007-NLR-NLR-V-58-I.-PODIYA-et-al.-Appellants-and-REV.-E-SUMANGALA-THERO-Respondent.pdf
1956Present: K. D. de Silva, J., and Sansoni, J.PODIYA el a7., Appellants, and REV. E. SU MAX GALATHERO, Respondent
,S. C. S9—D.C. {Inly.) Kurutwgala-, 6, US
Budtlhist Ecclesiastical Eaw—lies judicata—Applicability of doctrine to incumbencydisputes—Abandonment of incumbency—Effect on pupillary succession—Judgment of consent—Effect of res judicata.
The rule of res judicata is applicable to disputes' as to who is the law-ful Viharadhipathi of a particular Buddhist Temple. A pupil is the privy of.his tutor for purposes of res judicata.
The abandonment by a priest of an incumbency results in the forfeiture oftho rights of his pupil to inherit- tlie incumbency. Abandonment may tokoplace by means of the priest consenting to a decree of Court disentitling him tothe incumbency.
A judgment- of consent is ns effective by way of estoppel as a judgment ivherobytlio Court exercised its mind in a contested case, and has t-he full effect of n.res judicata between the parties.
In action Xo. 1, A sued B asking for a declaration that A was the controllingViharadhipnfhi of Manawala Vihnre as against B. After issues were framed the-dispute was"scttlcd on the following terms : “ Of consent plaintiff is declared thocontrolling Viharadhipathi of the Xfunawala Viliare but this right will vest inhim as from tho date of the demise of the defendant who is hereby declaredentitled to reside in and ofliciato ns Viharadhipathi of the said temple duringhis lifetime, without any let or hindrance from the plaintiff. Each part-y bears-In’s own costs. "
In the present- action Xo. 2, A sued C, who was the pupil of B. He claimed,on tho same title ns he hail set out in action Xo. I, that he was the Viharadhi-pathi of Manawala Viliare.
Held, that the settlement ifraction Xo. 1 and the decreo entered in accordancewith it was res judicata between the parties in action Xo. 2, because C was a.privy of B and was therefore bound by that decree.
Held further, that B, by consenting to tho settlement in action Xo. 1,abandoned liis rights to the incumbency in favour of A. Therefore C had noincumbency to which he could succeed on B’s death.
j^lPPKAL from a judgment of the District Court-, Kurunegala.
If. If'". Jayeicardene, Q.C., with C. P. Gunaratne, for the 2nd to 6 thdefendants appellants.
T.P. P. Goonctilleke, for the plaintiff respondent-.
Cur. ada. vult.
May 10, 1956. Saxsoxi, J.—
The plaintiff brought- this action claiming to be declared the controllingViliaradhipathi of the Manawala alias Kalegedara Temple and prayingthat he be restored to possession of the three lands described in the-schedule to the plaint, and the six defendants ejected therefrom. The
plaintiff claimed the office as the pupil of one Attadassi who was thepupil of one Sunnanda. The sixth defendant denied the plaintiff’sclaim and pleaded that he was the lawful Viharadhipathi of ihe templeas the pupil of one Rewata, who was himself the pupil of one Aggatissa.The second to fifth defendants filed a separate answer supporting theclaim of the sixth defendant; they pleaded that they were in possessionof the lands in dispute under the sixth defendant.
