HANIFFA , Appellant, and PACKEER (S. I. Police), Respondent

083-NLR-NLR-V-51-HANIFFA-Appellant-and-PACKEER-S.-I.-Police-Respondent.pdf


330
BASNAYAKE J.—Haniffa v. Packeer (S. I. Police)
1949Present’. BasnayakeJ.
HANIFFA, Appellant, and PACKEER (S. I. Police), RespondentS. C. 6$—M. C. Batticaloa, 6,958
Penal Code—Insult—Provocative of breach of peace—No actual provocation—Offence—Section 484.
An offenoe under section 484 of the Penal Code is committed whorethe insult is provocative of a breach of the peace even where the personinsulted is not actually provokod or where he shows restraint.
Frazer v. Sinnaiya (1910) 14 N. L. R. 3 followed.
.AlPPEAL from a judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, Batticaloa.
E. Chitty, with Vernon Wijetunge, for accused appellant.
A. E. Keuneman, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
April 11, 1949. Basnayake J.—
This appeal is from a conviction of tho appellant on the followingcharge:—
“ That you did within the jurisdiction of thisCourt at BadullaRoad,Koddamunai, on November 21,1948, intentionally insult J. Armstrong,Excise Inspector of Batticaloa, by using the following words to wit:* Onta Pendilai Thada Pundai Magane ’ intending or knowing it to belikely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peaceand thereby yon have committed an offence punishable under section484 of the Ponal Code. ”
Shortly the facts are as follows: On November 21, 1943, ExciseInspector Armstrong was driving his car along the Badulla Road withhis mother and children as passengers. He was not in uniform at thetime. Near the office of the Eastern Bus Company he heard someone
BASNAYAKE 3.—Haniffo v. Packer (S. I. Police)
331
9hout to him to halt his car. He pulled up, got down and went to therear of the car and saw the appellant and one Marian. The appellanttold him that he had knocked down Marian. The Excise Inspectorthen offered to take either of them, if injured, to the hospital. Theappollant then became defiant and said: “ You arc an Inspector. I havebeen driving a car and I know how to drive. ” Tho accused thereaftergetting more defiant abused him in Tamil using the words mentionedin the charge, which have been interpreted to mean “ Give me your wife,son of a woman’s private parts” and advanced monacingly towardsInspector Armstrong with raised arms.
It is submitted by learned counsel that the evidence does not disclosetho offence alleged in the charge. Learned counsel relies on certaindicta expressed in the judgments of this Court cited by him *. Withgreat respect I find myself unable to give my unreserved assent to thoexpressions of opinion relied on by learned counsel. Tho reasons for myinability to accept the proposition of learned counsel will appear fromwhat I say hereinafter.
I shall begin by quoting section 484 of the Penal Code which reads :
“ Whoevor intentionally insults and thereby gives provocation toany person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocationwill cause him to break tho public peace, or to commit any other offence,shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a termwhich may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. ”
To establish an offonce under this section it is necessary to provo
(а)that the offender intentionally insulted a person,
(б)that he thereby gave provocation to tho person insulted,
that he intended that such provocation will cause the person
insulted to break the public poace or commit any other offence,or
that he knew it to be likely that such provocation will cause the
person insulted to break tho public peace or commit any otheroffence.
Before proceeding further it will be well to examine the meaning of someof tho expressions such as “insults”, “ gives provocation ”, “break thepublic peace” and “offence”. “To insult ” is to treat another with grossindignity, insolence or contempt, by word or act, or to offer an indignityor affront. “ To give provocation ” is to produce anger or resentment orvindictive feeling in another or to irritate him. A “ breach of thepublic peace ” is a violation of that quiet, peace, and security which isguaranteed by the laws for the personal comfort of the subjects ofthis country s. “ Offence ” means an act punishable under tbe PenalCode*.
Whether words are insulting would depend on a variety ofcircumstances, such as the context in which they are uttered, the intention,the tone and the attitude of the person uttering them, and tho situation
1 S. I. Police v. Wijesekera, {1935) 38 N. L. R. 30.
Balaevriya v. Dharmasiri, {1938) 1 C. L.W. 343.
TJ. J. Perera, Police Vidanev. H. J. Fernando, (193$) 1 G.L.J. {Notes of Cases) 49.Marimuttu v. Disoanayake, (1939) 41 N. L. R. 31.
Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edn., p. 747.
Section 38 of the Geylon. Penal Code.
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BA8NAYAKS J.—Haniffa «. Packeer (S. I. Police)
in which they are uttered. Acts which are insulting have to be determinedsimilarly according to the circumstances in which they are done. Thereare cases in which it has been held that it is an insult to pull a Mahommedanby his beardl, to make faoes at another, or to make lewd and indecentgestures in the presence of a female 2t or to ridicule one in the course ofcaricature or in any one of the ways in which human feelings are movedand hurta. Whether words or acts are insulting is a question of factwhich falls to be determined on the evidence in each case.
