Moulin Nona v.^Routhledge
provides that the motor vehicle shall not be driven bjr—

any person who is not the holder of a driving licence.

It will be seen that the condition specified in the policy was one thatwas permitted by S. 102 (4) of the Act and that the two categories of“ excluded drivers ” correspond to the classes dealt with in S. 102 (4)(6) (i) and S. 102 (4) (c) (ii) respectively.
It was argued by learned Counsel for the respondent that the classreferred to in S. 102 (4) (c) (ii), viz : “ Any person who is not the holder of adriving licence ” will not include the “ insured ” as under sub-section (4)(6) (i) the “ insured ” has been specifically excepted from the definitionof “ excluded driver ”. The argument, however, is untenable as thetwo sub-sections refer to separate and distinct categories. LearnedCounsel’s submission amounts, in effect, to a request that we shouldinterpolate the words “ other than the insured ” after the words “ anyperson ” in S. 102 (4) (c) (ii). We have no power to do so. In our viewthere was a breach of an essential condition of the policy and the plaintiffcompany is discharged from liability and is entitled to the declarationpra}red for in the plaint.
We set aside the judgment and decree appealed from and enterjudgment for the plaintiff as against the 2nd defendant as prayed forwith costs in both courts. The plaint includes a prayer against the 1stdefendant as well. The 1st defendant did not file answer or contest theaction and was absent at the trial. The District Judge will enter, in thefirst instance, a decree nisi for default against the 1st defendant.
Sri Skanda Rajah, J.—I agree.
Appeal allowed.