"When the case came up for trial the parties admitted that the landsin dispute belonged to the Manawala Temple ; they also admitted thatthe plaintiff and the sixth defendant were the pupils of Attadassi andRewata respecfcivelj A preliminary issue of law was then framed inthe following terms :
“Is the judgment and decree in D. C. Kurunegala Case Xo. 2,051res judicata between the plaintiff and the sixth defendant on the■question as to whether the plaintiff is the present lawful Viharadhi-pathi of the Manawala alias Kclegedara temple and entitled to thepossession of its tcmjioralities ? ”
The relevant pleadings and proceedings of that earlier action weremarked in evidence. They showed that the present plaintiff broughtthat action against the sixth defendant’s tutor Rewata, asking for adeclaration that he was the controlling Viharadhipathi of this temple.He claimed on the same title as he has set out in this action, and alsopleaded that the Mnlwatte Sangha Sabha had declared him to be thelawful Viharadhipathi as against Rewata. The defendant Rewata inthat action claimed the office as the pupil of Aggatissa ; he pleaded thatthe order of the Sangha Sabha was invalid. After issues were framedthe dispute was settler 1 on the following terms :—
“ Of consent plaintiff is declared the controlling Viharadhipathiof the Manawala Vihara but this right will vest in him as from thedate of the demise of the defendant who is hereby declared entitled toreside in and officiate as Vihardhipathi of the said temple during hislifetime, without any let or hindrance from the plaintiff. Rac-h party■bears his own costs. ”
The learned trial judge held on the preliminary issue of law that thissettlement and the decree entered in accordance with it was res judicatabetween the present parties, because the sixth defendant is a privy ofRewata and is therefore bound by that decree.
This appeal has been filed against that decision, and Mr. Jayewardencattacked this finding on three grounds :
A pupil is not a privy of liis tutor, since no question of property
but only a question of status is involved when the matter indispute is the office of Viharadhipathi..
The terms of the decree are uncertain and there is no clear adjudi-
cation in the decree as to who the lawful Viharadhipathi is.
It is not open to a Viharadhipathi to deprive his pupil of such an
office by being party to a settlement of a dispute regarding thatoffice.
In my view all three objections must fail.
In regard to the first objection, it is remarkable that although disputes•as to who is the lawful Viharadiiipathi of a particular Buddhist Templehave been tried in our Courts for very many years, it does not seem tohave been urged before that the rule of res judicata, does not apply tothem. It was only last year that such an action came before this Courtand a previous decree was pleaded as res judicata between the parties,but no objection was raised by the learned Queen’s Counsel, who•appeared in that case on either side, to the application of this doctrine.I refer to the case of Jloragolle Sumangala- v. Kiribatnune PiyadassiIn his judgment in that case (with wjiich I agreed) Gratiacn, J. expressedthe definite opinion that a plea of res judicata- may properly be raisedin such a dispute, although for the reasons given by him in that ease thepica was of no avail.
In that case the respective tutors of the plaintiff and the defendanthad been parties to an earlier action in which a decree was entered dis-missing that action. That decree was relied on as res judicata bythe defendant in the later action. In dealing with that plea Gratiaen,-J. said :
This plea of res judicata would without doubt have succeededif a decision that Ratnajoti (the defendant’s tutor) was in truth thelawful incumbent of the temple had been implicit in the dismissal ofIndajoti’s (the plaintiff’s tutor) action. In that event the present-defendant’s claim to have succeeded to the incumbency (by reasonof the “ privity of estate or interest ” which exists under the SisyannSis3*a Paramparawa between a proved incumbent and his pupil) couldnot have been challenged by the plaintiff (claiming the office asIndajoti’s privy). ”
The learned judge then went on to consider whether such a decisionwas necessarily involved in the dismissal of Indajoti’s action, and foundthat the action was dismissed not because Ratnajoti was the lawfulincumbent but because Indajoti had failed to prove.that he had anyright to the relief he claimed in the action. In other words, there wasno determination as to who the lawful incumbent was. In the presentaction the plaintiff is not faced with any such difficulty. He has obtain-ed a decree of Court which explicitly declared him to be the controllingViliaradhipathi as against the sixth defendant’s tutor. It is there-fore not open to the sixth defendant now to reagitate that issue. I-do nob think that ifcj's essential in order to constitute one person the privyof another that there should be a question of ownership of propertyarising ; there arc lesser rights in property which a Viliaradhipathi, byvirtue of his office, acquires. For instance, he is entitled to the unham-pered use of the Vi hare for the purpose of maintaining the customaryreligious rites and ceremonies. He can claim full possession of it eventhough the title in respect of it and of the other endowments of the
(10-55) 50 X. L. It. 322.
