062-NLR-NLR-V-58-K.-SUBRAMANIAM.-Appellant-and-ARIYA-PERERA-S.-I.-Police-Respondent.pdf
1956Present:L. W. tie Silva, A.J.
K. S [RPR AM ANT AM, Appellant, and ARIYA PERERA(S. I. Police), Respondent
S. C. GS1—M. C. Jaffna, S.-13S
Immigrants and Emigrants Ad, Vo. 20 oj JO IS— Section 75 (/) (r), as amended bys. 20 (!) of Act Vo. 1C of J9-50—Difference between “ transports ” and causesto be transported. ”.
A person would be guilty of “ transporting ” an illegal immigrant within lhomeaning of section 45 (1) (c) of the Immigrants and Emigrants Act if, withguilty knowledge, ho personally takes an illegal immigrant in a ear, althoughllio car is a borrowed one and the drivers services hnvo been hired.
pi-MOAT. from a jmJgtucnl of the 3I.igi.slrate’s Court, Jaffna.
(foiein Ji. de Silva, with M. JI. Ivuutarukulasinyham and AI. L. de Silva,for l lie accused-appellant.
T. A. tie S. I~ijcsundtru, Crown Counsel, for the Attorney-General.
Cur. adv. vult.
November 21, 1956. L. W. de Su.va, A.J.—
The appellant was charged with having commit ted an offence punishableunder section 45 (1) (c) of the Immigrants and Emigrants Act Xo. 20 of194S as amended by section 20 (i) of the Act Xo. 16 of 1955 in that lie hadtransported by car, on 23rd *3Iarch 1956, at Xavaly North, a certainIndian immigrant named Pichchai Kannu Devar, knowing or havingl-casonable grounds for knowing that the said Devar had entered Ceylonin contravention of these Acts. The amended section is as follows :—
“ Any person who conceals or harbours any other person in anyplace whatsoever, or transports any other person or causes any otherperson to be transported by any means whatsoever, or employs any otherperson, knowing or having reasonable grounds for knowing thatsuch other person has entered Ccj'lonoris remaining in Ceylon in con-travention of any provision of tin's Act or of any Order or regulationmade thereunder, shall be guilty of an offence under this Act, ” etc.
After trial, the 3Iagistratc convicted the appellant and sentenced himto a period of three months rigorous imprisonment. At the hearing ofthis appeal, learned Counsel for the appellant accepted the findingsof the 3ragistratc but sought to find a loophole of escape on a point whichhad not been raised in the court below. Shortly stated, learned Counseldrew a distinction between transporting a person and causing a personto be transported, and contended that the appellant was entitled to beacquitted since, according to the evidence, the appellant had not trails-*ported the Indian immigrant but had caused him to be transported bycar, and the charge should have been framed accordingly.
There is no doubt that the section draws a distinction between a persontransporting another and a person who is responsible for the transport.Two different relationships arc contemplated and ta o different ways ofcommitting the offence arc indicated in the enactment. But one whoprovides another with means of transport cannot be said to “ cause ”that other to be transported. He merely enables him to transport.But, to cause a thing to be done is the same thing as to be its causa causa us.
In my opinion, it is in this sense that the expression “ causes any otherperson to be transported ” has been used in the Act. The facts establishedby the prosecution in this case show that the appellant had not onlyborrowed the car on a false pretext, but travelled in it himself and had itdriven to the place where certain illegal immigrants were, including Devar.
It was the appellant who pointed out the place to the car driver, and got
the immigrants into the car at two different stages of the journey, andalso pointed out the place to which they were taken. The various items*of evidence, taken cumulatively, j’i'ove that the appellant, while beingpresent at every stage, was the person who did in fact use the car withguilty knowledge to transport the illegal immigrant named in the charge.It was an occasion on which the car driver’s services were hired by theappellant who did the transporting in person. The man who physicallypropelled the vehicle thus enabled the appellant to transport the illegalimmigrant. This is not a case where the appellant caused him to betransported. I am of the opinion that the charge was correctly framed.The conviction and sentence arc therefore affirmed, and the appeal isdismissed.
ppeal dismissed.