IRANGANIE BOANGE, Appellant, and C. V. UDALAGAMA, Respondent

096-NLR-NLR-V-57-IRANGANIE-BOANGE-Appellant-and-C.-V.-UDALAGAMA-Respondent.pdf

1955Present : Gratiaen, J., and Swan, J,IHAXG;VNIE B0AXG13, Appellant-, and C. V. UDALAGAMA,Respondent
,b'. C. 4-1-1—D. C. Kcyulfe, 7,873
Lircuch oj jiromisc uj mnrriuyc—'* If ritten promise*—Itoti'rif us condition—Quun/umoj evidence—Jfurrittyc Jicyistrullon Ordhmiicc [f.'nji./ft (-7).
Aa action for damages for breach of promise of marriago lies if, in a lettermltlrcsscij by the ilefemJant to the plaintiff,' there is either conlirination or atleast an unqualified admission of a subsisting oral promise of marriage.
Where there is a written promiso to marry, the parly who made the promiseis not entitled to l-osiie from it on (ho ground that a dowry, which both partieshad conl-dcntly antic-iputod but was not a condition to the promise, was nod.settled ir. itue course.
J^LPPiOAL. from a judgment of the District Court, Kcgalle.
A marriage had been “ arranged ” for tlie plaintiff and the defendantby their respective parents according to Kandyan custom. The terms ofthe contemplated marriage so arranged between the respective parentsacting through an intermediary were that a dowry of Rs. 5,000 in cashand 5 acres of tea were to be given over to the intended bride by herfather on the day of the betrothal ceremony. The defendant wasaware of the terms agreed upon by the parents. The plaintiff also,according to the conclusion of the learned trial Judge, “did acquaintherself at an early stage of the proceedings with the dowry she was to get ”.
Sooji after Ihe aforementioned transaction between their parents, theplaintiff and defendant met each other frequently and wrote letters. Onequestion in the present action for damages for breach of promise ofmarriage was whether one of the letters written by the defendantestablished a “ written ju-omisc ” to marry within the meaning of theproviso to section 19 (3) of the Marriage Registration Ordinance. Theevidence disclosed that the defendant had informed the plaintiff's fatherthat if the dowry was not given before May 21, 1951 (the date fixed forthe betrothal ceremony), “ the marriage was off”. The plaintiff’s fatherdid not make over the dowry on or before that- date. The defendant-,however, admitted that the first occasion on which this “ condition ”imposing a time limit for the dowry was communicated by him to theplaintiff’s father was at a time subsequent to the date of the defendant’sletter which, it was submitted .on behalf of the plaintiff, constituted awritten promise to many.' Further, the new ‘‘condition” imposed bythe defendant on the plaintiff’s father was not communicated to tlieplaintiff herself.
C. Thiagalingam, Q.C., with I. Misso and A. Nayendra, for the plaintiffappellant. ' ^ '
G. Wikramanayakc, Q.C., with II. IT. Jaycicurdcnc, Q.G., J. AFernandopulle, P. Jiunasinyhe, II'. Wickratuasinghc and Day a Pcrcrafor the defendant respondent.
Cur. adv. vult.
November 25, 1955. Ghatiaex, J.;—
This is an action for breach of promise of marriage. The parties arewell-educated Kandyan gentlefolk, and each of them is the child of pa rentswho hold conservative ideas on the subject of marriage. The plaintiff,who was born in 1930, had done very well at Hill wood School in Kandyfrom which she passed out in 1949 as Head Girl after a good scholastic-career. It is common ground that she is a well-mannered, good-lookingyoung lady of unC|iiestioiiable good character.
The defendant was enrolled as an Advocate of the Supreme Court-in 1914, and within five years had established himself in a promisingprofessional practice at Kegalle. In 1949, his father, a retired Govern-ment servant, decided that the time had arrived to “arrange” a suitablemarriage for the young man, who was then about 31 years of age. Theprocedure which Mr. Udalagama senior proposed to follow in thisconnection is best explained in his own words :
“ Among the class of persons to whom I belong, marriages come aboutin this way ; we ordinarily send a man lust, and lie speaks to the parentsof the girl and finds out whether the proposal would be accepted.Thereafter a day is fixed and the father goes there and negotiations arecarried on. The first thing in my case is the dowry. I will tell youthe reason: I have been so many years in t lie Government Service,and if the dowry is not properly fixed, the result is in the DivorceCourts. Once the dowry is finalised, a visit is made, and they visitus and a da}' is fixed. As a matter of fact, in arranged marriages,young couples arc not in any way consulted because the parents knowwhom their sons should marry. ”
One gathers from the evidence that, after the dowry has been “ finalised ”,a formal betrothal ceremony takes place on an auspicious day in thepresence of the- close relatives of both families : tlie intended bridegroomputs a chain round the neck of the intended bride, and she in turn giveshim a ring. Thereafter the young couple (being virtually strangers).arc given some latitude to get to know each other; in due course themarriage ceremony takes place.