The question whether insult was intentional is also a question of fact.The intention will not as a rule be proclaimed by the offender. It has tobe inferred from his words, his tone, the manner in which the words arespoken, or his acts and other circumstances. It is not necessary thatthe person whom the offender intends to provoke or knows to be likelyto be provoked should in fact be provoked or should actually commita breach of the peace or an offence. The section requires that theperson insulting should intend to provoke a person to commit a breachof the peace. It is immaterial whether the person insulted takes theinsult in the manner intended.
The mere forbearance of the person insulted and provoked fromcommitting a breach of the peace is insufficient to protect the offender *.The offence depends on the provocation given and not upon the provoca-tion felt6. The offence is intended to prevent the doing of an act likelyto occasion a breach of the peace. It is not necessary that the insulting,words should result in an actual breach of the peace, nor, indeed, is itnecessary that the person insulted should in fact be provoked or yield tohis resentment, because if it were so it would not be an offence -to insulta person who by virtue of his position in life exercises restraint or is tooweak to retaliate. The law is not designed to enable those who do notrespect law and order to oppress those who do. The section punishesinsults which arc provocative of the breach of the peace, and theircharacter is judgod by the standard of an ordinary reasonable man,holding them criminal if they are ordinarily sufficient to arouse passionsand provoke retaliation *.
Some of the decisions of this Court7, especially in cases where theinsult has been directed against police officers8, seem to proceod on thefooting that no offence is committed where the person insulted has notbeen actually provoked or where he has shown restraint. There isno justification for assuming that insult directed to a police offioer orany other public officor does not fall within the ambit of the section.
1 Bhagwan Dae t>. Saddiq Ahmad, {192$) A. I. R. Allahabad 318.
Syed Mahomed, (1900) 1 Weir 622.
Jaykrishna Samanta and another v. King Emperor, 21 C. W. N. 95.
Sooraparasu, (1894) 1 Weir 621.
Syed Mahomed, (1900) 1 Weir 622.
Gout's Penal Code of India, see. 6316, p. 1170.
8.1. Police, Kalutara v. Silva, (iSSS) 6 Times p. 74.
Rahaman v. Perera, (1929) 7 Times 66.
Corea MudaUar v. Anthonipillai and wife, (1906) 5 Thambiah Rep. 88.
Sri Mudali v. Sebastian, (1898) 4 Bal. 133.
" N. /. Police v. Wijesektra, (1936) 38 N. L. R. 30.
Herath o. Rajapakse, (1932) 1 C. L. W. 326.
Police Vidane v. H. J. Fernando, (1936) 1 C. L. J. (Notes of Cases) 49.
BASNAYAKE J.—Hanijfa v. Packur (S. I. Police)
333
With respect, I am unable to share the view taken in those cases. Subjectto what I have said above, with deference I agree with the view taken byWood Benton J. in Frazer v. Sinnaiya 1 wherein he says:
“ I think it is not necessary that the complainant should say in somany words: ‘ I was provoked by the conduct to which I complain. *It is sufficient, I think, if the insult is clearly of a provocative character,of a character likely to produce a breach of the public peace on thepart of the respondent towards whom it is directed, and if the Court issatisfied from all the circumstances of the case that the accused musthave intended to produce, or must have known that he would produce,that result. ”
The Indian Courts in construing section 504 of the Indian Penal Codewhich is the corresponding section have consistently taken what I thinkis the correct view. I think it will not be out of place to record here theopinions expressed in some of the Indian cases.
In the case of Queen Empress v. Jogayya 2 it was observed “ the lawmakes punishable the insulting provocation which, -under ordinarycircumstances, would cause a breach of the peace to be committed, andthe offender is not protected from the consequences of his acts becausethe person insulted became too terrified to accept the provocation inthe manner intended. ”
In the case of Kanshi Ram v. Fad Muhammad and another3 thecomplainant was not actually provoked by the insulting words but'* merely Btepped back and stood quiet * The court said: “If abusivelanguage is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would, in theordinary course of events, lead the person insulted to break the peaceor to commit another offence under the law, the case shall not be takenaway from the purview of seotion 504, merely because the insulted personexercised self-control or being terrified by the insult, or overawed by thepersonality of the offender, did not actually break the peace or commitanother offence. ”
In the case of Quranditta and another v. Emperor4 it was argued thatthe oomplain&nt was a man of placid temperament and that as hebelonged to a very peaceful community it was not likely that therewould have been a breach of the peace as a result of the abuse in whichthe petitioner indulged. The Court observed: “Moreover in dealingwith section 504,1. P. C., we have not to judge the temperament or theidiosyncrasies of the individual concerned. * In the case of KingEmperor v. Chunibhai Dahyahhai5 the Court observed: “We thinkthat in order to constitute an offence under section 504, Indian PenalCode, it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the otherparty to lose his temper and say or do something violent. The publicpeace can be broken by angry words as well as by deeds. ”
The evidence in the instant case establishes all the essential ingredientsof the offence alleged against the appellant. In my view the learnedMagistrate has rightly convicted the appellant.
The appeal is dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
* (1910) 14 N. L. R. 3.1 (1932) A. l.R. Lahore 430.
(1887) I. L. R. 10 Mad. 3S3.* (1930) A. I. A. Lahore 344.
M1902) 4 Bom. L. R. 7ft.