111-NLR-NLR-V-18-DUNLOP-v.-COOPAN.pdf
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i&lB.
Present : Shaw J.
DUNLOP v. COOPAN.
1,739—P. C. Avi8saweUaf 80,949,
Labour, Ordinance—Notice of intention to quit service given through the-post—Notice good as from the day letter is delivered at the place ofbusiness of employer.
Where a cooly gives notice of his intention to quit service, to hiamaster, by post, the notice is good as from the date that the letterwas delivered to the complainant.
A notice delivered at the usual place of business of the employermust be taken to have been received by him on that day.
T
HE facts are set out in the judgment of the Police Magistrate. (N. E. Ernst, Esq.):—
' The accused is a cooly employed under complainant under a verbalcontract of hireand service forthe periodof one month.He quitted
complainant's service on August 4,1915. Mr. Rajanayagam, the
proctorfor accused, appearsto have givennotice onbehalf of accused
and 79 others.
Theregisteredletter containingthe notices waspostedon July * 3.
Receipt J> 1 from the post office was produced in proof of this.
Thepostmarkon the envelopeproducedby complainantshows that
the letter left the Avissawella Post Office on July 4,and on thesame
day complainant received a notice from the post office.
The notice was signed and returned by complainant, and in theordinary course of business it should have reached him on July 5.
As a matter of fact, he was away from the estate on the 5tb, and theletter reached him on July 6.
Thetappal isbrought to the estate onlyonce aday, and registered
letters are not delivered on Sundays.
Thenotice from the postoffice reachedcomplainantonly on the4th,
and itis clear that in theordinary courseof businesshe could nethave
received the letter from Mr. Rajanayagam before July 5.
Therefore, according to complainant, the accused should have leftthe estate on August 5 or 6 instead of on the 4th.
B wssalleged that eomplafiianfeaakedthe aocoeedandhis coolies on
July 5 to, cancel their note. This was denied by complainant, andtheevidence kd byaccusedIonthis point wasnotatall ratiafactaro.
X am «*rinfi«a that complainant received the notice on July 6.
The accused, on instructions ton his proctor, le$ on August A
The proctor tor accused contended thatthe noticeshould becomputed
from thedate of its being posted,and that accusedmighthaveleft the
estate on August 3 or 4, as the notice was posted-on July 3..
He cited 6 & G. G. 14$ end $ fir. 14.
The fint decision quoted does not apply. There is notiling to showthat thenotice was posted. Thenoticeappears tohavebeenreceived
bythe oomplfinantin thatease on March 19orSLIn the second
case, the superintendent, thoughhe was aware thattheregistered letter
was lying at the post office for him, refused to receive it. In that casethe accused was certainly justified in acting as he did.
In this 'case, however, it has been clearly proved that complainant couldnot have received the letter in the ordinary course of business till July 5.
There is nothing to show that he refused to aocept the letter. Ipthecase reported in'Koch's8.€. Decisions 32,ithasbeen held that
notice to terminate an engagement with a superintendent • of an estatemust' be computed from the time such notice reaches the superintendent,and not from the date of its being posted. The notice may be delayedin reaching him, or it may never reach him at all, and it is only fairthat he should have a fall month's time to engage other labourers.
The only other point raised was whether this prosecution was inorder, as on the date the case was filed it was alleged that accused ‘wasnot employed under complainant.
The offence was committed on August 4, and according to my findingthe contract of service had not expired on that date.
The accused was frill employed under complainant, and he should nothave left the estate till August 5.
The offence was committed while the contract of service was still inforce i and proceedings might have been instituted at any time withinthree years of the date of commission of the offence (vide section 4aof Ordinance No. 13 of 1889).
Bs. 10, or in default one week's rigorous imprisonment.
BalasingkanUy for the accused, appellant.—The notice of theintention of the accused to quit service was posted on July 3, andin the ordinary course the letter should have reached the estate onthe. 4th. The complainant received information from the post officeon the 4th that the letter was lying there to his address. It washia fault if he did not send for the letter within office hours. Thedate on which a notice like this takes effect is the date on whichthe letter would have reached the addressee in the ordinary courseof business, and not on the date on which the letter actually reachedthe addressee. If the addressee is not in his station, it may notreach him for weeks together. Counsel cited 4 Com. B. 45, {1810)W. N.9U9, 16 M. & W. 124, 7 M. & W. 515, 18 Q. B. B. 388, 3 Br.24, 5 8. C. C. H3. The sentence is excessive for a technical offence.
Koch, for the* respondent, argued on the facts (not called uponfor a reply on the point of law).
mB. *
O.9
DtWsp w.
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November 28, 1915. Shaw J.—
8 In tiris ease' the accused, who gas ap estate cool;, was chafedWiMi absenting hkni^lf from work contra# to the teems of the LabourOrdinance, and was found guilt; and fined a sum of Be- 10. Happears that the accused ‘and some 70 or more other labourers gavt110(100% quit the employment by a letter from a proctor, whichwas posted ®and registered on July 8. The notice was for thetermination of the labourers' agreement on August 4. The letterwas not delivered to. the complainant on the day following the dayit was posted. That day was a Sunday, and apparently registeredletters are not delivered, at any rate in this district, on a'Sunday.
It was, however, delivered to the complainant at the estate onMonday, the 5th, but it was not opened by him on that date, becausehe was absent from the estate, and did not get it until Ms return onthe Oth. On August 4 the accused and the other labourers left theemployment, Relieving their notice to have expired on that date.The complainant tided to make them stay until, the 6th, assertingthat their notice was not good except at the expiration of a monthfrom the time he actually received the notice, which wee on July 0..The Labour Ordinance contains no provision as to tire method ofservice of notice to quit, arid no special form of notice is requitedby the Ordinance, but it has to be a month's notice, which meansa calendar month's notice. II the accused and the other cooliesebo&* to avail themselves of the post, which is indeed the ordinarymethod here oi giving notice, still their notice is only good as fromti^e date that the letter was delivered to the complainant. In thepresent ease it was delivered at the estate, the usual place of businessof the estate, addressed to the superintendent, on July 5. That-notiee was, in my opinion, good from that day, because a noticedelivered at the usual place of business of the employer must betaken to have been received by him on that day. Therefore, thelabourers, including the accused, had no right to leave, their. worktill August 6. They were wrong as to one day. just as the com-plainant was wrong in. his contention that they ought to haveremained still further. I agree with the Magistrate that the offenceis an absolutely technical one. The labourers were acting under theadvice of their prfetor, which appears to have been in this particularease wrong. Probably the proctor was unaware, in consequence oftile letter bring registered, that it would not be delivered until twodays.after it was posted. Had he not registered the letter, it isquite dear that the accused would have been entitled to leave theestate as he did on the 4th, and it is Dot surprising that he thoughtthat he could have left on that day, as in an ordinary case. TheMagistrate has indicted a fine of Bs. 10. I think, myself, that amere nominal fine is all that is necessary for the technical offencethat has been committed. Whilst affirming the conviction, I reducethe penalty to a fine of Be. 1.
Sentence ©cried. :