143-NLR-NLR-V-55-IN-RE-S.-A-.-WICKREMASINGHE.pdf
GXJNfASEKARA J.—In re Wickremasinghe
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Present: Gratiaen J., Gunasekara J. and Pulle J.In re S. A. WICKREMASESTGHE
In kthe fl&iTTKR 3f a Rule issued on Dr. SugiswaraAbeywardena Wickremasinghe to show cause why
HE SHOULD NOT BE PUNISHED FOR AH OFFENCE OF
Contempt of Court
Contempt of Court—Extent of right to criticise Judges.
In the course of a speech, at a public meeting the respondent criticised Judgesin such a manner that no person who may have been persuaded by the speechto accept the views expressed in it about the judiciary could continue to haveconfidence in the impartiality of the courts of justice, and in particular of theoourts in the*city of Galle.
Held, that it is no less an offence of contempt of court to scandalise thejudiciary generally than to scandalise the Judge or Judges of a particular court.
Jn the matter ofpa rule issued for Contempt of Court.
T.S. Fernando, Q.C., Solicitor-General, with Douglas Jansze andWalter Jayawardena,' Crown Counsel, as amicus curiae.
s
Respondent in person.
Cur. adv. vult.
January 25, 1954. Gunasekara J.—
A Rule issued by this Court on December 9, 1953, called upon therespondent to “ show cause why he should not be punished for an offenceof contempt against and in disrespect of the authority of the Courtsof this Island and in particular of the District Court and the Magistrate’s■Court of Galle ” committed by the uttering of certain words in the courseof a speech made by him at a public meeting held at the Galle Esplanadeon October 4, 1953. The speech was made in Sinhalese, and the passage
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GTTNASEKAKA J.—In re Wichremasinghe
that was alleged to constitute a contempt was set out in the Rule togethewith a translation of it in these terms :—‘ e.
“ I think there is no other Police Station anywhere in Ceylon whichso indecently, and for no reason, scorns the rights of the people inso base a manner as the Galle Police {applause and laughter). Look !
I now come from Akuressa. Even in those village areas a permitis allowed to speak through the loud speaker till half-past six. In theCity of Galle, a city where lights are on—it must be stopped at six,it is said. Yes ; cannot they (those fellows) see after six ? (laughter)/That has happened because of Police chiefs of that same kind—s-chiefswho lead extremely uncultured and uncivilised lives ; Courts alsoexist which suit them well—the great pestilence of this city today.If there are judges (in Courts) who have' self-respect and a back-boneit will become possible to make these a little more disciplined than this.What has happened now is that there now exists a herd who (act) asthe Police say—a herd of judges—who expect to safeguard their jobsby obeying the behests of the Police. It is not a. case of giving inde-pendent judgments ; it is a very great pestilence that has come aboutin Ceylon. ”r
i <«
The respondent, who appeared before us in person, admitted that hehad no cause to shew why he should not be punished. He said, however,that the purpose of his speech had been to expose the wrongdoing of thepolice, and in particular of the police at Galle, and to suggest meansby which they might be prevented from abusing their powers, andthat he had not intended “ to bring the judiciary into contempt ”.He had not known at the time that “ general criticisms ” could amountto a contempt of court, but he had since been advised by his lawyersthat the uttering of the words in question did constitute a contempt.“ I do express my regret ”, he said, “ because unintentionally I brokethe law by criticising the courts and brought the judiciary into dis-repute. My intention was to criticise the police but not the courts
The respondent did not contradict or challenge the accuracy of thestatements contained in the affidavits upon which the'Rule was issued.The words imputed to him in the Rule are quoted from a report which,according to some of these affidavits, is based on an electrical recordingof his speech made on a “ Grundig ” tape recorder. . Further, it appearsfrom the affidavits of four of the deponents, who say that they heardthe speech, that they heard the respondent say about the judiciarywhat is imputed to him in this report. There can be no doubt that hedid utter the words in question in a speech made at a public meeting held onthe Galle Esplanade as alleged in the Rule.
It is true that the main topic of the speech was the conduct of thepolice. But it is also true that in his speech the respondent used languagethat stated or implied that the judges were devoid of self-respect; thatthey had not the courage to do justice in cases where the police had donewrong ; and. that they were so shameless and weak and dishonest as togive judgment in such cases in accordance with orders received from thepolice, for fear that otherwise they might be removed from office. It isidle for the respondent to pretend that he did not intend to bring the
GTJXASEKARA J.—In re Wickremasinghe513
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judiciary into contempt; though, it may be true that he did not knowat the time^that this “ general criticism ” of the judges anio-unted to acontempt of court, and in that sense it was “ unintentionally ” that he“ broke the law
What the respondent has chosen to describe as a “ general criticism ”is a scandalising of the general h~ly of judges and, in the light of thecontext, a scandalising in particular of the judges of the courts sittingin Galle. It is far removed from an exercise of the right of criticism,about which it has been said :
“ The path of criticism is a public way : the wrong headed arepermitted to err therein : provided that members of-the public abstainfrom imputing improper motives to those taking part in the administra-tion of justice, and are genuinely exercising a right of criticism, andnot acting in malice or attempting to impair the administration of'justice, they are immune.” Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidadand Tobago 1.
While there is no question that judges and courts are open to criticism,there is no longer any room for doubt that scandalising a judge is punish-able as a tfiontraapt. Ail argument that no such branch of the law ofcontempt existed in this country was rejected by a Bench of three Judgesin the case of Armand de Souza 2.“ Any act done or writing published
calculated to bring a Court or a judge of the Court into contempt, orto lower his authority, is a contempt of Court Reg. v. Gray2. Theobject of this branch of the law, of course, is not the protection of thepersonal reputation of judges but the protection of the authority of thecourts, which must be preserved in the interests of the community.It is therefore no less an offence to scandalise the judiciary generallythan to scandalise the judge or judges of a particular court. No personwho may have been persuaded by the respondent’s speech to accept theviews he expressed about the judiciary could continue to have confidencein the impartiality of the courts of justice, and in particular of thecourts in the city of Galle.
For these reastins we convicted the respondent of the offence withwhich he was charged, and we sentenced him to six weeks simpleimprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 or a further term of six weeks simpleimprisonment in default of payment.
The learned Solicitor-General brought to our notice a previous con-viction of the respondent on a charge of disaffection laid against himunder the Defence (Miscellaneous) Regulations, 1939. That was aconviction in 1940, and we did no* take it into account in sentencing therespondent for the present offence. On the other hand, we did not findit possible to regard his expression of regret as a sufficient apology forhis offence.*'
Gratiaen J.—I agree.
JPuxi/e J.—I agree.’
"Rule made absolute.
1 [1936] A. C. 322 at 335.* (1914) 18 N. L. R. 33.» [1900] 2 Q. B. 36.