Negotiations on these lines were initiated by Mr. Udalagama seniorwith the wealthy parents of a young Kandyan girl whose name wasdisclosed at the trial. A considerable dowry was “ finalised ”, and 24thNovember 1949 was fixed for the betrothal ceremony or, as some witnessescalled it the formal engagement Hut shortly before that date, thedefendant saw the girl for the first time and persuaded his father to dis-continue tlie negotiations : he apparently considered her ill-favoured andinsufficiently educated. Accordingly, Mr. Udalagama senior wrote aletter to the-girl's father on 101 It November 1949 postponing the ceremonyon some shadowy pretext, and requesting that no further preparations
bc in;nIo “ unlil 3-011 hear from me again The request was understoodin the spirit in which it was intended. The matter was dropped, presum-ably without ill-will on either side. Let it be recorded to the credit ofthe procedure adopted that no hearts were broken on that occasion.
Very soon afterwards, Mrs. Xnnda Udalagama (who was related to bothllie plaintiff and the defendant) wrote to him from Kandy inviting himto call on her as she thought she had found a more suitable “ match ”for him. It was on this occasion that the defendant first saw the plaintiff,and he later indicated that he was “ interested ”. Xarnla made certaintentative proposals to the plaintiff’s father (Mr. Boange) without success.Kventually, the defendant invoked the more mature advocacy of hissister-in-law Mrs. C. H. Udalagama who agreed to help, having firstobtained the consent of Mr. Udalagama senior. In due course, as theresult of negotiations carried on primarily through Mrs. C. H. Udalagama,the parents on both sides agreed that the plaintiff should be “ givenin marriage” to the defendant. The horoscopes were compared withfavourable results and, after some haggling, the floury wax finalised ”at Its. 5,000 in cash and 5 acres of tea. 'The significant reduction in the.amount of the dowry stipulated in this case (i.e., from about 2 or 5 lakhsto about Rs. 10,000) is perhaps the best indication of the assessment bythe Udalagamas of the plaintiff’s suitability as a wife for the youngAdvocate who had by now applied for appointment as a member of theCeylon Judicial Service.■■
The terms of the contemplated marriage so arranged between therespective parents acting through an intermediary need to be elaborateda little further. Mr. Udalagama senior had first consented to the dowrybeing made over to the intended bride after the wedding, but it was laterstipulated that it should be given on the day of the betrothal ceremony.Mrs. C. H'. Udalagama, whose evidence was accepted by the learned trialJudge as true on all material issues, explained that the defendant waswell aware of the terms agreed upon by the parents ; the plaintiff, on theother hand, “ did not know anything : it is not usual to talk to the girlabout- dowry matters. ” She was certainly not a party to the agreement,but I accept, for the purposes of my decision, the conclusion of the learnedJudge that she “ did acquaint herself at an early stage of the proceedingswith the dowry she was to get. ”
expressing a feat- Hint “ if we have, it in May, he (her father) may delayover the wedding This plea was ignored by the defendant. Theevidence which tlie learned Judge has accepted is to the effect that, inselecting 21st May for the betrothal ceremony, the defendant orallvexplained to Mrs. C. H. Udalagama and later to Mr. Boangc himself, wliovisited him at Point Pedro on 20th April, that if tlie dowry was not givenbefore that particular date, “ t lie marriage was off5'. The defendantadmits that this was the first occasion on which this condition precedentwas imposed by him and communicated to Mr. Boangc.
