087-NLR-NLR-V-71-DISSANAYAKE-MUDIYANSELAGE-PUNCHI-MAHATMAYO-Petitioner-and-D.-WIJEDORU-Assis.pdf
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Dissanayake Puncfii Mahatmayo v. Wijedoru
Present: G.P.A. Silva, A.C J., and Siva Supramaniam, J.DISSANAYAKE MUDIY ANSEL AGE PUNCHI MAHATMAYO,Petitioner, and D. WIJEDORU (Assistant Commissioner ofAgrarian Services) and another, Respondents
S.C. 257/68—Application for a Mandate in the nature of a Writ of
Certiorari
Paddy Lands Act, as amended by Act No. 11 of 1964—Sections 6(1), 3 (1A), 4 (6)—Joint tenant-cultivators—Protection given to them against eviction—Date ofcommencement—Interpretation Ordinance (Cap. 2), s. 2 (it).
Not only sole tenant-cultivators but also joint tenant-cultivators wereprotected by the Paddy Lands Act even before section 3 (1A) of that Act wasintroduced on 24th August 1964 by the amending Act No. 11 of 1964.
-APPLICATION for a writ of certiorari^
Mark Fernando, for petitioner.
N.Sinnetamby, Crown Counsel for 1st respondent.
M.Kanagasunderam, for 2nd respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
G. P. A. SILVA, A.C.J.—Dissanayaka Punchi Mahaimayo v. Wijedoru 421
January 29, 1969. G. P. A. Silva, A.C.J.—
This is an application by the petitioner, who is the owner of apaddy field, for a Writ of Certiorari to quash the proceedings held and theorders made by the 1st respondent, an Assistant Commissioner ofAgrarian Services, on the application made by the 2nd respondent tobe restored to possession of this paddy field on the ground that he hadbeen wrongly evicted by the petitioner. On the 2nd September, 1963the 2nd respondent, alleging that he was and had been a tenant cultivatorof the said paddy field under the petitioner, made an application to the1st respondent under the provisions of the Paddy Lands Act to havehimself restored to the possession of the said paddy field on the groundthat he had been wrongly evicted. The 1st respondent held certaininquiries on this application commencing on 29th July, 1964 and endingon 29th November, 1965 and, at the conclusion thereof, made orderdeclaring that the 2nd respondent was a joint tenant cultivator withthe husband of the petitioner and restoring him to possession of thesaid paddy field. The petitioner thereupon appealed to the Board ofReview' constituted under the Paddy Lands Act against the order of the1st respondent but his appeal was dismissed by the said Board.
The main contention for the petitioner is that, at the time of the appli-cation made by the 2nd respondent for relief under the provisions of thePaddy Lands Act, no provision existed in this Act to recognise the rightsof a joint tenant cultivator and that such a right was recognised onlyby the amendment to this Act made on the 24th August, 1964 and thatthe 1st respondent had therefore no jurisdiction to entertain the saidapplication or to make an order in terms of a subsequent amendment tothe Act which was not retrospective in its operation. The argument istherefore twofold, namely, that whatever rights the 2nd respondent isentitled to, have to be resolved in terms of the provisions of the originalAct and that the 1st respondent was acting without jurisdiction when heexercised powers conferred on him by the Amending Act which came intooperation only on 24th August, 1964. .
In regard to the first limb of his argument the submission of counsel forthe petitioner is that section 3 of the original Act No. 1 of 1958 did notrecognise joint cultivators but only a single cultivator and that a personin the position of the 2nd respondent would not come within the definitionof a tenant cultivator under that section. The Amending Act No. 11 of1964 was in his submission intended to fill this gap and bring in jointcultivators within its scope. Section 3 (1) provides :—
Where any person is the cultivator of any extent of paddy landlet to him under any oral or written agreement made before or after thecoming into operation of this Act in the Administrative Districtin which that extent wholly or mainly lies, then, if he is a citizen ofCeylon, he shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be the tenantcultivator of that extent.
422 G. P. A. SILVA, A.C.J.—Diaaanayake Punchi Mahatmayo v. Wijedoru
In view of the provisions of section 2 [ii) of the Interpretation Ordinancethat words in the singular number shall-include the plural, it is difficultto accept the submission that section 3 of the Paddy Lands Act contem-plated only a single cultivator. Secondly, inherent in the nature ofpaddy cultivation and more pronounced than in other types of cultivationis the necessity for joint participation in the various operations ofploughing, sowing and reaping. It is idle to think that the framers of theoriginal Act did not contemplate the numerous instances where morethan one person, whether they were members of a family or otherwise,cultivated paddy fields jointly as tenants of absentee landlords. Ifthe contention of the counsel for the petitioner is sound it will alsonecessarily lead to the conclusion that the original Act or even theAmending Act did not contemplate more than one landlord, of any paddyfield let to a tenant cultivator ; for, the word landlord is generally usedin the singular in both the Acts except in the preamble to the originalAct.. Such an interpretation will lead to the absurd result that jointlyowned paddy fields let out to tenant cultivators in Ceylon, which aremore the rule than the exception, would fall outside the purview of thePaddy Lands Act. For all these reasons I do not find it possible toagree with the contention of the petitioner in regard to this point.
