113-NLR-NLR-V-71-K.-CHELLIAH-and-others-Appellants-and-INSPECTOR-OF-POLICE-RATNAPURA-Responde.pdf
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Chelliah v. Inspector of Police, Satnapura
1967Present: Siva Supramanlam, J.X. CHELLIAH and others, Appellants, and INSPECTOR OP POLICE,RATNAPURA, RespondentS. C. 1147-114911966—M.C. Eatnapura, 4590
•Criminal Procedure Coder—Section 152 (3)—Indictable offence—Power of Magistrateto try it summarily—Scope.
Where a Magistrate assumes Bummary jurisdiction in terms of section152 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code in respect of an indictable offence,the jurisdiction, once it has been properly entered upon, is not affectedmerely because the facts and law are found later to have assumed acomplicated character.
19 j 9) 61 N. Dt^$5.
SIVA SUFRAMANIAM, J.—CheUiah v. Inspector of Police, Ratnapura 666
Appeal from a judgment of the Magistrate’s Court, Ratnapura.
M. M. KumaraJeviasingham, with S. Sinnatamby, for the 1st accused-appellant.
8. Sinnatamby, for the 2nd and 3rd accused-appellants.
W.K. Premaratne, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
February 28, 1967. Siva Sppbamaniam, J.—
The three appellants and another were charged with having dishonestlyretained eleven milla logs valued at Rs. 474'91 property in the possessionof the Divisional Forest Officer, Ratnapura, knowing or having reasonto believe the same to be stolen property and thereby having committedan offence punishable under s. 394 of the Ceylon Penal Code. Aftertrial, the appellants were convicted of the offence and each of them wassentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year. The 4th accused was’ acquitted.
The offence was triable by a District Court by reason of the fact thatthe value of the stolen property exceeded Rs. 200. The learned Magistratetried the case summarily under S. 162 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code.Learned Counsel for the appellants strongly urged that the convictionsshould be set aside as the case was one in which non-summary proceedingsshould have been taken and the accused persons tried on an indictment.They submitted that the assumption of jurisdiction under S. 152 (3) wasimproper.
The reasons given by the learned Magistrate for his opinion that thethe offence may properly be tried summarily were as follows.:—
“ (1) Facts simple. (2) No complicated points of. law.
(3) Expeditious trial ”.
Learned Counsel submitted that the reasons did not bear examinationas (a) the facts of the case as unfolded at the trial relating to the.identification of the accused as well as to the identification of the logswere by no means simple, (6) there arose questions of law as to whetherthe principal witnesses were accomplices or not, and (c) there was noexpeditious trial as the hearing which commenced on 4th May 1965 was• not concluded until 24th March 1966. While there is much force in thesubmissions of learned Counsel, the question for determination in appeal iswhether at the stage at which the learned Magistrate assumed jurisdictionunder S.-152 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code, such assumption ofjurisdiction was unwarranted. The learned Magistrate recorded the evidenceof certain witnesses on 1st December 1964 and 12th January 1965 beforehe decided to hear the case summarily. The accused were represented bya lawyer on both dates. There was no submission made to the Magistrateeither by the prosecution or bui^ie defence that the case was not one which43-PP 006137 (98/08)
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Navaratnam v. Sabapathy
may properly be tried summarily. Had the value of the logs been lessthan Rs. 200 the offence was one within the summary jurisdiction of theMagistrate’s Court. The summary jurisdiction was ousted only becausethe value was Rs. 474*91. On an examination of the evidence recordedby the Magistrate on 1.12.64 and 12.1.651 am satisfied that the assumptionof jurisdiction under S. 152 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code was notunwarranted.
I agree, with respect, with the opinion expressed by Pulle J. inSelvaratnam v. Piyasena (S. C. No. 503 of 1952, M. C. Colombo 20904)* that a jurisdiction, once properly entered upon, is not affected merelybecause the facts and law are found later to have assumed a complicatedcharacter. T. S. Fernando J. expressed the same view in the case ofKhan v. Ariyadasa1 where he stated: “ The question whether jurisdictionhas been properly assumed in terms of section 152 (3) must be judged onthe facts and circumstances as known to the Magistrate at the time thequestion came on to be decided by him and not by what may havehappened at the trial at a point of time after he had decided thatquestion. ” That the facts turned out to be complicated at the trialdoes not affect the validity of the assumption of the jurisdiction underS. 152 (3). The submissions of learned Counsel on this point thereforefail.
Learned Counsel also pointed out certain infirmities in the evidence ofsome of the witnesses called by the prosecution and urged that the evidencewas not sufficient to establish the guilt, at least of the 1st accused-appellant, beyond reasonable doubt. I haye carefully examined the wholeof the evidence led at the trial and I am satisfied on that evidence thatall the appellants are guilty of the charge and that there has been nomiscarriage of justice by reason of a summary trial.
I dismiss the appeals.
Appeals dismissed.