The. defendant seems to have suspected that Mr. Boangc would notmake over the. promised dowry before the stipulated (late, and secret Ivcommunicated his prophecy to his father in a letter dated 7th May 19.71.“ Hence ”, he advised, “ without kicking up a row, slowly drop it ; keepeverything to yourself, and communicate everything only with me..‘Don’t tell anyone anything, even those at home for they cannot keeptheir tongues quiet ”. One gathers from this attitude that the defendant,knowing Mr. Boange’s tendency to procrastination, was not averse toconsidering himself released from his obligation to marry the plaintiff.A week later he wrote another letter to his father in the same strain, andraised the question of an alternative plan for marriage. “ If some otherproposition is to be arranged, ” he said, “ I want a minimum dowry ofRs. 25,000. The. girl must be educated, good-looking, respectable andyoung …. Please keep anything you do to yourself and me. ”
As prophesied, Mr. Bonnge did not make over the dowry on or beforethe 21st- May 1051. In the result, the defendant adopted the attitude(which was not, however, notified to the plaintiff) that he was again freeto enter the '‘arranged marriage” market-; and his father, unknown toother members of the family circle, made discreet inquiries for anothercandidate answering to the description given in the defendant’s letterdated 14th May. On this occasion, everything went smoothly andaccording to plan. On or about 20th July 1951 a marriage was arrangedwith the parents of Miss JCugawcla. But the present action relates tothe mutual promises which, according to the plaintiff, were contempor-aneously but independently made by herself and the defendant to marryeach other. She alleges that in or about August 1951 the defendant wrong-fully repudiated his personal promise to many her and she claimedKs. 20,000 as damages on this account.
The defendant, who had married Miss Xugawela before he filed hisanswer, pleaded by way of defence that he at no time made any promise,orally or in writing, to marry the plaintiff. His position was that he hadmerely " intimated ” (whether to Mr. Bonnge or to the plaintiff was notexpressly stated in his pleadings) that he “ would be willing to becomeengaged to or to promise to marry flic plaintiff in a certain eventualitywhich did not arise.
In the sharp conflict of testimony which characterised a protractedand bitterly contested trial, the learned Judge was called upon to decidewhether the young couple, quite independently of the transactions whichtook place between their parents, had in fact hound themselves by mutualprom isos to marry one anol her ; and if.so, whether t he defendant’s promise
had been made “ in writing ” within the meaning of the proviso to section19 (3) of the Marriage Registration Ordinance (Cap. 95). In the absence-of such writing, of course, the claim for damages would not be enforceable.
For the puiposes of our decision we must be guided generally by thelearned trial Judge’s findings of fact, based on his assessment of thecredibility of witnesses. What is the effect of the evidence which thelearned trial Judge believed ?'
It would ajjpear that, shortly after the plaintiff left school, she waspersuaded early in 1950 by Mrs. C. H. Udalagama to accept an appoint-ment as a teacher in a well-known Government school in Kegalle, of whichMrs. Udalagama was the Principal. Tentative arrangements had alsobeen made for the plaintiff to attend a school in Colombo in May 1950with a view to offering herself as a candidate for the University Entranceexamination.
During the first school term of 1950 the plaintiff resided at the teachers*hostel at Kegalle, visiting Mr. and Mrs. C. H. Udalagama's home duringthe week ends. But from about May 1950 she stayed with this couple _in their bungalow opposite that in which the defendant lived with hisfather. By this time, the dowry conditions agreed upon between theparents had been “finalised ” and Mr. Boange had been invited to fix thebetrothal ceremony ‘'for any date convenient to him ” (Pll). On 15thJune 1950 formal visits between the families were also exchanged.
It was now confidently assumed by everyone that the marriage betweenthe young couple, as arranged bet ween their respective parents, would takeplace in due course. Pending that anticipated event, the plaintiff con-tinued to be a school teacher at Kegalle, having abandoned the idea ofentering the University for higher studies. And, from this point of time,the plaintiff and the defendant, who met frequently at the home ofMr. and Mrs. G. H. Udalagama, fell violently in love with each other. Theromantic courtship which followed, though perfectly proper and honour-able according to modern standards of behaviour, was apparently con-trary to what is expected in conservative Kand3ran circles from youngpersons who are not 3-et “ formally engaged ”. Mrs. C. H. Udalagamatook the matter up with the defendant who, being an Advocate of 6 3'earsstanding, was in a better position to understand the delicacy ofthe situation than «a girl w ho had just left school. Mrs. C. H. Udalagama’sversion of this conversation is to the following effect :
“ I thought Teddy (i.e. the defendant) should not come so oftento my house. I thought there should be a formal engagement beforeTedd3r continued to meet the plaintiff so frequently^ in my house.Tedd3r replied ‘ You need not mistrust me’. I understood by that thathe would not let down the girl. ”
Mrs. Udalagama accepted the defendant’s assurance as to his intentions,which were certainly quite honourable at that stage. The 3?oung couplecontinued to meet regularly on this basis throughout the rest of the 3’ear1950, and, indeed, until the defendant left Kegalle at the end of February1951 in order to take up his first Judicial appointment in Point Pedro.
