162-NLR-NLR-V-47-DHARMARATNA-Appellant-and-INDASARA-ISTHAVIRA-Respondent.pdf
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KETJNEMAN S.P.J.—Dharmaratna v. Tndanara Jnthaxrira.
1946Present: Keuneman S.P.J and Jayetileke J.DHARMARATNA, Appellant, and INDASARA ISTHAVIRA,Respondent.
390—D. C. Matara, 16,531.
Buddhist Ecclesiastical Law—Right of individual priest to select for hvmselj aparticular place in the vihare against the wishes of the controllingViharadhipathi—Liability to be ejected from the temple premises.
Where the plaintiff, the controlling Viharadhipathi of a Buddhisttemple, permitted the defendant, who was his pupil, to occupytemporarily the room in the temple known as the Poyage but thedefendant persisted in his occupation of the room and refused to leaveit though requested so to do—
Held, that the defendant was guilty of contumacy and was liable to beejected from the temple premises.
PPE AD from a judgment of the District Judge of Matara.
V. Perera, K.G. (with him L. A. Rajapahse, K.G., and S. W.Jayasuriya), for the plaintiff, appellant.
N. Nadarajah, K.C. (with him V. Wijelunge), for the defendant,respondent.
Cur adv. vult.
October 25,1946. Kettnkman S.P.J.—
The plaintiff is the controlling Viharadhipathi of the Agrabodhi Vihareat Weligama. He alleged that the defendant who was his pupil hadbeen disobedient and disrespectful to him, and further was in wrongfuland forcible possession of the premises known as the Poyage. Theplaintiff asked that the defendant be ejected from the premises of thetemple. The defendant denied the allegations in the plaint. A numberof issues were framed, and after trial the District Judge dismissed theplaintiff’s action with costs.
Except for one matter which I shall presently mention, the DistrictJudge has not definitely held whether the acts of disobedience anddisrespect were actually done by the defendant. For instance, evidence
KliTTNKMAN S.P.J.—Dharmaralna V. Indasara Ialhavira.
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was called by the plaintiff to show that the defendant on one occasiontook a plate of rice and was aboat to dash it on the head of the plaintiff,and also other acts of disrespect were spoken to. All that the DistrictJudge says on this part of the case is—“ The relationship between theplaintiff and the defendant had deteriorated; acts and counteractshave been done but how, why and when this sthte of affairs started isnot disclosed by the evidence This finding is not helpful, and theDistrict Judge would have been well advised to hold definitely whatacts, if any, were done by the defendant and under what circumstances.
It is fair, however, to mention that none of the “ counteracts ” arecharged against the plaintiff personally.
As the case stands at present, however, we have no help from theDistrict Judge to decide the degree of blame attaching to the defendantas regards these matters.
There is one matter, however, which is clear. The defendant, at firstwith the permission of the plaintiff, occupied the room in the templeknown as the Poyage. This has been described as the confessionalroom of the priests. In this room at the season of “ Wass ” the priestsperform a Poya kerima ceremony—which is a sort of mutual confession.rrhere can be little doubt that thereafter the defendant claimed a rightof exclusive occupation of that room, with the result that the foya-kerima ceremony could not be held. The defendant, though oftenrequested so to do, refused to leave the' Poyage and kept the key of thePoyage in his possession. Even at the trial he stated that he was notprepared to leave the Poyage, and maintained that the plaintiff askedhim to leave the Poyage without a cause and gave instances of otherpriests who had occupied the Poyage before him.
There can be no doubt that the defendant is making an untenableclaim, and in doing ao is defying the authority of his tutor, theViharadhipathi.
In Piyadasa v. Duramitia1 a predecessor of the Maha Nayake or HighPriest of the Malwatte Vihare had granted to the defendant in thatdispute an informal document authorising him to put up a new buildingin the temple premises and to use such building as a permanent residencefor himself and his pupils. The defendant put up the building at his ownexpense and after the death of his tutor claimed the right to continuein possession of that house. In this connection de Sampayo J. pointedout that the informal document was insufficient to create an interest inthe property, and doubted whether in any event the High Priest had aright to create an interest which was to last beyond his own tenure ofoffice ; and added—
“ The first defendant, in the next place, falls back upon the generalprinciple that sangika property is common to the entire priesthoodand that an individual priest cannot be ejected therefrom. Theprinciple was stated by Cayley C.J. in Dhammajoti v. Tikiri Banda 2as foJ'ows : ‘ A Buddhist priest cannot be ejected from a Buddhistvihare except for some personal cause irrespective of the rights ofproperty ’. There is no doubt about this Buddhist law
(1921) 23 Hi. L. R. 2d.
{1881) 4 a. O. C. 121.
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Charles Ajypu v. The Controller of Establishments.
This right of the priesthood, however, surely does not mean that anindividual priest can select for himself a particular place in the vihareindependently of the chief incumbent and against his wishes. Ithink that any persistent assertion and insistence on any such allegedright is a ‘ personal cause ’ for which he may properly be asked toleave. Such conduct woffid amount to contumacy, and in the exerciseof ecclesiastical discipline and order the incumbent has, I think,sufficient authority even to eject the offending priest ”.
This applies with equal or greater force to the present case. It istrue that the defendant entered the Pay age with the permission of theplaintiff, but it is clear that the permission applied only to a temporaryoccupation and that that permission has long since been withdrawn..In spite of this the defendant persists in his occupation of the Poyageand refuses to leave the room though requested so to do. In the wordsof de Sampayo J. the defendant has been guilty of contumacy ” and hasrendered himself liable to be ejected from the temple premises. In tniscase however it is not necessary to go so far, and the plaintiff is notunwilling to take an order of ejectment of the defendant merely from thePoyage.
In all the circumstances I set aside the judgment of the District Judgeand enter judgment for the plaintiff, declaring him entitled to possessionof the room known as the Poyage. The plaintiff will 1 put in possessionof the said room and the defendant will be ejected therefrom. Theplaintiff will be entitled to costs in the court below and in appeal.
Jayetileke J.—I agree.
Appeal allowed.