s house ; the witnesses then proceeded to makepayment to a woman and then went each with one of two other womeninto a room. The subsequent events disclose that at the time thewitnesses went to the house of the accused, there was no question ofany solicitation by the accused. The solicitation, if any, must be re-garded as having taken place at the first meeting of the witnesses with theaccused.
The question is whether the offer by the accused to the witness Mutuwaof two women and to the witness Wickremesinghe of tea and anythingelse they wanted while at the same time the accused pointed out hishouse where two women were out obviously to attract the attention ofany males, constitutes soliciting.
Learned Counsel for the appellant relied upon the case of Thiedeman v.Ghinasekera 1 and stressed one sentence from the judgment wherede Kretser J. expounded the meaning of the term “ soliciting ”.“ Soliciting ”, the learned Judge said, “ connotes importunity, askingwith earnestness, pressing of a matter, and not mere inquiry ”. Butthe learned Judge did not stop there, for he proceeded to observe that" it may mean inviting as when a trader solicits patronage—but thatagain is not mere inquiry ”. The term ” solicit ” or ” soliciting ” neednot necessarily be confined to cases where an appeal is made earnestlyor is pressed but it is wide enough to cover the case where an invitation isextended or where a person is invited or even where an offer is madecoupled with 'not necessarily an express but an implied invitation.
» {1941) 43 N. L. B. 143 ; 31 C. L. W. 110.
M. B. it Silva v. The Commissioner of Income Tax
It is to be noted that in the case cited by Counsel the facts clearly showthat there was no soliciting by the accused. Both in that case and inthe case referred to therein, reference to which is not to be found in thereport but which according to Counsel is the case of Selvaratnam v.Martin the facts were that Police officers went up and halted theircars near about houses reputed to be of ill-fame and by either switchingoff lights and in the latter case by tooting horn in addition, attracted theattention of the accused persons who thereupon went up to the Policeofficers and made inquiries whether they wanted “ the goods ” or usedsome other euphemistic term. It was held in these circumstances, andthere can be little doubt in regard to it, that there was no solicitationby the accused in those cases, but if at all, the solicitation proceeded fromthe Police officers themselves who played the role of would-be patrons.
The facts of the present case amply fall within the definition of soli-citing in the sense of an invitation, for the offence was complete when thethe accused made offer of women to the witness Mutuwa and invited thewitness Wickremesinghe to come in and have tea and anything else hewanted, implying women. The case, therefore, against the accused hasbeen established and I see no reason to interfere with the judgment of thelower Court. I
I therefore dismiss the appeal.
Appeal dismissed.