. The learned Judge was satisfied that during the period May 1950 toFebruary 1951, many acts of endearment passed between them; the defend-ant gave her presents (all of which she produced at the trial) ; they pro-mised eternal loyalty to one another, and discussed their plans for theirfuture happiness together as man and wife.
The defendant denied that he had given the young lady the presentsreferred to, or that any “ acts of endearment ” had taken place betweenthem. He was disbelieved on these points and considerable significanceshould be attached to these false denials. It suffices only to quote hisown words of explanation :
Q.—“ Why didn’t you give her presents ? ”
A.—“ Because there was no formal engagement.”
The inference to be drawn from these denials is to my mind irresistible.The defendant was well aware that much that had taken place (thoughperfectly innocent) in anticipation of the betrothal ceremony would beregarded in the conservative society to which he belonged as appropriateonly to couples who were in fact bound to one another by mutual promisesof marriage. Having regard to the evidence which the learned trialJndire has accepted, it is purposeless to speculate further as to whether thedefendant had “ in so many words ” promised to marry the girl. Theproved conduct and behaviour of these two young persons towards oneanother establishes more convincingly' than any' “express words” whichpassed between them that they' now regarded themselves as solemnlyengaged to be married.
Let it be said in fairness to the defendant that this conclusion is far morefavourable to his sense of honour than tlie inference which he himself hadinvited the Court to draw from his own version of the facts. He admittedin re-examination that he had no doubt in his own mind at any' time ofhis courtship that the marriage “ arranged ” by the parents would ulti-mately' materialise. It occurred to nobody that Mr. Boange (unwisely,as tilings turned out) insisted on postponing the betrothal ceremonyuntil he had renovated his house so as to entertain his guests on a farmore lavish scale than was necessary. The learned Judge’s theory' thatthe defendant had merely' agreed to marry the plaintiff “ subject to thecondition that the promised dowry would be provided ” is unacceptablefor more than one reason. In the first place, this was not the defendant’scase. In the second place, the theory was categorically put to him in thewitness box, and he repudiated it:
Q.—“Did you make it clear to the plaintiff that you would marry her.only if you got the dowry' } ”
A.—'“No. ”
Finally he admitted that the purported imposition of a condition as tothe settlement of dowry did not arise until the end of April 1951 :
Q.—“ Did you ever tell Mr. Boange or his wife that unless the dowrywas given by a particular date the marriage was off ? ”
A. ■—“ I told Boange. ”
Q.—“ When ? ”
.4.—st When he came to see meal Point Pedro (i.e. on 20th April 1951)
I am perfectly satisfied that long before 1st March 1951 the defendant hadon many occasions promised the plaintifFat Kegalle that he would marryher, and that she in turn -promised to marry him. The promises werenot conditional but were made at a time when both parties confidentlyanticipated that the dowry Mould be settled in due course. In otherM ords, they agreed to marry when (and not if) the dowry was forthcoming ;and the question of cither party being free to resile from the engagementM'as neither discussed nor contemplated. There is no doubt that by theend of 1950 they M ere gron'ing increasingly impatient-over Mr. Boange’sdelay. But they still regarded the ultimate implementation of his partof the bargain uith Mr. Udalagama senior as certain. It is in this contextthat one must examine the letters D7, D8 and PI which were relied on bythe plaintiff as constituting a “ written promise ” sufficient to support thepresent action.
