116-NLR-NLR-V-48-KANGASABAI-Appellant-and-CANAGARATNAM-Respondent.pdf
Kanagasabai v. Canagaratnam.
355
1947Present: Dias J.
KANGASABAI, Appellant, and CANAGARATNAM, Respondent.
S. C. 432—M. C. Matale, 8,059.
Housing and Town Improvement Ordinance—Building operation—Conversioninto dwelling house—Section 6 (2) (g).
The “ alteration ” contemplated by section 6 (2) (g) of the Housing andTown Improvement Ordinance is the conversion into a dwelling houseof a building which up to that time had not been used as a humanhabitation.
». (1920) 22 N. L. R. at p. 158.a (1935) 36 N. L. R. 442.
• (1926) 28 N. L. R. at p. 63.1 (1927) 5 T. L. R. 11.
» (1932) 12 C. L. See. atp. 28.
356DIAS J.—Kanagasabcti v. Canagaratnam.
^^PPEAL against a conviction from the Magistrate’s Court, Matale.
H. W. Tambiah, for the accused, appellant.
No appearance for the complainant, respondent.June 27, 1947. Dias J.—
Cur. adv. wit.
The appellant was permitted by the local authority to build a garageon his land. It was an affair of clay and cadjans and was not intended tobe used as a human habitation. The appellant, however, rented that shedto Selliah as a dwelling place. It is alleged that thereafter the appellantauthorised Selliah to fix a jute hessian curtain or screen to two reepersat the two ends of the room which was thereby converted into two parts.Selliah lived in one part and sold vegetables in the other. WheneverSelliah wanted to go from one part of the room to the other, he crawledunder the jute hessian curtain.
The appellant has been convicted and sentenced to pay a fine ofRs. 100 under section 13 of the Housing and Town ImprovementOrdinance (Chap. 199) for contravening the provisions of section 6 (2) (g)of that Ordinance. The only relevant portions of section 13 underwhich the appellant could be convicted appear to be section 13 (1) (c)for executing “ a building operation ” in contravention of section 6 (2) (g)or under section 13 (1) (f) for causing Selliah to do so. I doubt whetherthe act of affixing a jute hessian screen to two reepers inside a roomcan be described as a “ building operation ” within the meaning ofsection 13—see the observations of Poyser J. in Nesaduray v. Appuhamy
Section 6 (1) provides that no persons shall make an “ alteration ”in any building within local limits without the written consent of theChairman. For the purpose of section 6 and the connected sections,section 6 (2) defines the word “ alteration ” to mean inter alia “ theconversion into a dwelling house of any building not originallyconstructed for human habitation ”—section 6 (2) (g).
Can the act of Selliah, whether authorised thereto by the appellant ornot, be called the conversion into a dwelling house of this shed, whichat that time was being used by Selliah as his residence ? The word“ convert ” means to change a thing from one state to a different state.When one speaks of the conversion of a sinner, or the conversion of thequadrangle of the Courts into a set of chambers, we imply that the laststate of the sinner and the quadrangle are changed from their previousstate into something different. If the state remains unchanged there isno “ conversion ”.
This shed was not originally constructed for human habitation. Theconversion took place when the appellant rented that shed to Selliahto serve as a human habitation. It is impossible to say that when thejute hessian screen was affixed there was any further conversion of theshed into a dwelling house because it was that already. When the screen
1 (1935) 14 C. L. Bee. at p. 197.
Ehiya Lebbe v. A. Majeed.
35?
was affixed there was a converson of part of the dwelling house of Selliahinto a vegetable boutique, but I cannot hold that this amounts to a breachof section 6 (2) (g) which says nothing about converting a building into ashop or place of trade.
I am of opinion that section 6 (2) (g) has in view the doing of somework—some building operation—which results in the alteration or con-version into a dwelling house, of a building which up to that time was notused as a human habitation—see the observations of Fernando J. inNesaduray v. Amarasinghe If before that work or building operationw.as done the building had, in fact, been used as a human habitation,the doing of that work does not convert that building into what it alreadywas.
It is extremely doubtful that Selliah, who had taken this shed as thetenant of the appellant, would have asked his permission to affix a jutehessian screen to two reepers.
I do not think this charge can be maintained. It may be that theappellant committed some offence when he rented the shed to Selliahto serve as a human- habitation, but that is not the charge against him.
I set aside the conviction and acquit the accused.
Conviction set aside.