Although it is not necessary to deal with this matter in order to decideon the initial contention of the petitioner, in view of the submissionmade by counsel, the question arises as to what the purpose was inintroducing the new sub-section 1A immediately after section 3 (I) ofthe original Act. To my mind it may well have been intended to defineclearly the position of cultivators in rotation. For, where there is anagreement between one or more landlords and one or more cultivators ascontemplated by section 3 (1) of the original Act, but the cultivation asbetween the tenants is carried on in rotation, one cultivator or a set of cul-tivators who work the paddy field in one season would not be cultivatorsduring the next season. Had it not been for the new section 3 (1)A intro-duced by the Amendment the cultivator or cultivators, as the case maybe, who did not do any cultivation during one of the seasons in rotationwould commit a breach of tho agreement with the landlord and forfeit hisor their rights as tenant cultivator under the agreement. The new sub-section seems to have intended therefore to afford protection to such atenant cultivator of that extent (let to him under any' oral or writtenagreement) for the season or seasons in which he is a cultivator of thatextent. I am fortified m this view by the absence in the original Act,in the definition of “tenant cultivator” of the words “season or seasons ”which find a prominent place in the same definition in the Amending Act.The question of seasons would in the context in which it is used, only arisein the case of cultivation in rotation and would not have a place inthe normal case where tho tenant cultivator or cultivators would becultivating the extent let to him or them during every' season. Theword ‘ jointly ’ in this section does not militate against this constructionbecause the agreement with the landlord in such a case may be enteredinto jointly by several tenants undertaking to cultivate the land jointly,
G. P. A. SILVA, A.C.J.—Diasanayake Punehi Mahal mayo v. Wijedoru . 423
but at the same time one of the tenants (where there are only twojoint tenants) or one group of tenants (where there are several) cultivatingthe land-in such alternate seasons as may be agreed upon.
In the application before me no question of any cultivation in rotationarises. According to the affidavit filed by the 2nd reaspondent he hasbeen tenant cultivator of the paddy field in question under the petitionersince 1947. The finding of the 1st respondent after inquiring into thecomplaints of eviction, which finding is hardly being canvassed, isthat the 2nd respondent was at least a joint tenant cultivator withCuda Banda, the husband of the petitioner, at the time of the evictioncomplained of. In view of the conclusion reached by me earlier thereforethe 1st respondent acted Adth jurisdiction when he held the inquiry andgave his decision which was upheld by the Board of Review and inrespect of which the present application for a Writ is being made.
Crown Counsel who appears for the 1st respondent, while submittingthat the original Act did contemplate joint cultivators, also contendsthat even if joint cultivators were brought within the purview of theprincipal Act by the introduction of sub-section 1 A, on 24th August, 1964,the moment the Amending Act came into operation tenants, whethersingle or joint, were protected as from 12th April, 1956 from whichdate evictions of tenant cultivators were to be taken notice of in terms ofsection 4 (6) of the original Act even though the Act became law onlyon 1st February, 1958. I think there is substance in this contention.The original Act itself was retrospective in its nature in that reliefwas given by it to persons whose grievances arose nearly two years beforethe passing of the Act. Even if the Amending Act created a new classof tenants who were entitled to the reliefs set out in the original Act,in the absence of any provision to the contrary as to the operative datefrom which such reliefs could be given, it is reasonable to'assume thatthe date already specified in the original Act which now embodies theAmending Act is the operative date.
In supporting the contention of counsel for the 1st respondent counselfor the 2nd respondent submits that there is no indication either direct orindirect anywhere in the original Act that only sole tenant cultivatorswere to be protected by the Act. He further submits that if the questionof the eviction of joint tenants had arisen prior to the passing of theAmendment of 1964, no court could have reasonably held that theoriginal Act did not protect joint tenant cultivators. This is a submissionwith which I agree. In the circumstances both the contentions of counselfor the petitioner fail. The application is accordingly dismissed withcosts.
Siva Supramaniam, J.—I agree.
Application dismissed•