The plaintiff had returned to her parents’ home for the Christmas .holidays, and she kept her promise to «*rite to the defendant M'ho remainedat Kegalle but Mas himself expecting to visit Xu war a Eliya for a fen- days.This correspondence is the best evidence of the state of mind of the partiesand of their sincerity at the time. In 1)7 dated ISth December 1950she n-rites :
It has always been my one idea to love only one. Take my n'ordfor it. I am not a person who is easily tempted. I have aluays aimedat having a pure character and you can be sure that in rain or sunshineI will stand by you till the end of my life. It -was my ambition to find aman too uith a pure character and I have found it in you. Thereforedon't fear. I will always be faithful to you, my darling. ”
To this part of the letter the defendant replied as follows in PI of 21stDecember :
" Girlie dear, I have been missing A'ou very badly these days. Indeedthe evenings are very dull and boring uithout you …. I ammuch thankful to you and for the kind thoughts you have been thinkingabout me. Girlie, I don't think I need repeat all what you. have writtento me, because I feel just the same way as you. have explained. I canassure you that all the expectations and the dream-s you have of your futurewill not be in vain ; you can confidently hope. The sooner it is the belter,
I think. ”
The defendant’s suggestion that these words of reply, read in conjunctionM-ith M'hat the plaintiff had written, should be construed as a mere “ inti-mation that he M ould be M illing to be engaged to, or promise to marry theplaintiff if and when the (father’s) agreement M-ith regard to the dourywas finalised ” "was quite fanciful. I find myself equally unconvinced bythe learned Judge’s theory that the promise of marriage contained in PIMas unenforceable because it Mas qualified by a condition Avhich has notbeen satisfied.""'
Does PI, read in conjunction with tlie letters D7 and DS, constitute a.“ written promise ” within the meaning of the proviso to section 19 (3) ?The Ordinance does not declare that oral promises of marriage are nulland void ; it merely renders them unenforceable unless they be evidencedin writing. The object is to avoid the risk of vexatious actions based onperjured testimony. The earlier authorities of this Court were all dis-cussed during the argument, and it is settled law that an action for damageslies if, in a letter addressed by the defendant to the plaintiff, there is eitherconfirmation or at least an unqualified admission of a subsisting andbinding oral promise of marriage. This is the effect of Jayasinghe v.Percra, Missi Nona v. Arnolis , and Karunauathie v. U'imalasuriya 3.The letter PI completely satisfies this minimum test.
After the letter PI was written, the young couple met frequently inKegalle. She accepted an invitation from his parents to join them andthe rest of the family in celebrating his appointment to the Judicial Service,and, as Mrs. C. H. Udalagama explained, everybody present “ consideredher as the person whom Teddy was going to marry ”.
The relationship in March 1951 between the newly-appointed Magistrateof Point Pedro (aged 33) and the young school teacher of Kegalle (aged 21)was perfectly clear. A marrige had been “ arranged ” for them by theirrespective parents according to Kandyan custom ; at the same time therewas a subsisting private agreement whereby they were pledged to becomeman and wife. On 6th' March 1951 he -wrote from Point Pedroprofessing his love for her, and expressing the wish that she should visithim during her Easter vacation chaperoned by his brother and sister-in-law. She replied confirming how much she missed his companionship,and mentioning that she had summoned sufficient courage to persuadeher father to fix tentative dates in April and May for the betrothal cere-mony. She expressed a personal preference for April 11th, and promisedthat if he agreed to that date “ I will see that we get married soon …
. If April is convenient for you, why not have it then ? In any caseinyour next letter to me please let me know about your arrangements. ”
The defendant’s reply' of 16tli March evaded this special recpiest andmerely' stated that he was expecting a letter from Mrs. C. H. Udalagama-on the subject. However, he indicated that he would not be able to leavePoint Pedro during the Easter vacation, and hoped that she wouldaccompany' the C- H. Udalagamas on their visit to him in April.
This was the last letter which the defendant wrote to his fiancee. Hedid not directly' communicate with her regarding t lie fresh condition which(so he says) he had subsequently imposed on Mr. Bonnge to the effect thatthe marriage would not take place unless the dowry was deposited before21st May' ; nor did he give her the slightest indication that he had in anti-cipation advised his father “ slowly ” to let the matter drop. This be-haviour would have been less inexcuseablc if his obligations towards thegirl were regulated solely' by the terms of a “ quasi-c-ommereial ” contractarrived at for his benefit between his parents and hers. But, examined
in the light of his commitments voluntarily undertaken under a privateagreement with the young lady herself, his behaviour deviated from acourse of conduct which had previously been honourable. He gave theplaintiff no opportunity to exercise her personal influence over her fatherto deposit the cash and the title deeds before 21st May. His sister-in-law,who had been the intermediary in the dowry arrangements, was also keptin the dark as to the new plans which were on foot—so much so that evenin August 1951 Mrs. C. H. Udalagama re-assured the girl concerningrumours that the defendant was now contemplating marriage to Miss.Xugawela.
