Then followed a series of actions instituted by the respondents.
Da ajufBAYO upon which the Attorney-General relies, as showing that theJ. respondents have habitually and persistently instituted vexatious/Mfvoa civil legal proceedings. These actions are the following:—
(l) D. C. Colombo, 87,098, instituted by the respondents against
Messrs. Vanderspar on February 4,1014, claiming
Rs. 17,064.80 as interest on the purchase money fromJanuary 1, 1012, to December 2, 1018, oh the groundthat during that period the defendants had oontrol andmanagement of the respondents’ shares of the said estateand appropriated all the profits thereof. This action wasdismissed by the District Judge on the ground that theconsent decree in appeal precluded the respondents frommaking the claim for interest, and the dismissal wasaffirmed in appeal.1
(2) D. G. Colombo, 88,489, instituted by the respondents onMay 15,1014. against Messrs. Vanderspar, claiming
repayment of Rs. 8,049.85, being the amount of compen-sation deducted from the purchase money, and alsoclaiming on four other causes of action various sumsaggregating Rs. 685.77 as damages for unlawful detentionof certain articles of furniture and building materials.The District Judge dismissed the claim for repayment oftiie amount of compensation, but ordered delivery to therespondents of certain articles, or in default the paymentof Rs. 270. The Supreme Court in appeal affirmed thisjudgment.
D. C. Colombo, 40,557, instituted on December 8, 1014,by last respondent, claiming from Mr. Tonks, proctor,the sum of Rs. 8,870.27 as balance payable to her andthe second and third respondents out of moneys receivedby Mr. Tonks on their behalf. Mr. Tonks pleaded thatthis sum was retained by him in respect of costs due tohim in four actions in which he had acted for the respond-ents. This action was dismissed, both in the DistrictCourt and in the Appeal Court.
D. C. Colombo, 41,508, filed in person by the first respondentagainst Mr. Tonks, claimed Rs. 15,000 as damages forlibel, in that Mr. Tonks had in a letter to counsel, written:" Between ourselves, I am having a good deal of troublewith this lady over costs, and I intend to get them paiddown before 1 make any more appearances. ” TheDistrict Judge dismissed the action, remarking that itwas a purely speculative action, and that the plaintiffhad eagerly seized an opportunity to harass and vexthe defendant who had just before claimed a large sumfor professional work done.

369 )
(6) D. C. Colombo, 42,795, filed in person by the. first respondentfor herself, and as attorney of the second and third res-pondents against Mr. Tonks. churning Rs. 34,767.52 asdamages on the ground that he, contrary to the respond-ents’ instructions, and wur. *ut any a uthority, wronglyconsented to a variation in appeal of the District Judge’sjudgment in the above case No. 34,263. The DistrictJudge found against the respondents on the facts, andheld that the respondents knew and approved of thesettlement and acted upon it. This, judgment wasaffirmed in appeal.
Da SakfayoJ.
In re anApplicationagainst
D. C. Colombo, 48,981 ; claim of Rs. 50,000 as damages
against Mr. Tonks on the grounds—
That Mr. Tonks filed a proxy in above case No. 84,263
alleged to have been given by the first respondent,and acted without authority ;
That, he engaged counsel without authority ;
That he failed to apply for type-written copies in the.
said action in time ;
That he without authority consented to payment of
costs in the said action ;
That he falsely alleged in above action No. 42,795
that he had authority to act in the said actionNo. 84,263; and
That he wrongly and unlawfully left out C. F. Cantlay's
share from the sale of the estate to Messrs.Vanderspar.
The action was dismissed both in the District Court andin the Supreme Court in appeal.
D. C. Colombo, 52,457, against Mr. Tonks for Rs. 30,000 as
damages for cancellation of the original agreement with.Messrs. Vanderspar, for declaration of title to andpossession of the portions of the estate allotted to therespondent in the partition action, it being alleged thatMr. Tonks was guilty of various acts of fraud in connectionwith the above cases regarding Mipitiyakande estate andits transfer to Messrs. Vanderspar. The District Judgeon March 15, 1919, on the motion of the defendant,stayed proceedings and dismissed the action, holdingthat it disclosed no reasonable ground of action, andthat it was frivolous and vexatious and constitutedan abuse of the processes of Court. No appeal wastaken.
( 370 )
D. C. Kegalla, 5,684, against Messrs. Vanderspar institutedon December 18,1920, substantially repeating all that
had been alleged in the previous actions, and chargingMessrs. Vanderspar and Mr. Tonka' assistant, Mr. Hislop,with having conspired to defraud the respondents of theirproperty, and claiming Rs. 90,000 as damages, cancellationof the transfer to Messrs. Vanderspar and declaration oftitle and possession of the estate, and payment of thevarious sums the respondents had unsuccessfully claimedin the previous actions, amounting to Rs. 45,244. Thisaction is still pending.
With regard to the first of these actions, the consent decree in
No. 34,263 had .reserved the respondents' right, if any, to sue forre-payment of the amount of compensation, and the exercise ofthat privilege, however hopeless, cannot .count against the respond-ents in this matter. The claim for interest on the purchaseamount of the estate, in the second of these actions, is not unreason-able, because the purchasers had got the rents and profits pendingthe execution of the transfer. But, as regards the other actions,it is, to my mind, impossible not to regard them as vexatious. Itis true that the respondents have p&id the costs of the variousunsuccessful actions. But the ability to spend money and topay the costs of the opposite side does not make any difference,if the litigation is in fact vexatious. I do not therefore thinkthat the .English case re Alexander Chaffers,l in which the non-payment of the costs of the previous actions was noted as a pointagainst the respondents, helps the respondents. Nor is the questiondependent on, the number of actions instituted, re Jones s, norupon any consideration whether there may not have been possiblecauses of action in some of the cases. As was observed in reAlexander Chaffers (supra) what we have to look at is the generalcharacter and result of the number of actions brought by therespondents. It is relevant also to note that, although the Ordi-nance applies, whether the previous actions were against thesame person or against different persons, yet, where they wereagainst the same persons, the remedy provided will be morereadily applied, because in that case the element of intention andpersonal feeling is more pronounced. In the present instance theactions are either against Messrs. Vanderspar or Mr. Tonks, andall of them have reference to and spring from the action No. 34,263brought for specific performance of the respondents’ agreement tosell their interest in Mipitiyakande estate to Messrs. Vanderspar.The respondents have been ringing the changes over the consentdecree in that action, and have in one shape or another assertedwith increasing bitterness the same things again and again againstMessrs. Vanderspar or against Mr. Tonks. In this connection
1 {1897) 76 L. T. 351.• {1902) 18 T. L. R. 476.
Dk SaxpayoJ.
In re anApplicationagainstOantlay
( 371)
I may refer more particularly to the cases (5), (7)/* and (8) noted 1921.above. It is not practicable to describe in a mere summary the De sX»payocharacter of this litigation, but a perusal of the pleadings and J.proceedings in the various actions leave the distinct impression onin~re~an
my mind that the respondents may rightly be described as persons Applicationwho have habitually and persistently indulged in vexatious civillegal proceedings. It is probable that the respondents feel a senseof grievance which will not allow them to accept the decision ofany Court as final. But the Ordinance is intended to protect thepossible objects of their attention from being harassed and vexedby actions due to such obsession, and the Courts of justice frombeing troubled with unnecessary and hopeless litigation.
In my opinion the respondents have brought themselves withinthe salutary provision of the Ordinance, and I would make theorder applied for.