Vihare is vested in a trustee. See Giineratne Nayalce Thcro'v. PunditBanda Korale 1. Again, he is entitled to the control and management ofthe temple premises and might regulate its' occupation and use to theextent that no other priest can select for himself a particular place in'the Vihare independently of him against his wishes. A priest who is-guilty of contumacy is liable to be ejected by him. See Piyadasa v.Deevdmitt'a 2.
would also refer to the case of Gunaratne v. Punchi Banda 3, where-Schneider, J. contrasted the relationship which exists between successivehigh priests of the Dambulla Vihare with that which exists between a-tutor and his pupil under the succession called Sisyanu Sisya Pa-ramparawa. The learned judge said :
“■ A priest becomes a high priest of the vihare in question not by’virtue of any form of succession recognised by the law, but by beingappointed to the office by some person or persons. The law has notl’eeognised a continuity of succession to temporal rights as existingbetween one high priest so appointed and his successor, as it lias inrecognising the succession called Sisyanu Sisya Paramparawa. ”
He impliedly decided that a pupil is the privy of his tutor for purposesof res judicata- It therefore seems clear that the sixth defendant couldhave claimed this incumbency against the plaintiff only if there hadbeen no decision in the earlier action as to who was entitled to the in-cumbency. But a declaration that the plaintiff was the lawful incum-bent was made in that action against the sixth defendant’s tutor, and the-matter is therefore at an end.
Mr. Goonetilleke also urged that the sixth defendant had no right toclaim the incumbency independently of his tutor Rewata, and he sub-mitted that the sixth defendant had no such right in view of the decisionin Punncinanda v. Weliwitiya Soralha 4. In that case it was held that theabandonment by a priest of an incumbency results in the forfeiture ofthat to which his pupil’s rights of succession are attached, namely, theincumbency itself. In such a case there remain no rights for the pupilto inherit. If that decision is applied to this case the plaintiff’s caseis all the stronger. In effect, Eewata by consenting to the settlementabandoned his rights to this incumbency in favour of the plaintiff, andsuch abandonment was made a matter of record in a decree of Court ;the sixth defendant therefore had no incumbency to which he couldsucceed on Rewata’s death.
With r-egard to the second objection, I think the meaning of the settle-ment is clear enough. The matter in dispute was whether the plaintiffwas entitled to be declared the controlling Viharadhipathi, and this de-claration was granted to him. There was added the condition thatRewata was entitled to reside in’ and officiate as Viharadhipathi during’his lifetime. In effect, the plaintiff was declared de jure incumbent andRewata was to be de facto incumbent for life. I do not think that thislimitation imposed on the plaintiff’s title rendered the matter which was
1 (1929) 28 X. L. R. 145.3 (1927) 29 X. X. R. 249.
* (1921) 23 X. X. R. 24(I960) 51 X. X. R. 372.
decided by the decree uncertain. I would say that the very qualifi-cation which was introduced in favour of the defendant made it all theclearer as to who was declared by the decree to be lawfully entitled tothe office of controlling Viharadhipatlii.
With regard to the third objection, I see no reason why we should notappljr the ordinary rule that “ a judgment of consent is as effective byway of estoppel as a judgment whereby the Court exercised its mind in-a contested case, and lias the full effect of a res judicata between theparties Sinniah v. Eliakutly l. 3Ir. Jaye war dene objected that if•the principle of res judicata, and particularly that principle in relationto judgments of consent, were applied to incumbency disputes, it wouldbe possible for a tutor deliberately to divert the succession to the in-cumbency from his pupils to an outsider. He would be enabled to do■indirectly what he cannot do directly. This argument seems to dealwith another topic—as to whether such a decree may be attacked on suchgrounds as fraud or negligence. It docs not, however, induce me toreject the application of what has been described ns “ a fundamentalconcej>t in the organization of every jural society ”, “ a rule common toall civilized systems of jurisprudence ”, and “ a rule which, founded onancient precedent, is dictated by a wisdom which is for all time. ”
Tor these reasons I would affirm the judgment under appeal and dismissthis appeal with costs.
_K. D. de Srr.VA, J.—I agree.
Appeal dismissed.