003-NLR-NLR-V-70-G.-V.-MARTIN-SILVA-Appellant-and-MAHASOON-and-another-Respondents.pdf
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TAMJ3IAH, J.—Martin Silva v. Mahasoon
1967Present : Tambiah, J.V. MARTIN SILVA, Appellant, and MAHASOON and another,
Respondents
8. C. 370J1966—D. G. Matara, 1999/L
Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act No. 12 of 1966—Scope of sections 2 and 4 (2) (c)—Ejectment of tenant on ground of rent being in arrears for over 3 months—Decree entered on 12th March 1965—Enforceability—How long can an actionbe regarded as pending ?—Civil Procedure Code, s. 6.
A decree for ejectment entered in favour of a landlord againBt his tenantbetween 20th July 1962 and the date when the Rent Restriction (Amendment)Act No. 12 of 1966 came into operation, in respect of an action institutedduring that time, is not rendered null and void and unenforceable by section4 (1) (c) of the amending Act, if the judgment was obtained on the groundthat rent was in arrears for three months or more.
An action must be considered as pending within the meaning of section4 (1) (a) of Act No. 12 of 1966 if, after judgment is entered, the judgment-creditor has still to come to Court to obtain reliefs.
Appeal from a judgment of the District Court, Matara.
K. Premadasa, with F. C. Perera, for the Defendant Appellant.
Rodrigo, for the Plaintiffs-Respondents.
August 22, 1967. Tambiah, J.—
The plaintiffs brought this action on 13.3.64 against their tenantin respect of premises to which the Rent Restriction Act applied. Theyalleged that the tenant was in arrears of rent from 1st July 1962 and
TAMBIAH, J.—Martin Silva v. Mahasoon
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prayed for ejectment of the tenant on this ground. On 12.3.65 theparties arrived at a settlement and judgment was entered as prayedfor and decree was entered on 12.3.65.
The Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act No. 12 of 1966 came intooperation on the 10th May 1966. The plaintiffs applied for ejectmentof their tenant in terms of the decree but their application was resistedon the ground that the decree was null and void under the provisionsof Section 4 of the Rent Restriction (Amendment) Act No. 12 of 1966.The learned Commissioner, however, held that the decree was executable.
The Counsel for the appellant contends that under Section 4 (1) (c)of the Amendment Act No. 12 of 1966, all decrees entered between the20th July 1962 and the date this Act came into operation are null andvoid. It may be noted that Section 4 of this Amending Act makes theAct retrospective as from 20th July 1962. Counsel for the appellantconcedes that had this action been brought after the Amending Actcame into operation the decree would not have been null and void. *I am unable to accept the argument of Counsel for the appellant thatthe decree is void because it was entered prior to the coming into operationof the Amending Act. If such a view is tenable then it will lead tothe result that all actions filed by a landlord after this Act came intooperation on the ground that his tenant was in arrears for 3 monthsare permissible and decrees entered are valid whereas actions broughton the same ground during the preceding period, namely between 20thJuly 1962 and 10th May 1966 are null and void.
Section 4 (1) (c) of the Amendment Act enacts “ proceedings shallnot be taken for the enforcement of any judgment or decree in anysuch action as is referred to in paragraph (a), and where such proceedingshave begun before the date of commencement of this Act, but havenot been completed on the date of commencement of this Act, suchproceedings shall not be continued. ” A distinction, therefore, is madebetween decrees in such actions as are referred to by Section 4 (1) (a)and other decrees.
Before the Rent Act was passed a landlord could terminate thetenant’s contract and bring an action to eject him. The Rent Actdoes not take away the rights of a landlord but only operates as a barto his action. The Rent Act, before the Rent (Amendment) Act No. 12of 1966 came into operation, permitted a landlord to bring an actionto eject the tenant on certain grounds set out in Section 13 of that Act.Under that Act, a landlord need not have waited for a tenant to be inarrears for a month. He could also have brought an action if hereasonably required the premises for his own use and also on othergrounds set out in that Section. The Rent Restriction (Amendment)Act No. 12 of 1966 was enacted to protect tenants who occupied premisesthe rent of which was less than Rs. 100. At the same time it also gavea right of action to a landlord* in certain circumstances set out inSection 2 of the Amending Act. Although the rental may be less thanRs. 100 a landlord is entitled to institute action for ejectment where
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Uon JJewis v. Dissanayake
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the rent of the premises had been in arrears for 3 months or more.In my opinion Section 4 (1) (a) only renders null and void, actions whichare in contravention of Section 2 of the Amending Act No. 12 of 1966.In the instant case the landlord is permitted to bring an action forejectment since the tenant was in arrears for over 3 months andtherefore the decree entered is not null and void.
It was further contended by Counsel for the appellant that the actionwas not pending. If his argument is carried to its logical conclusion,then Section 4 (1) (a) has no application. But it suffices to state thatwhen a judgment is entered the action is pending if the judgmentcreditor still has to come to Court to obtain reliefs. In Salt v. Cooper,1Jessel M. R. said, “ A cause is till pending, even had there been a finaljudgment given, and the Court has very large powers in dealing witha judgment until it is fully satisfied. It may stay proceedings on thejudgment, either wholly or partially, and the cause is still pending,#therefore, for this purpose, as it appears to me, must be considered aspending although there may have been a final judgment given in theaction, provided that judgment has not been satisfied. ”
It is true no doubt that the plaintiffs had obtained judgment in thiscase, but they have not realised the fruits of their litigation. UnderSection 6 of the Civil Procedure Code they could make an applicationfor relief or remedy for ejectment as well as for the recovery of damages.This is an action within the meaning of Section 6 of the Civil ProcedureCode, vide also the judgment of Sansoni, C.J., in Abeysinghe v. Guna-sekara 2. In Charles Fernando v. T. P. D. Costa 3, a bench of two judgesgave a similar interpretation to Section 4 (1) (c) of the Rent (Amendment)Act of 1966 and with respect I agree with that view.
For these reasons I affirm the order of the learned District Judge anddismiss the appeal with costs.
Siva Supramaniam, J.—I agree.
Appeal dismissed.