In August 1951, the defendant received three letters from the plaintiffwhich admittedly led him to realise that she was heartbroken by his-silence. He ignored them all. Mr. Boange’s letters to the effect that thehouse would soon be ready for the betrothal ceremony, and that the dowrywould be made over, were treated with equal discourtesy. In September,he became formally engaged to another lady and a few months later hemarried her. This was an unequivocal repudiation of the solemn promiseof marriage which he had given to the plaintiff. In her shame andhumiliation, she left Kcgalle and returned to her parents’ home. He hadirrevocably put it out of his power to redeem his pledge, and the plaintiff’scause of action was complete.
The. learned Judge seems to have taken a most unfavourable view ofMr. Boange’s conduct. But the gentleman concerned was not a witnessin the ease, and the plaintiff did not need to call him to rebut an issue asto whether the defendant’s personal promise to marry the plaintiff wasqualified by any conditions. Mor was the question raised as to whether areasonable time for implementing the dowry arrangements had elapsedso as to release the defendant from his obb'gations. The plaintiff’sobjections to the admissibility of certain statements alleged to have beenmade by Mr. Boangc were over-ruled on the ground that he was her agentwith implied authority to make admissions that bound her under sectionIS of the Evidence Ordinance. I really cannot understand how anythingthat Mr. Boange said or did could fairly be construed to have any bearingon the terms of a private contract of which he was completely unaware.
Let it be recorded in fairness both to Mr. Boange and to Mr. Udalagamasenior that neither parent had the slightest idea that, apart from the“ arranged marriage ” which they had negotiated, the young couple hadindependently pledged themselves to marry one another. If the parentshad realised this, I do not doubt that Mr. Boange, out of respect for hisdaughter’s feelings, would have ceased to dawdle over the arrangementsfor the betrothal ceremony ; nor would Mr. Udalagama senior, mindfulof his son’s honour, have countenanced the suggestion that he shoulddrop the matter “ slowly ” as he did. Perhaps the most reprehensibleaspect of the defendant’s conduct was that he kept both parents inignorance of the extent to which he had personally committed himself andcompromised the girl. These conservative gentlemen did not know thathe was no longer in a position, either in law or indecency, to back out ofthe marriage “ arranged ” for him without committing a breach of hisprivate obligations.
The defendant did not inform the plaintiff after 20th April 1051 of thonew “ condition ” that “ time was of the essence of the contract As amatter of law, this uncommunicated stipulation did not bind her.
On the issue as to damages, the learned Judge considered that theamount to be awarded the plaintiff should not exceed Us. 5,000 in theevent of his decision on the other issues being set aside by this Court.I take the view that this amount is in no way excessive if one takes intoaccount only the personal unhappiness that has been caused to her by thedefendant’s later conduct in repudiating his obligations (honourablyundertaken in the first instance) without so much as an expression ofregret for what he had done. At the trial, she was publicly cross-examined on the basis of his instructions that she was a liar and a “ gold-digger ”. To his knowledge, she deserved neither condemnation. Iwould allow the appeal and enter judgment for the plaintiff for Its. 5,000with costs in both Courts.
Swax, J.—I agree.
Appeal allowed ~
I now proceed to relate the history of “ the arranged marriage ” amiits ultimate frustration. Formal visits between the two parties werepaid and returned. In flue course, “ experts ” were again consulted foradvice as to the selection of alternative auspicious times and dates in •April and Ma}1- 1951 for the customary betrothal ceremony. Two datesin April and three in the following month were submitted on 15th March1951 to the defendant who by then had assumed duties as Magistrate ofPoint Pedro. He chose the latest- point of time suggested, namely,
“ C.01 a.m. on 21st May 1951 ”, which, according to the editor of theephemeris almanac maintained by a school of astrology at Peradeniya,was “ auspicious for exchange of rings ”. The plaintiff had herselfwritten.to the defendant on 6th March 1951 pleading that he should .select an earlier but equally auspicious date, namely, lltli April, and ’